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Abstract 
Established in December 1990, the Hospital Authority (HA) applied the new 
public management QSfPM) to improve organizational performance. One of the 
philosophical roots of the NPM is the assumptions of the economic man model. It 
suggests the use of micro-economics theory and business practices in public sector 
management. 
The economic man model assumes that individuals are autonomous decision 
makers who act rationally to maximize their self-interests. This theoretical assumption 
views individuals as selfish and asocial beings. Based on this assumption, the 
managerial school advocates the rational design on incentive mechanisms that would 
induce individual to behave in ways that are beneficial to organization performance. 
The research question asked here is “Does the rational actor model adequately 
explain the organizational and administrative changes in the public sector?" Based on 
Spencer Zifcak's (1994) "appreciative shift" model and Richard Scott's (1995) 
"cognitive pillar", this paper utilizes an organization culture approach to examine the 
HA's managerial reform. In addition to official documents, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with HA staff. The idea is to understand the managerial reform through the 
actual experience of the participants. 
The participants did not just receive and act according to what they were 
instructed to do. Rather they leamed, reacted and collectively created new meanings 
to the reform. As a result, a social reconstruction process went hand in hand with the 
rational managerial reform. "Efficiency" and "performance" were constructed myths. 
The NPM approach reduces complex policy problems to simple causal relationships 
among a few discrete variables, thus it yields only piecemeal solutions without 
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The Hospital Authority was established in 1991 to integrate the previous 
government and subvented hospitals under one single unified management system. The 
setting up of the statutory body in the form of a non-departmental public body O^DPB) 
outside the civil service was an outcome of a re-organization proposal made by a private 
consultancy firm.' The establishment of the Hospital Authority (HA) was part of the 
Hong Kong government's public sector reform. 
After the establishment ofthe HA, a lot of managerial practices has been adopted to 
improve its performance. These practices were based on the ideas of the New Public 
Management Q^?Uy that emerged in the late 1980s. The NPM is rooted in economic 
theories and assumes that the private sector is more efficient and effective than the public 
sector. 
Although the NPM approach derives from the rational actor (or the economic man) 
model has been widely accepted by many western democracies, it does not prevail 
without challenges in the academia. For example, Geoffrey M. Hodgson makes some 
fundamental challenges to the neoclassical economic assumptions about rational behavior 
(1988). Christopher Hood (1991) and Christopher Pollitt (1990) question the approach's 
applicability and a number ofresearchers questioned its moral defensibility (Lutz & Lux, 
1 The Coopers and Lybrand W D Scott Consultant Firm was deployed by the Hong Kong Government in 
1985 to review the delivery ofmedical services in public hospitals. In its report handed to the government, 
it made a number ofrecommendations on structural and management changes, as stated in its Executive 
Review "A statutory Hospital Authority is recommended, outside the Civil Service but largely funded by 
Government It would report through its own Board, the chairman of which would be independent. Public 
health would be handled by a separate body, within Government." (See the W. D. Scott & Co Pty Ltd., 
1985. "Executive Review" in The Delivery ofMedical Services in Hospitals-A Reportfor the Hong Kong 
Government Executive Review. Hong Kong: Government Printer). 
2 New Public Management G^PM) is also known as new managerialism. In this paper, the two terms will 
be used interchangeably. 
1 
Chapter One 
1979; Etzioni, 1988; Kohn, 1990). Empirically, the NPM reform efforts have not been 
proven to be really and completely successful. Gary Wamsley and Lackin Dudley (1998) 
proclaim that "we still don't get it" (1998). Spencer Zifcak (1994), too, cast doubt on the 
effectiveness ofNPM by raising a research question "why administrative reform always 
fails?" 
Despite the claim by its proponents that better organization performance can be 
achieved, the rational managerial approach has been criticized as introducing technical 
solutions to complex social and moral issues. It seeks universal solutions to social and 
political problems. As Michael Oakeshott (1994:10) argues, "the error of the Rationalist 
is of a simple sort — the error of mistaking a part for the whole, of endowing a part with 
the qualities of the whole". 
In Hong Kong, a decade has passed since the creation of the HA. It is time now to 
review the managerial reforms and organizational changes that it has undertaken in the 
name ofNPM. This thesis will review the way and the kind of changes that have been 
initiated in the past decade. The managerial reform program introduced by the HA has 
instituted new practices as well as new ideology to the public hospital system. Targets 
such as “making work more efficient", "improving performance", “eliminating waste，，， 
and "better services" are so "noble" in nature that they have been accepted 
unquestionably. 
As the reform was largely modeled on the “rational actor" model, rational 
calculation and action of the individuals are the main foci of the analysis. Although 
"rational analysis” is well known for its logical theoretical assumptions and predictability, 
I question its applicability and adequacy in understanding and analyzing the operation of 
2 
Chapter One 
public organizations. This paper challenges the ontological assumptions and the 
deductive research methodology of neoclassical economics on which the mainstream 
administrative reform has been based. This paper also contends that the institutional and 
organizational cultural perspectives are better alternatives to the analysis of the 
organizational and administrative changes that HA has implemented thus far. These two 
approaches may indeed make excellent complement to the "rational actor" model. 
Administrative Reform in Western Industrialized Countries 
For a very long time, public administration in western industrialized countries has 
evolved along Max Weber's ideal type bureaucracy (Gerth & Mills, 1970). Governments 
played an extensive role (true to the previous welfare states, like the United Kingdom) in 
the direct production of goods and services to the public. The government bureaus used 
to operate by rules, regulations, formal procedures and other mechanisms of checks and 
balances to ensure procedural fairness. Public bureaucrats served in a politically neutral 
manner, carrying out in a faithful and efficient manner the policies made by elected 
politicians. They held permanent employment status and were unaffected by change in 
the "government of the day. 
Over the past few decades, the public sector in many western liberal democracies, 
including United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has 
experienced tremendous transformation. They all faced an increasing pressure to change 
their rigid, hierarchical and bureaucratic form of administration to a more flexible, 
business-like and market-based form of public management. Such changes involve not 
only a minor change or adjustment of the management style of the government, but 
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constitute a fundamental change in the governance ideology and thus the critical role of 
the government. It also redefines the relationship between government and citizenry 
(Hughes, 1994). 
The western administrative reforms since the 1970s originate from different but 
similar intellectual roots. The "public choice school" stresses institutional reform and 
argues for a replacement of the highly centralized bureaucratic structure by multi-
organizational arrangements. The “new right school" stresses market efficiency, small-
scale public sector and a minimal role of the government. The "managerial school" 
suggests better management as a solution to governance problems, as evidenced in 
Osborne and Gaebler's book on "reinventing government" (1993) that advocates for an 
entrepreneurial spirit for government transformation. In addition, these schools also 
introduce concepts such as "responsiveness", “more choices", “empowering the public，，， 
"mission-driven", and "result-oriented" for improving public services. The 
administrative reform has thereby exhibited a strong faith in economic efficiency and 
business-like managerial practices. The ultimate aim of these schools of thoughts is to 
change the traditional paradigm of public administration to a new managerial paradigm 
(Hood, 1996), which is expected to be more efficient, responsive and flexible in operation. 
Public administration in westem industrialized countries also encountered similar 
problems of governance at the macro level (Isaac-Henry & et al., 1993). Economically, 
these countries faced various degrees offiscal stress. Politically, the bureaucratic form of 
government was attacked as inefficient, inflexible and unresponsive to citizens' needs. 
Subsequently, the public generally lost their confidence in the poorly performed 
government. Socially, many ofthese countries faced an aging population. Predictably, 
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expenditure on the services provided to the elderly, the sick, and the disabled would 
constitute heavy financial burden on the government. Above all, citizens have become 
more vocal, demanding not only for more services, but also for better quality of services 
(Caulfield and Schultz, 1989). All these problems together engendered the so-called "a 
crisis of the welfare state". 
The changing political-economic-social reality at the macro level constituted a 
significant driving force for reforms. The western administrative reforms thus geared to 
improving governments' performance in public services whilst minimizing the amount of 
expenditure on public services. Because the problems are conceptualized as one of fiscal 
difficulties, economic theories and thinking were expectedly well received by public 
officials as effective solutions to "governmental ills." This explains why the new right 
approach and public choice theory, hence the NPM, were able to gain political support in 
the 1980s. 
The Influence ofthe New Right Ideology and the Public Choice Theory 
The new right ideology and public choice school serve to legitimize westem 
democratic governance. Reform agendas usually involve the reduction of government's 
role in the provision of social services. As a result, different models of privatization and 
modes of service delivery were introduced and being implemented. Although public 
choice theorists and new rights advocate do not totally deny the role of the government, 
they often suggest that the public sector is problematic and inefficient, and public 
bureaucrats are as self-interested as buyers and sellers in the market. 
Norman Flynn (1993) lists four themes that are associated with the “new right" or 
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the "new liberal" model: 
i) that market mechanism should be encouraged and applied whenever possible; 
ii) that we should encourage competition among service providers and more 
choices should be provided to consumers; 
iii) that we should promote individual choice, not collective decision; 
iv) that the state provision should be kept to a minimum and the government 
should encourage private and voluntary organizations to participate in the 
provision of goods and services to the public. 
Underlying the new right model is the philosophical thinking enshrined in the "neo-
classical economics" or "economic rationalism". It advocates the use of micro-economic 
theories for policy analysis and delivery of public services. The most important 
economic theories applied to the bureaucracy are the pubic choice theory and the 
principal-agent model. 





-(The Construct of Rational-Actor) 
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Public choice theory is a branch of economic thought concerned with the 
application of microeconomics theories to political and social phenomena (Mueller, 
1989). The core premise of the public choice theory is the "rational-actor" 
conceptualization in line with "methodological individualism", namely the assumption 
that individuals are rational and self-interested actors who maximize their utilities. The 
theory suggests there are many intermediate situations between the sharp distinction of 
public and private goods, (depending on the extent and the boundaries of the spillover 
effects) and self-interested actors will develop different strategies accordingly for 
maximizing individual interests. Vincent Ostrom (1971) suggests that public agencies 
should not be seen as bureaucratic units for processing instructions from the top. Rather, 
they should be organized in a manner that would enable them to deliver and manage 
goods and services responsively to the preferences of autonomous individuals. Following 
the logic of rationality, Ostrom advocates reform at the constitutional level: to re-design 
public organizations as multi-organizational units. Each agency should be operated with 
sufficient autonomy and high responsiveness to maximize individual citizens' benefits. 
The public choice theory also argues that public bureaucrats, instead of being 
motivated by the public interest, are to a large extent motivated by self-interests. Public 
bureaucrats try to maximize their interests at the cost of the agency and the public interest. 
Likewise, politicians are not trustworthy. They only want to maximize the number of 
votes that they can get and will be ready to trade off the public interest whenever it is 
• expedient to do so. Therefore, public choice theorists propose to maximize the role of 
market to encourage competition and individual choice whilst keeping a minimal, 
residual role for the government. In short, different forms of "marketization" (or 
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privatization) of public services should be undertaken. 
The principal-agent model provides a key to solve the problem of accountability 
and control in the public sector. The principal-agent model was first developed and 
applied to private firms to solve the problem of goal divergence between the managers 
(agents) and the shareholders (principal). The shareholders want to maximize their profit 
while the managers are more concerned with the long-term growth of the firm. The 
shareholders often find it rather difficult to control the managers for the latter have 
monopolous control of1nformation. Put differently, the agent is always in a better 
position to use, withhold, filter, and even manipulate the information without informing 
the principal. The separation between ownership and control thus reduces the power of 
shareholders. The principal-agent model puts forth different incentive schemes, such as 
performance-related pay and contract arrangement to motivate the agents to act in the 
interests of the shareholders. These mechanisms rely on a contractual relationship in 
which the rights and responsibilities of the agents are clearly specified. If the principal is 
dissatisfied with the performance of the agent, he/she can terminate the contractual 
relationship. The model chooses to develop service provision and employment 
relationship in the public sector on short term but renewable contracts. Consequently, the 
organizing of the public sector is increasingly turning away from the Weberian type of 
bureaucracy. 
A new model of public sector management under the influence of the above-
mentioned economic theories has gradually emerged and formalized as the NPM since 
the late 1980s. There are many names to call it: "managerialism" (Pollitt, 1990); "new 
public management" (Hood, 1991); "market-based public administration" (Lan and 
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Rosenbloom, 1992) or "entrepreneurial government" (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). 
Though the labels are different, their substances are the same. Eventually, policy and 
program analysis are converted and reduced into "unit cost" calculation and measurement. 
Such a change has been further labeled as "economicization" (Gorz, 1989) or 
"accountingization" (Power and Laughlin, 1992) of public services; Hood refers to new 
model as "public administration by numbers" (1995: 170). Some remarkable features of 
the new managerial model can be exhibited as follows: 
i) It regards the management styles of the private sector as solutions to 
governance problems found in the public sector. 
ii) It calls for a change of human resources management practice, encourages staff 
participation and the use of performance related pay as incentives to foster staff 
initiatives and performance, introduces more flexible staff hiring and dismissal 
procedures, and also suggests replacing permanent employment by renewable 
contracts. 
iii) It stresses on performance target and output controls, that is, focusing on 
results, not on procedures, and using explicit standards for the measurement of 
performance. 
iv) It emphasizes on the setting up of small 'corporate units,，encouraging different 
forms of franchising and contractual arrangements within and outside the 
public sector, and advocating market competition to monitor cost and 
performance. 




Overall, these administrative reform measures do not only change the way the 
governments manage their own business, but also how people see their governments. By 
repositioning the government-citizen relationship as service providers and rational 
consumers, and thereby weakening the political bond between government and citizenry, 
the model generates a new paradigm for organizing public administration and managing 
the public sector. 
Based on the above discussion, I would like to summarize the intellectual lineage of 
the NPM. Its theoretical framework is largely based on the public choice theory and the 
principal agent model of which are derived from the micro-economic theories. The NPM 
works under a structure of rationality, where the content of its operation is based on the 
methodological individualism, the strategy to pursue rationality is by self-interest 
maximization. See Figure 2 below: 
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The Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: 
The Case of the Hospital Authority 
In Hong Kong, the Hospital Authority was established in 1991 to take over the 
management of public hospitals and to integrate the dual system of government and 
subvented hospitals.^ The setting up of a Non-Departmental Public Body O^DPB) to take 
over the responsibility in service delivery was a milestone to the provision of public 
medical services in Hong Kong. The idea of the reform was initiated in a consultant 
report, commonly called the Scott Report, published in 1985 after a comprehensive study 
of the delivery system of public hospital services. The report made a number of 
recommendations to restructure the management of hospital services. A statutory 
authority independent of the civil service was suggested to oversee the management of 
public hospitals. Such an institutional arrangement was intended to bring about a more 
flexible organizational structure and was the precursor for the later larger scale 
management and financial reforms in the line ofNPM. 
Following the recommendations of the Scott Report, the Provisional Hospital 
Authority (PHA) was set up on 1 October 1988 to consider and make recommendations 
related to the establishment of the HA. The first structural reform took place in April 
1989 to split the responsible bureaucratic authority, i.e. the then Medical and Health 
Department, into two separate administrative departments. The Hospital Services 
Department was responsible for the management of all ex-government hospital services, 
3 Before the Hospital Authority was established, the public hospitals were mainly divided into two camps. 
The first camp was the government hospitals which were managed by the government. The second camp 
was the subvented hospitals which were owned and managed by various subsidized welfare agencies. The 
subvented hospitals had their own board of management and they served the community with special 
mission inherited from their mother organizations. 
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and the Health Services Department's prime responsibility lied with the implementation 
of primary health care. 
The operation of the Hospital Authority is stipulated in the Hospital Authority 
Ordinance. The functioning of the HA is subjected to public scrutiny/ The HA is an 
executive agency that is responsible for the overall management and delivery of public 
hospital services. The making of medical and health care policies still now rests in the 
hands of the Health and Welfare Bureau, previously known as the Health and Welfare 
Branch. 
The HA is heavily influenced by the NPM advocating a new form of service 
delivery that is patient-centered. The prime objective of the service system is to ensure 
that quality hospital care is delivered efficiently and cost effectively. Authority is 
decentralized to the hospital level. The hospital management structure is streamlined to 
cope with new trends of development. The content of managerial reform will be 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
It is noteworthy that the environment of governance that prompts administrative 
change in Hong Kong is very different from that in the western industrialized countries. 
Hong Kong has a relatively small public sector, and expenditure on public services has 
been controlled at around 20% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Up to the mid-
1990s, Hong Kong was able to maintain steady economic growth/ Therefore, the 
pressure for administrative reform, as Anthony Cheung (Cheung, 1995: 41) points out, is 
4 There are both formal and informal mechanisms to scrutinize the HA. Formal mechanism include directly 
answerable to both the Executive and Legislative Councils. Financial auditing by the Auditing 
Commission. Its operation is also be subject to the review of the Commissioner for Administrative 
Complaints. Within the Hospital Authority's organization structure, representatives of public are being 




“not only a result of efficiency and managerial imperatives, but also an outcome of an 
evolving proactive approach to defend the government in face of the changing political 
environment in which the government's legitimacy is increasingly challenged." Albeit 
having very different rationales, the change direction and reform measures are invariably 
modeled upon NPM. 
About the Study 
The research design of this thesis is based on Spencer Zifcak's study (1994) on 
administrative reforms in Britain and Australia. He used a qualitative and action-oriented 
research approach to find out what actually had happened through "the eyes of the 
participants". In his study, Zifcak was able to gain access to administrative organizations, 
met and interviewed the public managers/officers. From the field data, Zifcak induced 
three theoretical frameworks: the "purposeful intervention", "institutional negotiation" 
and "appreciative shift" models. Although the three frameworks advocate quite different 
perspectives in analyzing and understanding the reforms, all are related to the concept of 
"rationality"— the cornerstone of management and organizational studies. 
Question Asked in This Study 
The fundamental research question asked in this thesis is: “Does the rational actor 
model adequately explain the organizational and administrative changes in the public 
sector?'' Indeed administrative reforms by dint of NPM in the westem liberal 
democracies have neglected several distinctive features of the "politicalness" of public 




First, the NPM reform has over-emphasized the idea of rationality, thus 
underestimating the influence of organizational history, culture and institutional 
arrangements on public organizations' operation. Empirical evidence may show that 
reform outcomes always deviate from what are expected. It is because the model 
neglects the interaction between the actors and the institutional environment. Social and 
political life is so complex that it could not be understood simply based on rationality 
alone. 
Second, it is questionable if the application of managerialism is generic to the 
public sector and the core values of public administration are different from the private 
sector. When management solution is utilized to address the governance problem 
(Wamsley and Dudley, 1998), it reduces complicated governance issues to narrowly 
defined management problems. Deborah Stone (1988) comments it as using economic 
solutions to political problems. That the management of the public services is 
closelyassociated with the concept of the public interest and the political institution 
defeats the NPM,s claim for generic application. 
Contrary to the rational-actor model of NPM, the organizational cultural approach 
stresses the cognitive and interactive process of the organizational actors. Organizational 
actors do not simply perceive and act according to what they have been instructed to do 
instead, they leam, react and collectively create new meanings to the reform. In order to 
better understand the managerial reform implemented by HA, this thesis applies an 
organizational cultural approach to review the organization changes through the 
participants' actual experience. 
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Objectives and Focus of the Study 
This thesis has several objectives. Firstly, it challenges the methodological and 
ontological assumptions of the neoclassical economics on which the administrative 
reform is based. Secondly, it illustrates that administrative reform is a social 
reconstruction process, i.e. organizational actors understand the reform within the 
organizational context and they create new meanings to reform concepts like “efficiency，，， 
"quality" and performance measurements. 
The focus of the study is not to evaluate whether the managerial reform is 
successful or not. Instead, the thesis explores from the organizational culture perspective 
the limitation of the rational actor model in explaining organization life. Through 
analyzing the data collected from interviewing HA staff, we argue that the NPM concept 
ofmanagerial efficiency is indeed a cognitive as well as a context-dependent concept. 
Research Methodology 
The research methodology adopted in this thesis serves to reveal the weaknesses, 
and thus provides a critique, of the neoclassical economic theory that forms the 
intellectual basis of the NPM. 
Methodological Critique of the Empiricism and Positivism 
The methodology and theoretical stands of the neoclassical economic theory are 
defended by economists for its scientific character and predictability. However, some 
critics remark that its scientific status "has not been validated empirically" (Eichner, 1983: 
50). It is also widely criticized by the institutional school in particular and social 
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scientists from various disciplines in general. 
Milton Friedman (1953), a noble laureate in economics, once defends the 
methodological position of the neoclassical economic theory. He asserts that neoclassical 
economics is founded on the Popperian methodology, i.e. the "ultimate goal of a positive 
science is the development of a 'theory' or 'hypothesis' that yields valid and meaningful 
(i.e. "not tmistic" as remarked by Hogdson) predictions about phenomena not yet 
observed" (1953: 7). The merits of this methodology are its simplicity and fmitfulness, 
and its hypothesis helps explain much by little and enable valid prediction. In addition, 
Friedman argues, it would be impossible to test whether the theoretical assumptions are 
descriptively "realistic". A good theory to him is the one that "yields sufficiently 
accurate prediction" (1953: 15) 
However, Friedman's defense invites a number of challenges. First, the terms 
"realistic" and "unrealistic" are used ambiguously fNagel, 1963). Friedman does not say 
clearly what they actually mean, whether "realistic" refers to something testable, or 
something true, or being supported by evidence. Alan Musgrave (1981) points out that 
Friedman fails to differentiate different kinds of assumptions, particularly negligibility 
from domain assumptions. Musgrave argues that it is insufficient to state whether the 
assumptions of a theory is descriptively "realistic" or not, for the realistic assumptions 
might be of negligible importance or irrelevant to the phenomenon under investigation. 
Rather, the fundamental concern falls on the status of the domain assumptions. 
The neoclassical economic assumptions have also been highly acclaimed for its 
instrumental value of making valid prediction. However, the fundamental question is 
whether the aim of a social science theory is to predict certain phenomena, or to 
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understand how they come about. There is no concrete proof as to whether such an 
instrumental value (making valid prediction) is really superior (Hodgson, 1988). After all, 
people might accidentally get the correct prediction by using wrong assumptions (Bear & 
Orr, 1967). To evaluate the validity of a theory, therefore, other appraising criteria have 
to be included other than the instrumental value alone. Put differently, true theories 
always yield correct predictions; simply examining the consequences cannot tell whether 
the assumptions are true or not. 
The predictability of the neoclassical economic theory, requires one to match 
empirical observations against expected consequences. This methodology is commonly 
labeled as "empiricism." Empiricism, which also includes positivism, stresses its 
objectivity and denies the influence of any subjective knowledge and interpretation. For 
objective tests to be done, observations should be free from any theoretical concepts. 
However, G. M. Hodgson argues in an anti-empiricist stand that "no observation 
can be independent of the conceptual framework, language and theoretical system of the 
observer All facts are expressed in some form of language, and an aconceptual or 
atheoretical language is impossible" (1988: 35). He further argues that assertions such as 
the "facts speak for themselves" and "the unbiased nature of experience and empirical 
evidence" are non-existent.' Hodgson points out the inadequacy and unrealistic nature of 
the empiricism/positive methodology: 
By its nature, explicit knowledge is communicable and thereby expressed in the form of a 
(social) language. Thus any unit of such knowledge is further structured by the mode of 
6 Hodgson, however, alert us to the saying that "facts" and "experiences" are not independent from theories 
and concepts that the researcher believes in. But it is not to say that facts and theories are purely subjective 
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expression of the particular language that is used, and this structuring is a product of 
social relations and process. To some extent the socially imprinted language affects the 
“ t h e o r i e s that are developed. Furthermore, as a number of philosophers of science from 
varying points of view have emphasized, science is a social activity and its development 
involves the social generation, scrutinization and acceptance or rejection of theories, 
procedures and norms. Consequently, science can never be "natural" in the sense that it is 
entirely free of biases and preoccupations of society and the scientific community (1988: 
36). 
Such a criticism is not to deny the existence of the real world, but to remind us that 
any observation requires both selection and interpretation. Empirical work involves the 
selection of data, and in turn, data are interpreted and analyzed in such a way that 
observer's preconceptions, past experiences and anticipation are likely to play an 
important role. In other words, science is never totally "neutral" or "objective" in nature. 
Despite the neoclassical economists' insistence on the rational actor model, there is 
an increasing recognition of the importance of institutional effects and cultural variables 
in other social science disciplines. Hodgson's criticism is an example to rejuvenate other 
non-rational methodologies from a subordinate position. He calls for a critical review of 
the contents of prevailing rational methodology and its underlying assumptions. 
Research Approach and Data Collection 
Pacing Hodgson, this thesis opines that the organizational culture perspective 




Study cultural change in an organization would be longitudinal qualitative research such 
as participant observation and the clinician perspective (Schein, 1984). However, due to 
time and resource constraints as well as lack of access to the job environment, it is 
infeasible for this thesis to undertake these research methods. 
Data collection in this study relied on some other means. The first one is library 
research on official documents and literature. Official documents include government 
policy papers, consultant reports, HA annual reports, annual plans and newsletters. The 
information collected will be analyzed and reviewed in Chapter Three so as to present an 
official version of the managerial reform. 
The second source of data is the newspaper articles of Doctor Au Hoi Man and 
Doctor Wong Ki published in Ming Pao. The two doctors' articles could not be taken as 
official stance, but their writings are uniquely helpful in delineating the feelings and 
responses ofthe frontline staff towards the administrative reform. 
The third means of data collection in this study is in-depth interviews. In-depth 
interviews and qualitative analysis are used to de-mystify the new managerial culture 
through the actors' personal experience. Their 'narratives' should be rich in meaning. 
A total of thirty in-depth interviews were conducted from late February to early 
April 1998 (Please see Appendix I for an overview of the interviewees' profiles). Among 
the 30 interviews, 4 interviewees requested me not to tape the dialogue. The rest ofthe 
interviews were recorded by a tape recorder and later transcribed into scripts. 
Most interviewees were introduced and referred to me through some key 
informants. I followed up on the organization change with these people for a number of 
years. Some ofthese informants were also graduate students in other tertiary institutions. 
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They had a very good sense on research methodology, and they indeed helped a lot in 
identifying the interviewees for me. 
Before the beginning of an interview, the interviewees were informed about the 
nature and the objectives of the study. In order to protect the interviewees' anonymity, 
their names were not listed here unless they agreed to do so. I purposively grouped some 
interviewees' job title and nature of duty in certain big categories so as to hide these 
people's identity. 
Limitation of the Study 
Since in-depth interviews and qualitative analysis are used, the sample size is 
small and non-random in nature. This thesis is thus not ambitious in generalization and 
projection. Like many other qualitative organization studies, the researcher's objectivity 
is also a problematic issue. However, Steven Ott,s remarks best save this thesis from 
serious weakness: “detached objectivity in organizational research is largely a myth, no 
matter who conducts it." (1989: 101). 
Declaration 
I joined the Information Technology Division of the Hospital Authority Head 
Office as a temporary staff in August 1996. I stayed in the job until the end ofNovember 
1999. 
During the years I worked in the Hospital Authority, I informed my immediate 
supervisor and Division Head as well as other working colleagues that I was a part-time 
graduate student in the Department of Government and Public Administration of The 
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Chinese University ofHong Kong. I also told them that I was writing a thesis about the 
administrative reform in Hong Kong. 
In compliance with the requirement of the Ethical Committee of Graduate School 
ofthe Chinese University ofHong Kong, I would like to declare in this section that I had 
never made use of my staff status to gain access to unauthorized information. To avoid 
role conflict and bias, I have tried my best to separate working responsibility from my 
study. None of the interviewees was from the Division where I worked in, nor did I 
include in my thesis any analysis on the operation of the Division. I also avoided 
choosing interviewees with whom I had direct working relationship. 
The Organization of the Research Paper 
This thesis contains five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research topic, 
the objectives and methodology of the study, and the outline of the whole study. In this 
chapter, the background leading to administrative reforms in westem democratized 
countries are briefly discussed. 
Chapter Two reviews academic literature relevant to this study. It examines the 
intellectual basis of the western administrative reforms and its contents. The 
methodological and ontological critique of its neoclassical economic and its rationality 
assumptions will also be presented in details. Literature related to some core theoretical 
concepts like institutions, organizational culture, organizational learning, and the idea of 
social reconstruction will also be reviewed. Zifcak's study and his analytical framework 
are also discussed. 
Chapter Three examines and summarizes the reform processes and contents of the 
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case ofthe HA in Hong Kong. Special attention will be paid to the managerial changes 
of the HA in the past few years. Information in this chapter is mainly derived from the 
official documents of the HA. 
Chapter Four explores the managerial reform from the actors7participant' s 
perspective. Field data collected from in-depth interviews will be analyzed and discussed. 
Chapter Five is the concluding chapter to summarize the findings and discussions 
presented in the previous chapters. 
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New Public Management: Its Theoretical Underpinnings 
and Their Inadequacies 
This chapter reviews theoretical concepts related to the study. Since the 
fundamental research question asked in this study is "Does the rational actor model 
adequately explain the organizational and administrative changes in the public sector?" I 
will first review assumptions of the rational "economic man" model and the core ideas of 
such a model. 
The second section is a critique of some major concepts of the neoclassical 
economic theory. Concepts like "methodological individualism," the "maximizing 
hypothesis," and the "rational conception of action" will be critically reviewed. 
After reviewing the critiques related to the rational model, I will examine the 
institutional and organizational culture models as alternatives to explain organizational 
life and human behavior. 
Spencer Zifcak's "appreciative shift" will also be discussed in this chapter. After 
reviewing the relevant literature, I will develop the analytical framework of this thesis 
and put forward the argument that the current HA managerial reform has undergone a 
social reconstruction process. 
The Rational Economic Man Model 
The administrative reforms in western liberal democracies have their philosophical 
and ideological underpinnings in the micro economic theories and the rational "economic 
man" model. Before I review the critiques on the rational model, a brief introduction to 
the rational economic man model is in order. This model assumes that: 
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1. Actors pursue goals. 
2. These goals reflect the actors' perceived self-interest. 
3. Behavior results from a process that actually involves (or functions as if it entails) 
conscious choice. 
4. The individual is the basic actor in the society 
5. Actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable. 
6. If given options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility. 
7. Actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives and the likely 
consequences of their choices. (Monroe, 1991:4) 
Individuals are assumed to be autonomous decision makers that are free from 
external influences, who act according to their own preference ordering and try to 
maximize their own benefits. Decision is an outcome of benefit and cost calculation. At 
first glance, these assumptions seem rather logical and meaningful. They have been 
widely accepted and applied to explain economic behaviors, public policy decisions and 
political actions. The core ideas of the economic man model could be presented as: 
Figure 3: The Core Ideas ofthe Economic Man Model 
Conscious Rational 
Calculation 
/ The \ 
/ Economic \ 
/ Man Model \ 




However，the assumptions of the rational economic man model are inconsistent and 
unrealistic in real social life. Particularly, the stress on “methodological individualism”， 
that is, individuals as autonomous entities to make decisions, violates the basic 
ontological principles of social beings. Other assumptions such as interest maximization 
and the concept of rational action are also problematic and unrealistic. 
Based on the neoclassical economic assumptions, public administration has become 
primarily a utilitarian and pragmatic field. When economic rationality and efficiency 
become today's slogan, its methodology and core assumptions are simply accepted 
without serious scrutiny. In view of the deep-seated impact and implications of the 
reform, it is worthwhile to review the theoretical basis ofthe reform and its validity. 
Critique ofthe Neoclassical Theoretical Assumptions: 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson (1988) challenges the ontological assumptions ofthe rational 
theoretical model. He reduces the seven assumptions of the economic man model into 
three major aspects. Hodgson's intellectual critiques on "methodological individualism", 
the "maximization" hypothesis and the concept of rational action are discussed in the 
below sections. 
A Critique ofthe Concept ofMethodological Individualism 
Neoclassical economists state that the basic unit of analysis for all social 
phenomena is the purposive and goal directed individuals. Individuals are seen as 
autonomous entities who make choices upon their own preference ordering. Individual's 
preferences and other forces have been seen as exogenously given and there is a refusal to 
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recognize institution or other forces that play a significant role in shaping and molding 
individual preferences. 
To explain more about methodological individualism, Ludwig von Mises once put 
that "all action are performed by individuals" and “a social collective has no existence 
and reality outside of the individual members' actions" (1949: 42). To him and other 
supporters of methodological individualism, the social whole is an aggregation from 
individual parts, and that the micro affects the macro but not vise versa. The presence of 
collectives is being denied. For example, large firm is simply seen as the profit 
maximizing single entity. Indeed, large organizations could be an entity, which contains 
multiple, and even conflicting interests and organizational personalities. 
The validity of methodological individualism has been increasingly questioned 
within the social sciences disciplines. Before going into the criticism, let me review the 
elements of methodological individualism. 
Elements of Methodological Individualism 
The first element of methodological individualism is "purposeful human action." In his 
analysis of social and economic phenomena, von Mises insists that human action is 
"purposeful and goal directed" (1949: 11). Hodgson remarks that the notions of 
consciousness and purposes have not been verified empirically, we arejust told to accept 
the primary level of abstraction that human beings are purposeful agents (1988: 57). 
Hodgson agrees that the principle of the purposeful individual has some basis in 
real world situations. For example contract law operates in such a manner that parties in 
contract are conscious about their intent and responsibility with the contract terms. 
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However, individual intent is by no means universal in law. With the complexity of the 
twentieth-century legal system, there is the possibility that actions are not fully planned 
or purposive. So, it will be dangerous to follow the neoclassical school and see the 
principal of individual purposefulness as a universal principle governing all human 
behaviors. 
In addition, Hodgson points out another mistake that most of the methodological 
individualists have committed, that is, intent can be attributed to collectives. 
Methodological individualists assert that members of collectives are unanimous in their 
purpose, there are clear mechanisms to come to collective decision. It is unrealistic to 
assume a large firm has a single and simple objective, like profit maximization. And in 
most circumstances, the individual purposefulness is not the same thing as collective 
purposefulness. 
The second element of methodological individualism is “causality and purpose." 
The principle of causality states that individual purposes are sufficient course of action. 
This element solidifies the concept of methodological individualism. By this principle, it 
makes explicit claim that the purpose of individual is the driving force and the prime 
cause for all societal activities. Collectives and institutions themselves are purposeless 
unless individuals' intentions are added together. Again, this assumption invites 
challenges to its adequacy in explaining social phenomena. Hodgson raises a 
fundamental critique that if purpose cause action, then what causes the purpose. 
The third element of the methodological individualism is the "psychological 
explanation of purpose." Methodological individualists on one hand often inclined to 
psychological explanation of purpose. But on the other hand they try to exclude 
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psychology from economics. For example, von Mises denies the internal psychological 
processes as the cause of action (1949). Friedrick Hayek makes the similar argument in 
excluding social factors: “If conscious action can be ‘explained’，this is a task of 
psychology but not for economics . . . or any other social science" (1948: 67). Hodgson 
remarks that it is only by excluding psychology from any explanation of individual 
purposes and from any area of social sciences, that the purpose of the methodological 
individualism is made obvious. 
Hodgson, however, argues that modern psychology indeed serves strong social 
psychological element, which runs counter to the methodological individualist position. 
Some scholars, like Paul Hirst and Penny Wolley, also have great reservations in 
excluding the social elements in decision making. It would be wrong to consider 
psychology and even biology as essentially asocial. According to Hirst and Wolley, "it is 
not necessary in order to analyze the effectiveness of social relations . . . that they be 
rigidly differentiated from biological or psychological phenomena' (Hirst and Wolley, 
1982: 24). 
When methodological individualism argues the individual's purposeful action is the 
primary source of explanation for all social phenomena, Hodgson asks what causes the 
purpose in the first place? 
To resolve this challenge, methodological individualists recognize that psychology, 
but not other social sciences, has a role to play in explaining conscious actions. However, 
such a stand puts them in an inconsistent manner with their previous stand in rejecting the 
psychological explanation of human purpose. Moreover, simply accepting psychology 
exclusively to explain human behavior does not give a satisfactory answer to the 
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challenges. Hodgson and other scholars assert, psychology after all cannot fully explain 
human actions, which were historically specific. 
The Critique of Methodological Individualism 
People who support the neoclassical foundation insist that preferences and purposes 
of the individual are given and exogenous to the economic system. Nonetheless, it 
becomes more obvious that culture and institution not only influence but also mould 
people's perception, preference, and thus behavioral outcomes. As Hodgson points out, 
culture and institution "affect not only our eventual actions but also our views of the 
world and the purposes to which we aspire" (1988: 63). 
Besides the critique that institutional and cultural dimensions should be added to 
explain human purposes and action, the validity of the methodological individualist 
assumption is being challenged on many other aspects. One is made by Hodgson is for 
its spontaneity and absentee explanation. 
Hodgson challenges Ludwig Lachmarm's idea of purpose and plan by 
differentiating motives from purposes and plan. Motives may be determined by "psychic 
processes" (1969: 94) but plan are largely spontaneous and cannot be response "to 
anything pre-existent" (1969: 93). Meanwhile von Mises also makes the similar point 
that having the idea of "free will, of the irrationality of what is human, spiritual, or 
historical, of individuality in history", it could be possible that the “same situation has a 
different effect on different men" (1960: 11). When spontaneous and indeterminate 
elements behind the formation of purposes and plans are recognized, the determinate 
theory and its theoretical assumptions behind human behavior as advocated by the 
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orthodox economists will become problematic. 
Another critique made by Hodgson is the problem of infinite regress. The 
behavior ofpurposeful individuals can be explained by three elements: (1) the purposeful 
action of an individual (labeled as the "P" element), (2) the institutions and culture 
(labeled as the "I" element), and (3) other factors (labeled as the "0" element). Any of 
the three elements alone can only partially explain the behavior of the purposeful 
individual. And in turn, each of the three elements could be explained by other 
purposeful individuals (i.e. "P"), and for each of the "P" element, it can be explained by 
the "P", 'T' and “0” elements at the next immediate level and so on (See Figure 4). In 
other words, there could be infinite regress behind the explanation of purposeful 
individuals. When methodological individualists assert that "all reducible to individuals", 
Hodgson remarks that "all reducible to institution or social" (1988: 64). 
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Figure 4: The Infinite Regress of Explanatory Terms 
P etc. 
P I etc. 
0 
P I P etc. 
0 
P etc. 
P 1 P I etc. 
0 etc. 
0 
Key: P — purposeful action of an individual 
I - institutions and culture 
0 - other factors 
Source: Hodgson, G. M. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern 
Institutional Economics. Oxford: Polity Press, p. 63. 
The final critique is the concept of wholes and parts. To explain human action in 
terms of social structures and institutions is inconsistent with the work of methodological 
individualists. Friedrick Hayek, a methodological individualist, stresses that the method 
of natural sciences is analytic where the method of social sciences, in his own 
interpretation is "composite" or “synthetic，” (1952: 39). To him and other 
methodological individualists, the whole comes from its parts; that is, the macro is built 
from the micro. The so-called "composite" or "synthetic" method as a kind of implicit 
agenda does not sufficiently explain how the social wholes are built from their individual 
parts. Even within the Austrian School, the terms are used inconsistently to describe the 
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method of social sciences] In accepting Hayek's "composite method," the explanation 
model is pyramidal in which the macro is to be explained by the micro, the parts explain 
the wholes, explanation must start from the individual. 
Hodgson remarks that when households and firms are seen as a unitary element (a 
unit for analysis) in microeconomics, such a theoretical stand overlooks the possible 
interacting effect inside the group and other structured elements that might have affected 
the decision making of the whole unit. There should be two levels of analysis: the first 
level is the interactive effect among individuals within a group. For example, a husband's 
preference is heavily influenced by his wife and children. By the same token, 
individual's preference will also be continuously affected by the institutional structures 
such as the organization and family. Hodgson argues that individual's purposes and 
preferences indeed originate from social norms, culture and customs, and that people act 
according to the roles that they were expected to play in the society, in the organization 
and in the family. These two levels of analysis reject the neoclassical point of view 
about the self-autonomous individual and its deterministic nature in decision making. On � 
the contrary, individuals are social beings that are subject to institutional and cultural 
influences. 
The methodological individualists simply address the institutional influences by 
reference to the individual.^ However, such an explanation is problematic because ofthe 
logic of infinite regress as has been explained earlier. In addition, Hodgson remarks that 
it will break the hierarchical order of the "composite method" when it involves a jump 
1 For the same concept, Hayek uses the term "composite" while Lachmann describes it as "analytic" (for 
details, see Hayek, 1952 and Lachmann, 1969). 
2 The methodological individualists argue individual purpose can be explained by purposeful individual 
action, institutions and culture, as well as other factors. However, in their argument, all could be reduced to 
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from the level of the individual to the level of institution and back to other constitute 
individuals. The composite method will be broken when we pick up factors from an 
equal or a higher order in the hierarchy to explain an individual element. 
In explaining the "composite method," Hodgson alerts us to the "fallacy of 
composition." It is interesting to note that, on the one hand methodological individualists 
admit that the whole is no more than a mere aggregation of its individual elements. On 
the other hand, many of them also agree that the "whole is more than the sum of the 
parts." What matters most is whether the part functions simply with its inherent qualities, 
or whether the part would engage in a more complex web of relationship with other 
individuals and the whole? The simple aggregation formula misses all the possible 
interactive elements which have enriched and complicated the social whole. 
Disagreeing with the neoclassical economic view, Andras Angyal argues that inside 
the whole, the parts do not function by their inherent qualities, but by means of their 
positions and functions in the system's whole. As Angyal puts it: "The formation of 
wholes is therefore not additional to the aggregation of parts, but something of an entirely 
different order" (1941: 256). Richard Langlois, in defending the methodological 
individualistic stand, claims that "the only acceptable parts are the knowledge, 
expectations, intentions, and reactions of human beings" (1983: 632). Such a standpoint 
is criticized by Hodgson as having overlooked the close interactions between the parts 
and the whole. Put differently, the part should not be seen as given. 
Arthur Koestler (1967) states that there is no clear separation between the parts and 
the wholes. To Koestler, there are "intermediary structures" of"sub-wholes." While it is 
dangerous to explain economic phenomena by reducing it to the individual level, it would 
be explained by individual action. 
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be equally dangerous to deny the role of individuals in a hierarchical and holistic scheme. 
Hodgson also remarks that it is important to note that inside a multi-leveled hierarchy, an 
individual is both the wholes and the parts, it depends on which level you are looking at. 
Thus far, the criticisms of methodological individualism draw our attention to the 
wider socio-economic, political, and institutional environments that significantly 
influence the way we perceive information. The "individualistic" label is theoretically 
arbitrary and thus is inadequate to fully explain the nature ofhuman behavior. 
The Critique of the “Maximization，Assumption 
The rational economic man in the neoclassical economic theory is a utility 
maximizer with transitive and consistent preference ordering. The maximization 
assumption is defended by the "evolutionary" argument, that is, only the best species 
survive. When firms maximize, they are more likely to survive (Friedman, 1953). To 
increase their chance of survival, firms must consistently maximize their profit. At first 
glance, such an argument is persuasive. However, empirical evidences show that firms 
are willing to give up part of their profit and opt for cooperation and altruistic behaviors 
to increase the reciprocal help and customer loyalty in the long mn (Axelrod, 1980a, 
1980b, 1981 and 1984). 
In examining consumer behaviors, Hodgson observes that consumers will not be 
removed from the scene even if they fail to maximize their profits. The evolutionary or 
the natural selection argument does not give a satisfactory account for this phenomenon. 
Thus the notion of "consumer maximization" at best just supports the observation that 
people prefer more to less. Hodgson puts forward three basic critiques of the 
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maximization assumption. First, intransitive preference orderings have actually been 
observed. Second, the perfect knowledge assumption is almost unrealistic. It is 
impossible for each of the consumer to know the characteristics of each of the products 
available in the market. Third, from the perspective of consumer behavior, the preference 
function will change when choices are made over different time horizon. 
The maximization assumption is unrealistic as it puts a very demanding task on the 
agents (Boulding, 1956). Not only should they know all the alternatives and the 
consequences of their choices and actions, apprehend a complete set of preference 
ordering, know the probability of the outcomes, they must also possess the ability to 
"process" the information and do the calculation. 
The cognitive limitation, uncertainty and incompleteness of information are 
recognized by behaviorists, like Herbert Simon. Though Simon does not totally agree 
with the maximization hypothesis, he still suggests that agents are rational decision-
makers with a limited set of possibilities. He tries to advocate a more practical approach 
--people are not maximizing but satisficing with the bounded condition (1957a, 1957b, 
1959 and 1979). The "satisficing" model implies that it would be too costly to collect all 
the information for decision making, thus "satisficing" is for cost minimizing. Such an 
argument has been widely accepted by some economists as another version of the 
neoclassical maximization hypothesis. 
For both "maximizing" and "satisficing" models, decisions are made on the basis of 
objective calculation of benefits or costs, it assumes that information has been really 
collected and analyzed in great detail. However, in real life experience, choice might 
simply be the outcome of subjective personal likes or dislikes. Hodgson also asserts that 
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it is not uncommon that choices are relied on established routines and experiences of 
other economic agents. To the behaviorists, rationality is bounded in two senses. First, 
shortage of certain information; second, limited human cognitive capacity to process the 
huge amount of data. The behaviorist model implies there is too little as well as too 
much data and information to be handled. 
Hodgson also quoted a lot of empirical evidence to falsify the maximizing 
assumption. When the maximization hypothesis assumes that agents will fully utilize all 
the available information by their mathematical and computational ability to solve 
problems, other studies illustrate that agents just rely on simple procedures^ memories^, 
and confining choices to only a small set of meaningful or acceptable alternatives^ during 
the decision making process. In sum, many experimental studies in psychology show 
that people do not act rationally and use all the evidence available to them. Rather they 
rely on "rule of thumb" and other measures to deal with risk and uncertainty.^ These 
experiments show that human behavior violates the idea of consistently maximizing and 
the conventional preference assumption. 
Discussion up to here illustrates two types of criticisms. The first is the theoretical 
3 See Heiner's (1983) discussion ofRubic's Cube. 
4 Hodgson uses the example of skilled chess player as an illustration of this point (See Hodgson, 1988, 
p.82). 
5 This strategy is commonly employed in politics and international relations (See Hodgson, 1988, p.83). 
6 Several studies were cited by Hodgson: The first was Feldman's experiment, subjects were presented 
with a random sequence ofXs and Os symbols, the ratio for Xs to Os is 70% to 30%. Subjects were asked 
to predict the next symbol with reward for correct prediction. The rational behavior should always predict 
Xs in order to get the maximum number of correct prediction. However, most subjects acted in a 'non-
rational' manner as if there was a pattern for the sequence, and they tried to explore the pattem (For details, 
see Feldman, 1963). The second experiment cited was Lichtenstein and Slovic's experiment, in which 
individuals were presented with a choice between two gambles, one with a high probability ofwinning a 
modest sum of money and the other with a low probability of winning a large sum of money. For rational 
behavior, people should choose the former game, however, the empirical evidence werejust opposite to the 
conventional assumption (for details, see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971 & 1973). In addition, Kemieth 
Arrow cited other real world economic examples to falsify the rational maximizing assumption (for detail, 
see Arrow, 1962). 
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critique of the complexity of information, uncertainty being involved, and limited 
computational capacity of the human nature. The second category of criticism is the use 
of empirical evidences. To summarize, Hodgson suggests that rational maximization is 
exceptional rather than typical. In contrast, non-rational behaviors seem to be far more 
common than one would have been expected. 
We now turn to a more fundamental discussion about the nature of human 
preference. According to the neoclassical economic theory, the maximizing behavior is 
based on a stable and consistent pattern of preference ordering. However, such an 
assumption obviously differs from the commonly held principles and beliefs by the 
advertising or the marketing businesses. Marketing managers and advertisers believe that 
consumer preference is not stable, consumer tastes could be shaped, and consumer choice 
depends on the "product image" rather than rational calculation alone. This highlights an 
important question: where does our preference ordering come from in the first place? 
Apart from psychological critique, political critique is also offered by scholars. 
Neoclassical political economists like Anthony Downs (1957), James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock (1962) all point out that maximization behaviors are equally applicable 
to political activities. Politicians try to maximize votes and voters try to maximize net 
benefits. Given the fact that a single vote could hardly initiate significant effect to the 
fmal outcome, and the involvement of other tangible cost for a voter to go to vote, for the 
best choice, a rational voter is to register no vote (Benn, 1976). 
Anthony Downs tries to defend the theoretical stand by arguing that voters would 
vote for long term rational interest. However, this argument is inconsistent with the 
previous argument that a single vote exerts minimal influence on the outcome. Stanley 
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Benn (1976) also reminds us that a single voter is equally powerless in determining the 
long-term gain. This problem would go unsolved if we insist on applying the 
maximization hypothesis. Given the fact that a majority of the citizens vote when benefit 
is uncertain, we must find alternative theory to explain the phenomenon. 
According to the neoclassical economic theory, the rational man has distinct ends 
which are clearly distinguished from means and are unaffected by them. In the orthodoxy 
theory, the means-and-ends relationship is always a simple, one way causal relationship. 
Ends are taken as given, exogenous to the theory. However, institutional economists hold 
different views regarding the means-and-ends relationship. To them, means and ends are 
interwoven together. Moreover, ends are not always fully formed or well articulated for 
decision-makers right from the beginning. Instead, means and ends are mutually adjusted 
and choices are continuously made in an adaptive manner. When ends could be adjusted 
as circumstance changes, it means that preferences of the agent could also be changed. 
Whereas the neoclassical and the orthodoxy economists state that human preferences are 
immanently conceived and immutable, institutional economists propose that preferences 
are adaptive and responsive to individual experience. 
Overall, as Hodgson puts it "if ends are jumbled up with means then it is all the 
more difficult to follow utilitarian methodology and take a value-free stance. It is no 
longer possible to adopt the norms of means-ends rationality" (1988: 97). In addition, 
Hodgson, also alerts us to think about how agents make sensible (also socially acceptable) 
choice and overcome the problem of complexity and abundance of data, and the limited 
computational capacity of human brain at the same time. There must be some ways and 
tactics to do this. 
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The Critique of the Rational Conception of Action 
Neoclassical economics assumes that human actions are regulated by conscious 
rational calculation. The "economic man" is a rational calculator. Somewhat different 
from the neoclassical view, the behavioralist model (e.g. Simon, 1957a) holds that 
rational calculation is inevitably bounded. Thus, a "satisficing" model may be a more 
practical and appropriate description of rational human actions. 
Both the neoclassical and the behavioralist models assert that actions are driven by 
reason (rational calculation). The rational conception of action is being challenged not 
only by institutionalists, but also by economists, like Veblen (1909) and Wesley Mitchell 
(1918). Sociologist Vilfredo Pareto also suggests that many behaviors are enacted in 
ways that are not logically related to given ends. He further states that many human 
actions “are performed instinctively, mechanically, in pursuance of habit" (1935, Vo.l: 
83). 
If action is primarily driven by reason, how about the act of reasoning? Supporters 
of the rational conception of reason insist that the act of reasoning, as a second order 
reasoning, is also rational. This logic has pushed them into the trap of infinite regress. 
To stop the infinite regress, we must find something behind the action other than the 
reasoning. Thus neoclassical economists face the dilemma: either they have to recognize 
the possibility that some of the actions are not rational, or there is non-rational stimulus 
behind human action other than reasoning alone. However, both ofthese are inconsistent 
with the rational assumption. 
The concept of rational action also assumes a pattern of action, (i.e., somewhat like 
"programmed" action), do A to achieve B, for example. Hodgson (1988), however, 
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argues that daily decision making involves a much more complex web of interrelations 
between the means and ends. We do P, Q, R to achieve A, B, C, and when P and Q are 
acted, consequences X，Y and Z will be resulted. For such a complicated network of 
reasons and actions, they would hardly be consistent and free of contradiction. 
Hodgson (1988) further observes that decision making in real life should be broken 
down into different levels. Some decisions are at higher level, such as the decision to get 
marry and accept a newjob offer. These decisions are usually made after serious analysis, 
but it does not necessarily mean that all the possible alternatives and consequences are 
considered. There are other lower level decisions with "non-strategic" character. For 
example, choosing a bottle of shampoo. It is rather unlikely that people will spent too 
much time on analyzing all the possible means and ends for lower level decisions. 
The above-mentioned decision making hierarchy implies a modification of the 
rational conception of action with the "lexicographic" modeP of choice. Supporters of 
the rational conception of action argue that even if we cannot have consistent rational 
decision at all times, we still can be consistent at each level of choice. But according to 
the neoclassical economic assumptions, all decisions are made at the same level of 
consciousness. Simply put, if the decision-making hierarchy is to be accepted, it will be 
contradictory to the original theoretical assumptions. Nonetheless, Hodgson thinks that 
the concept of the decision-making hierarchy is still open to criticism. Just one simple 
question "why we have to divide decision making into different levels if the rational 
concept is always true?" First, the decision-making hierarchy already implies that 
different levels of deliberation will be used for different types of decisions and actions. 
7 This model involves a consideration of a number ofhierarchically ranked attributes. Analysis will be 
done for the first ranked attribute, when satisfied, go to the next below ranked attributes and so on. See 
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Second, when the problem of complexity is very severe, we still question whether the 
hierarchical divisions could really overcome the human computational limit. 
In addition to the discussion that different degree of deliberation might be applied 
at different levels of decision making, we now come to the idea of "unconscious" 
behavior. To protect their own theoretical paradigm and to preserve the idea of 
"consumer sovereignty," the neoclassical economists reject any ideas of unconscious or 
sub-rational human actions. However, concepts like "unconsciousness" and "sub-
consciousness" are widely recognized by psychologists, semiologists, and other social 
and political scientists. The idea of unconscious mental process^ has been studied under 
the stream of "cognitive psychology." This school of study advocates that we recognize 
objects around us not by rational calculation but by searching our conceptual memory. 
Such a mental process operates subconsciously in the processing of a huge amount of 
data. As cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser points out, “seeing, hearing, and 
remembering are all acts of construction" (1967:10). Perception of any object relies on a 
"constructive process and not on an immediate contact" (Piaget, 1969: 365). 
Hodgson suggests that the cognitive subconscious approach indeed makes more 
sense to real life decision making as we encounter a situation where there is too much 
data and too little knowledge (useful concept). It is not possible for us to make use of all 
the available data. The more applicable ^practical) way to reduce uncertainty is that “we 
form concepts, based on our past experience, to categorize the sense data and to endow it 
with meaning" (1988: 109). He goes on to argue that it is this "routinization of the 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1954)，Amos Tversky (1969), Peter Fishburn (1974) and Peter Earl (1983). 
8 It was Sigmund Freud who first popularized the concept of unconsciousness. For criticism on the 
conscious rational action, Hodgson has not tied himself to the strict Freudian framework in which there is 
clear division between conscious and unconscious behavior. 
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cognitive processes" (1988: 109) rather than conscious deliberation that makes the daily 
complex "calculations" possible. 
“For the discussion of conscious and sub-conscious actions, Post-Freudian 
psychologists recognize that consciousness is not an “all-or- nothing affair but a matter of 
degrees" (Koestler, 1967: 238). According to them, human agents can be rational and 
sub-rational at the same time. For the higher level consciousness, our actions are more 
likely to be based on deliberate plans. However, Searle (1984) reminds us that it would 
be equally wrong to assume all intentional actions as resulting from deliberations. For 
example, Searle remarks that full deliberation is rather uncommon in everyday 
conversation, though there may be an intention in it, “it is not an intention formed prior to 
the performance ofthe action," of which Searle labels as "intention in action" (1984: 65). 
To go further down in the hierarchy of consciousness, below intentions in action lie 
habits. Habits could be neural responses; they could also be deep-rooted 
responses/reactions that were formerly planned for complex acts, like driving to work. 
And below habits, there are various kinds of reflex and automatic actions, like breathing. 
While rational choice theorists always claim that rational mechanism is realized at each 
level of consciousness, following such a logic, habits should be regarded as repeated acts 
that are fully rational. For instance, voters habitually voting for the same party regardless 
ofwhether they know its policy. Anthony Downs (1957) regards voting behavior as such 
rational as it saves the voters' cost to collect information. Gary Becker (1976) suggests 
that there is a stable underlying preference that govems behaviors. 
Hindess (1984), however, criticizes that both Downs and Becker have committed 
the same mistake and missed the fundamental point. The rational choice model only uses 
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one form of assessment, that is, the ends and the conditions of action. It seems that 
rational choice theorists have been trying every possible argument to justify the presence 
of rational calculation. For instance, habitual voting is to save the cost for collecting 
information. But as Hindess remarks, "calculation", if happens, can also be socially 
determined. 
In discussing about the level of consciousness in decision-making, Hodgson (1988) 
also draws our attention to a kind of act which he labeled as "weakness of will" or 
"incontinence." It is the kind of action in which people act against what they have 
considered as rational, for example, drinking too much before driving. Unlike habits and 
reflex actions where there might be the presence of intention, "incontinence" is definitely 
not consistent with the idea of intention. Once we recognize the presence of complex and 
multiple levels of consciousness, we have to accept that there are different levels of 
deliberation for different kinds of actions. Thus the global assumption of the neoclassical 
scheme that all actions operate at the same level of consciousness becomes problematic. 
Although the behavioralist school and other modified models defend the rational 
model by highlighting the importance of imperfect information and bounded rationality, 
Hodgson critically points out that "there can be insufficient recognition that information 
does not enter raw into the decision-maker's mind. The perceptive, cognitive and 
conceptual process are sometimes downgraded or ignored" (1988: 112). Here comes the 
idea that data are to be perceived and understood only through a conceptual process. 
Institutionalists argue that such a process is indeed a socially constructed one. 
Before moving to the next section, I would like to sum up the discussions and 
criticisms on the neo-classical economic assumptions. First, autonomous decision 
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making is rare in real life, social being makes decision in a social context which is 
endogenous rather than exogenous to the decision-maker. Second, within a social arena, 
people maximize self as well as collective interests, social values and expectations not 
only exert influence on the decision-maker, but also shape one's preference in making 
choice. In addition to conscious rational calculation, it is more common for people to 
make decisions by habits, routines and reference to their own past experience. When the 
rational actor model only describes what is the best decision, it fails to explain why 
people come to such a decision. Its inadequacy calls for alternative models. 
Alternative Approaches: The Institutional and the 
Organizational Culture Models 
Criticisms against the rational assumptions ofhuman action draw our attention to a 
social, cultural and institutional framework for the analysis ofhuman actions. According 
to the institutional approach, culture and institution are significant because they not only 
affect the way we perceive the information, but also play an important role in moulding 
and shaping our preference and thus our choice of action in the first place. In short, they 
function as "information guidelines" (Hodgson, 1988: 118). 
For everyday decision-making and acting, we encounter a huge amount ofjumbled 
data. We have to rely on our previously acquired knowledge to interpret and to give 
meaning to the data. It is generally agreed that concepts and perceptual framework are 
obtained through the socialization including the educational process. Perception is an act 
of categorization and categories can be leamed and communicated, largely in the forms 
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of social language which is culturally specific.' In other words, as our conceptual frames 
originate from a particular social context in which we are brought up and socialized; by 
interacting with the others, we gradually learn our culture, social norms, customs and 
rules. Most importantly, we learn what are regarded as socially acceptable ways of 
practice. 
Application ofInstitutional Theory in Organizational Studies 
In this section, we will review the literature related to the development of 
institutional theory, particularly, its application to organizational studies. Richard Scott 
(1995) describes the development of institutional theory as a continuation of the 
intellectual thoughts of the open systems theory that stresses the importance of social 
environmental influence external to the organization and decision-makers. Institutional 
theory draws our attention to the social and cultural aspects of human behavior, 
especially, the social knowledge and the cultural rule system (1995). 
Earlier application of institutional theory to explain organizational behavior 
includes works of Robert Merton (1940, 1957) and Philip Selznick (1948). Although 
Merton did not use the term “institution，explicitly, he depicts how individual is 
constrained by the bureaucratic structure and its rule system, and being oriented to the 
normative dimension of the organization. Based on Merton's works, Selznick makes 
formal recognition of the institutionalization process. He points out that "organizations 
are social systems, goals or procedures tend to achieve an established, value-impregnated 
status. We say that they become institutionalized" (1949: 256-257). Both Merton and 
9 Cognition has cultural specificity, people who are brought up under different cultures, have their own 
rules and norms to interpret information as are specific to the world around them. And only through the 
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Selznick hold that value commitment to organizational procedures and mles by the 
members is not simply for attaining instrumental purpose alone. The institutional 
approach does not simply see organizations as rational entities which strike for 
instrumental survival purposes, but as vehicles that struggle continuously to preserve a 
set of unique values (Scott, 1995; Perrow, 1986). 
Talcott Parsons offers a "cultural-institutional" perspective to study institutional 
forces and organizations. On one hand, Parsons stresses the importance of the 
"subjective" dimension of institutions in which individuals internalize shared norms and 
values which form the reference frame for action. On the other hand, Parsons draws our 
attention to the "objective" dimension of institution. For the objective dimension, he 
refers to the wider normative structures which legitimatize the existence of the 
organizations, and particularly, the functional patterns of operation in which values are 
preserved (1934/1990, 1960a). 
Parsons remarks that the institutional approach relates organizations to the norms 
and conventions of the community and society. Organization is only a sub-system of “a 
wider social system which is the source of ‘meaning,’ legitimization, or higher-level 
support that makes the implementation of organization's goals possible" (Parson, 1960b: 
63-64). 
Parsons (1940) asserts that all human activities, including economic activities, take 
place within an institutional framework. Institutions are not simply organizational 
structures, but also "normative patterns which define what are felt to be, in the given 
society, proper, legitimate, or expected modes of action or of social relationship" (1940: 
culturally specific conceptual framework, can the sense data be understood (For details, see Lloyd, 1972). 
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190). The continuing of the institutions depend “on the support ofthe moral sentiments'° 
of the members of the society" (1940: 192). 
Parsons even argues that self-interested behavior is an institutional product. For the 
objectives and contents of self-interest are formed under institutions which favor their 
development. Self-interest itself must be a value being accepted (or even favored) by the 
social others. Thus self-interested behavior after all is a kind of social behavior being 
incorporated into the social norms. 
Scholars from the Carnegie School see the institutional forces in organization as a 
kind of governing mechanism constraining people to act more or less according to the 
"performance program” (March and Simon, 1958: 142). They recognize ingredients like 
value assumptions, cognitive frames, mles and things alike help to induce rational 
behavior in organizations. As Herbert Simon lively puts it, "the rational individual is, 
and must be, an organized and institutionalized individual" (1957b:102). 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the newly emerged social psychology brought some new 
insights into the understanding of human behavior in organizations. This discipline, also 
called the cognitive theory, puts equal emphasis on both the sociological and 
psychological elements in decision making. Despite their stress on the cognitive 
limitation of the human mind, cognitive psychologists have recognized individuals as an 
active and reflexive entity in perceiving, interpreting and making sense of their world. 
Under this approach, individuals are not totally passive to structural influence, rather, 
they interact actively with the social world. 
In short, "institution" seems to be an all- encompassing term, which Richard W. 
1° Parsons claims that moral sentiments are developed in the early childhood and are deeply seeded in 
personality. They are beyond one's consciousness and control except in some critical siUmtion. (See 
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Scott conceptualizes as: 
‘ Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various 
carriers - cultures, structures, and routines — and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction(1995: 33). 
Scott sees an "institution" as a multifaceted system that incorporates cognitive 
construction, normative rules and regulative processes. For him, these three components 
become the three pillars of institutions (Scott, 1995). 
The Three Pillars of Institutions 
Scott (1995) has suggested three pillars of institutions, namely the regulative, 
normative and cognitive pillars. Different scholars and theorists stress on one or the 
other as their central theme of analysis. 
The Regulative Pillar 
The regulative aspects of institutions have attracted attention from scholars of the 
economic stream, where they see institutions as devices for constraining and regulating 
behavior. The regulative processes are made possible by making use of explicit rules, 
incentives and sanctions. Douglas North (1990) conceptualizes the rule system and the 
enforcement mechanism as something similar to the rules of the game, which consist of 
both formal written rules and unwritten codes of conduct which the players are expected 
to follow, and punishment will be enacted if the rules are being violated. 
As individuals and firms mainly focused on advancing their own interest in the 
Talcott Parsons, 1940: 193) 
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market, there is a need to establish an effective regulatory mechanism to induce rule 
compliance so that good market order can be preserved. Force, fear and expedience are 
the crucial elements ofthe regulatory pillars. This approach assumes that individuals are 
motivated by the cost-and-benefit logic, and they react instrumentally to the 
organizational structure. 
The Normative Pillar 
The normative pillar of the institutions is widely recognized by sociologists. The 
normative pillar emphasizes normative rules that prescribe and legitimatize social 
behavior. The normative system includes both values and norms. According to Scott 
(1995), values are conceptions of what are preferred or desirable, from which behavioral 
standards are constructed; norms specify how things should be done, that is, what are the 
legitimate means. Simply put, the normative system not only defines the ends, but also 
prescribes the appropriate (legitimate) means for the attainment of the ends. In short, 
these conceptions prescribe the social roles of different individuals and they constitute 
normative expectations on individuals, that is, how they should behave. According to 
Scott's analysis, the normative rules constrain social behavior on one hand, but also 
empower and enable social actions on the other hand. He points out that "[T]hey confer 
rights as well as responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, and licenses as well as 
mandates" (1995: 38). 
In summary, the normative approach emphasizes how institutions structure choices. 
Actors conform to the structure rules not only for instrumental purposes, but also because 
they are expected to do so. 
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The Cognitive Pillar 
The cognitive pillar of institutions stresses the cognitive elements, that is "the rules 
that constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made" 
(Scott, 1995: 40). This dimension reverses the passive role of individual in the 
construction of social meaning. As Scott argues, in order to understand or to explain any 
social action, the actors have to use their own subjective interpretation in addition to the 
objective condition. For the reality is not defined objectively out there, facts do not speak 
for themselves; rather, the reality is to be interpreted and understood through a reference 
frame which formed from one's previous experience, beliefs and value premises. It 
breaks the common assumption that information is objectively and uniformly perceived. 
There is no consensus regarding the active role of human actors. In the earlier 
sociological studies, symbolic systems and shared meanings were regarded as internal to 
individuals and thus were subjective in nature. Under the cognitive approach to 
institutions, individuals do play a role in constructing and negotiating social meaning 
from day to day. However, in doing so, individuals are situated within a wider, pre-
existing cultural system which should be seen as both objective and external to them. In 
brief, the external cultural systems provide orientation, meaning and guidance for actions 
(Hoffman, 1974; Gonos, 1977; Maines, 1977; Swidler, 1986; Zucker 1977). 
The most important element under the cognitive pillar is the constitutive rules 
(Searle, 1969). These rules are used for the creation of categories and typifications of 
which the processes are both subjective and objective (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
The constitutive rules create the rules of the game, the actors and their roles in the games. 
But unlike the regulative view, cognitive theorists insist that the rules of the games imply 
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something much more than rules and controlling mechanism. The rules ofthe games also 
consist of "socially constructed players" (Scott, 1995: 42) who have different capacities 
for action and parts to play. 
Despite the fact that constitutive rules are so basic to social structure and social life, 
many people just take them for granted. However, as Scott (1995) suggests, actors are 
social constructions. People make sense of their social roles through socially constructed 
identities. For instance, in recognizing the identity of being a mother, a woman knows 
what she is expected to do. Moreover, the social construction of actors is not limited to 
persons, but also to collectives. The development of collective entities, like university 
and hospital, would take many years before their identities, utilities and capabilities could 
be formed and defined. Once they are established, they function as cultural models. We 
expect hospitals and universities to take up specific social responsibilities and operate in 
a particular manner. 
The significance of the cognitive dimension of institutional theory is its stress on 
social identities. Because of these socially constructed identities, we know who we are 
and how to react under different social situations. More importantly, the cognitive 
theorists recognize individuals as active and sense making agents who are not just 
confined by the institutions, but are able to react and create meaning to the social reality. 
The institutional approach as an alternative model to the rational economic man 
model provides a more sensible analytical framework for the understanding ofhuman and 
collective behaviors that are largely social in nature. The three pillars of institutions 
indeed constitute different levels of analysis between the institutional systems and their 
influence on the agents. Particularly, the cognitive pillar offers new insight into the 
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interactive agency-structure relationship. 
Understanding Organizational Change through the Organizational 
Culture Perspective 
It is difficult to describe exactly what organizational culture is. Different scholars 
define it differently. For the management school, organizational culture has been seen as 
a managerial tool that the top management can maneuver to induce the ‘ideal, type of 
organizational behaviors and performance (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Such an 
instrumental view sees organizational culture as many discrete variables, like values, 
beliefs, stories and norms, etc., that can be manipulated. However, culture can be seen 
as more holographic than mechanistic. The holographic view argues that when corporate 
culture is strong enough, organizational values are build into the attitudes of the 
organizational members (Morgan, 1997: 151). Organization members are strongly 
committed to those values rather than being "controlled" to do so. 
Organizational culture is commonly described as "the idea that certain things in 
groups are shared or held in common" (Schein, 1992: 8). Properties associated with 
such an idea include: (1) observed behavioral regularities when people interact with one 
another; (2) group norms, that is the implicit standards and values prevail; (3) espoused 
values; (4) formal philosophy; (5) mles of the game; (6) climate; (7) embedded skills; (8) 
habits ofthinking, mental models, and /or linguistic paradigms; (9) shared meanings; (10) 
root metaphors or integrating symbols. 
These elements are closely associated with the concepts of "sharing", "structural 
“For a detailed elaboration on each of these elements, see Schein, E. H. (1992). Organizational Culture 




stability" and "patterning or integration". When the term "culture" is used, it implies 
something that are not only shared, but deep and stable (Schein, 1992). 
Schein points out that group culture is the accumulated leaming of its members. 
Learning occurs when people share a common communication system and language. 
Learning happens at the conceptual level, which makes shared concepts possible. Schein 
labels these deeply shared concepts as the basic assumptions. These basic assumptions 
are powerful in a sense that they usually operate outside of the organization members' 
consciousness. Schein defines organizational culture as^ :^ 
A pattem of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to those problems (1992: 12). 
According to Schein, culture and leadership are interwoven concepts. Leaders 
create a kind of culture when they first create the group and its membership. The 
prevailing organization culture, in turn, determines the criteria of who would be leaders. 
So theories of organizational culture are also theories of organizational leadership. 
Steven J. Ott (1989) suggests a functional definition for organizational culture 
where: 
(1) It provides shared patterns of cognitive interpretations or perceptions, so 
organization members know how they are expected to act and think. 
(2) It provides shared patterns of affect, an emotional sense of involvement and 
commitment to organizational values and moral codes - of things worth 
working for and believing in — so organization members know what they are 
expected to value and how they are expected to feel. 
12 There are three other elements that related to this definition which will not be discussed here. They are 
the "problem of socialization", the "problem ofbehavior" and "can a large organization have one culture?” 




(3) It defines and maintains boundaries, allowing identification of members and 
nonmembers. 
(4) It functions as an organizational control system, prescribing and prohibiting 
certain behaviors, (p. 68) 
Ott (1989) remarks that through the organizational culture lenses, we actually see a 
mini-society made up of social constructions. These social constructions may vary in 
different parts of an organization that lead to the development of sub-cultures. It is 
noteworthy that these social constructions are not created explicitly or consciously. 
Rather the organization members come to agreement through a slow, implicit and 
unconscious process. There is no true definition of organization culture, as "truth" is 
constructed than discovered. 
Regarding cultural change, the concept of organizational learning comes in. 
Traditionally, two similar approaches but with different focus are found in organizational 
learning theory. The first approach sees organizational learning as learning done by key 
individuals of an organization, who in turn would be associated with subsequent 
organizational changes. The second approach holds that an organization possesses the 
ability to leam like individuals. Since both of these approaches have their theoretical 
grounds rooted in cognitive theory, people label this stream as the "cognitive 
perspective"^^ of organizational learning (Cook & Yanow, 1996). 
The “cognitive perspective" to organizational learning, however, neglects the 
uniqueness of organizational learning as the learning undertaken by the organization as a 
whole, not by individuals. As a result, studies under this perspective are not very fruitful 
for the understanding of how organization leams as a whole. Because of this limitation, 
13 For writings on the "cognitive perspective" on organizational learning, see Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Bohnan, 1976; Duncan & Weiss，1979; and March & Olsen，1976. 
54 
Chapter One 
Cook & Yanow (1996) advocate a "cultural perspective" on organizational learning as a 
complement to the cognitive perspective. 
The cultural perspective on organizational learning believes that organizational 
activities are collectively done by groups, not by individuals. For example, the ability to 
play basketball games and perform symphonies is only meaningflil when it is attributed 
to a group, but not individuals. 
Organizational learning, according to Cook & Yanow, "refers to the capacity of an 
organization to learn how to do what it does, where what it learns is possessed not by 
individual members of the organization but by the aggregate itself, and "when a group 
acquires the know-how associated with its ability to carry out its collective activities, that 
constitutes organizational learning" (1996: 438). This definition highlights the collective 
nature of organizational learning. Later, they define the cultural aspects of organizational 
learning as "the acquiring, sustaining, or changing of intersubjective meanings through 
the artifactual vehicles of their expression and transmission and the collective actions of 
the group" (1996; 449). 
Cook & Yanow assert organization learning is a cultural rather than a cognitive 
activity. This approach assumes that organizations are cultural entities, where culture is 
seen as "a set of values, beliefs, and feelings, together with artifacts of their expression 
and transmission (such as myths, symbols, metaphors, rituals), that they are created, 
inherited, shared, and transmitted within one group of people and that, in part distinguish 
that group from others" (Cook & Yanow, 1996: 439-40). This definition is in line with 




The importance of the cultural perspective on organizational learning is its focus on 
how “an organization constitutes and reconstitutes itself，(Cook & Yanow，1996: 450). It 
should be noted that organizational learning from the cultural perspective goes beyond 
the acquisition of new technical skills. It refers to whether organization members can 
cognitively come to the same level of understanding of new ideas, and more importantly, 
whether the ideas are legitimate and accepted by most of the organization members. This 
perspective draws our attention to the cultural metaphor in the organization. 
Organization actions are based on a shared systems of meaning, which in turn, rely on 
commonly held interpretive schemes that create and recreate meanings to these actions. 
For new ideas to be introduced into the organization, it requires members to collectively 
change (tone) their interpretive lens to the scheme adopted by their organization. It also 
requires a toning of (if not a change of) ideologies, values, beliefs, language, norms and 
other conventional practice that ultimately shaped and guided organized actions. So the 
actual task involved is to "create appropriate system of shared meaning that can mobilize 
the effort of people in pursuit of desired aims and objectives" (Morgan, 1997: 147). 
Changing organizational culture is by no means an easy task. But an understanding 
of the nature of the cultural metaphor enables organizational leaders and managers to 
create and shape meanings. When organizational members recognize the new meanings 
and behaviorally comply with them, we can say that organizational learning happens. 
Spencer Zifcak's "Appreciative Shift，，Model 
Spencer Zifcak (1994) studies administrative reforms in Britain and Australia. He 
uses a qualitative and action-oriented research approach to find what actually had 
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happened through “the eyes ofthe participants." From the field data, Zifcak constructed 
three theoretical frameworks to analyze the administrative reforms. The three models are 
"purposeful intervention", "institutional negotiation" and "appreciative shift" models. 
Although the three frameworks advocate quite different perspectives in analyzing and 
understanding the reforms, however, all are related to the concept ofrationality. 
Zifcak's "appreciative shift" model sees administrative reform and organizational 
change as the products of organizational learning (Cyert and March, 1963: 123-5; Schon 
1971: 109; Crozier and Friedberg 1980: 221; Starbuck et al. 1991: 785). Life in 
organization is not only based on reasons, logics and analysis, rather people in 
organization act more or less according to the collectively agreed forms, pattern and 
synthesis (Vickers 1983: 36ff), and on the basis of a series of learned and tacit norms 
(Polanyi, 1967: 1-25). Individual's appreciative system is developed through experience, 
particularly experience earned from human communication and interaction (Zifcak, 1994: 
181). 
Zifcak borrows Donald Schon's concept of "reflection in action" (Schon, 1983: 
49ff) to elaborate the above theme on the appreciative shift. It refers to a continuous 
process in which people frame their reality, act with reference to their framing, and alter 
the situation that has been framed. In this say, people constantly act as a ‘part, of the 
situation they are in, and give new meaning to it. 
Organization then becomes a collective accumulative knowledge system. The kind 
of knowledge means more than "facts," but also ideology, myth, symbol, story and 
pattem of behavior which are the major components of the organization culture (Zifcak, 
1994: 182). When people encounter problematic situations in organizations, they search 
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for solution from both personal and organizational knowledge. Individual and collective 
learning are made possible when people realize the repercussions of their actions. 
Through the learning mechanism, organization appreciation and syntheses occur. 
Recent research findings on both organization and management studies have very 
much stressed the importance of organizational culture. Actually organizational culture is 
crucial in understanding how organizational actors perceive the organizational reality and 
thus their choice of action. However, it should be noted that when we say organization 
culture exerts powerful influence on individual's action, we do not mean that it 
determines people's action. The choice of individual actor will depend on his/her reason, 
capacity and resources (Zifcak, 1994: 183). Tension might exist between individual and 
organizational appreciation (Kaufman, 1971; Schon, 1971:159). 
In sum, this perspective introduces a kind of rationality found in individual and 
collective intuition, interpretation and action (Harmon and Mayer 1986). Zifcak's 
"appreciative shift" offers new insight into researches on administrative reform, it 
suggests alternative ways to explore and explain why reform outcome deviate from the 
official reform agenda. Such a model shares the same cognitive lens as Richard Scott's 
"cognitive pillar" (1995). 
Analytical Framework: Social Reconstruction of Rationality 
After reviewing the relevant literature, this section comes to develop the analytical 
framework of this paper. 
Given the fact human decisions are rarely made independent from the social and 
organizational context, people go for self as well as collective interest, the rational 
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economic man model alone is of limited applicability to explain and understand 
organizational life in the public sector. Seeking alternative models to explain managerial 
change, I tumed to the institutional and organizational culture theories. The institutional 
approach emphasizes more on formal organization where much attention is given to the 
studies of structural elements, like rules and regulations. While organization cultural 
approach stresses more on informal organization where peer norms and group identities 
are the focus of analysis. Though the two approaches have their own areas of emphases, 
they share common elements are like organizational memories and histories. The two 
approaches actually could be fused together to strengthen their analytical and explanatory 
power. See Figure 5 below: 
Figure 5: Fusion of the Institution and the Cultural Approaches 
Normative Norms/Beliefs 
pillar 
/ # \ 
Regulative y ^ \ | \ ^ 
pillar X Institution ! 丨 Culture \ !dentity 
\ ^ ^ ^ 
Cognitive 
pillar Sense making 
The cultural and institutional aspects explain the embedded structural influence and 
the norm binding effects on the organization members. Especially the cognitive 
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perspective^^ that stresses individuals as active reflective participants who seek for 
meaning, come to agreement, jointly re-construct and give new meaning to organizational 
activities. This cognitive element constitutes the idea of social re-construction. In 
delineating (and to de-mystifying) the HA managerial change, there is no need to totally 
deny the rational economic man model as rationality still plays a role in explaining 
organizational life. In this thesis, I want to integrate the rational, institutional and cultural 
perspective into an analytical framework that stresses rationalities are social constructs 
and context dependent concepts. See Figure 6: 
Figure 6: Social Reconstruction of Rationality 
Rationality 
Cognition Sense Making 
Z Normative | Norms/ ^ ^ 
y ^ values I Beliefs \ ^ 
R u l e s / R e g u l a t i o n s , Z - < , ' < ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ � � \ Identity 
Individualism Interest maximization 
x^^^^X^ Unexplained part of organizational life 
14 Both Richard Scott's (1995) "cognitive" pillar and Zifcak's (1994) "appreciative shift" models adopt the 
same cognitive lens in their theoretical development. 
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Each of the three perspectives has its core elements presented in a triangle as what 
have been discussed in Figure 3 and 5, the three perspectives could be merged together to 
form a pyramid. It is the cognitive element of the institutional model and the sense-
making element of the cultural model that re-construct and give meaning to the rational 
behavior. Even the best analytical model could not fully explain social behaviors, so the 
base of the pyramid represents the unexplained part of the organizational life. 
Rationality as a Re-constructed Concept 
Rational analyses (calculations) are being worshipped for their objectivity and 
determinate rules, and for their privileged status as the universal truth. Stone argues that 
the kind of rational calculation in turn is only made possible by some predetermined 
categories. It is the definition of categories, not calculations that determine the result. It 
is important to note that the categories, as Stone observes, are "human mental constructs" 
(1988: 307). They are not something really objective as claimed; rather people are 
constructing their meanings. This interpretation is in line with Berger and Luckmann's 
theory which asserts that we come to know the reality only through the named categories 
that enable people to give meanings (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). So rational analysis 
is meaningful only with reference to particular social and political contexts. As Stone 
points out: 
. . . t h e categories of thought behind reasoned analyses are themselves being 
constructed in political struggle, and nonviolent political conflict is conducted 
primarily through reasoned analysis. It is not simply, therefore, a matter that 
sometimes analysis is used in partisan fashion or for political purposes. Reasoned 
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analysis is necessarily political. It always involves choices to include some things 
and exclude others and to view the world in a particular way when other visions are 
possible. Policy analysis is political argument, and vices versa (1988: 306). 
When neoclassical economics is the main stream thought, people put emphasis on 
economic efficiency and unit cost analysis. The current application of managerialism in 
the public sector involves a fundamental ideological shift in the provision of public 
services. Such an administrative reform with a focus on the efficiency, however, has also 
gone over an organizational learning and reconstruction process. 
The managerial reform brings new ideologies and commercial elements to the 
public sector which aims to create a new organizational culture to revitalize the 
government machine. "To improve performance," “to increase competition" and “to 
increase efficiency and productivity" are many of the rational targets to be attained. 
However, this paper queries the objectivity of these targets. Do organization members 
and the organization as a whole really "know" and "leam" what is to be achieved and 
how to achieve them? 
There may be typical kinds of belief, norms and practices deeply embedded in the 
organizational structure as well as in the culture which constitutes a reference framework 
for daily activities and decision making. Managerial concepts gain their legitimacy in the 
organization. In real life applications, organization members were not only being told 
what to do. Rather, concepts are communicated to the organization members, and the 
members search, construct and attribute meanings to these concepts. As a result, a social 
reconstruction process goes hand in hand with the rational managerial reform. 
"Performance", after all, may be some "mutually agreed" and "modified" standards to 
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follow. Concepts such as "efficiency" and "rationality," despite being labeled as 
objective, are constructed myths. All in all, as Richard Scott points out, "rationalities are 
contextualized" (1995: 151). 
In the next two chapters, I will analyze the HA managerial reform from an official 
and a participant perspective respectively. Readers can then understand what kind of 
managerial content had been introduced and how they were understood and actualized by 
the participants. I will let the interviewees tell their own stories. 
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The Content of the Managerial Reform: 
The New Philosophy of the Hospital Authority 
The idea of establishing an independent statutory body to oversee the 
management ofpublic hospitals was first proposed by the Scott Report in 1985^ The 
Provisional Hospital Authority (PHA) was set up on 1 October 1988 to consider and 
make recommendations on matters relating to the establishment of the Hospital 
Authority (HA). The HA was formally established on 1 December 1990. It marked 
the beginning of a new era in the delivery of public hospital services. 
The idea to establish an independent Authority to manage the public hospital 
services was largely following the western administrative reform model. People 
commonly thought that government bureaucracies were conservative, unresponsive, 
lacking of competition and innovation, and there were too many red tapes. So, there 
was a widespread effort to privatize public organizations and to rationalize resources 
allocation during the 1970s and 1980s in many of the western countries. The first tide 
of change focused on the institutional arrangement, either to privatize the services or 
to set up quasi-autonomous governmental organizations (Quangos) to run the services 
and to roll back the frontier of the government provision. The second tide was the 
emphasis ofapplying private business managerial concepts (with some modifications) 
in managing the public services. The "business" ways have been recognized as 
"solutions" to many ofthe inherited problems in public organizations. In this chapter, 
I will examine how the managerial concepts have been applied to the public hospital 
services management after the establishment ofthe HA. 
1 The Report identified a number ofproblems in the then health care system: the system was inflexible; 
imbalance utilization ofhospital services and resources among the government and the subvented 
hospitals; there were serious management problems in the large regional hospitals. The Report 
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Owen E. Hughes (1994) remarks that managerial reforms have several major 
themes. First, more attention is paid to what have been achieved. It is result-focused 
rather than procedure-focused as before. Secondly, it focuses on the flexible 
organization and personnel management. Thirdly, it stresses on the setting up ofclear 
organizational and personnel targets/objectives to be achieved, the associated 
performance indicators, and instruments for performance measurement. Fourthly, 
political appointment of senior grades staff. Fifthly, to introduce market mechanism 
and competition into the public sector. Sixthly, cutting the size of the government 
through the means of privatization. Christopher Hood (1991) points out seven 
characteristics of the 'new public management' which were largely overlapped with 
the above mentioned themes. In addition, Hood points out that there was an 
increasing use of professional managers to manage and control the professionals. 
There was also an emphasis on containing cost. The HA has largely adopted these 
ideas. 
In this chapter, I will review relevant HA reports, documents, and newsletters to 
delineate the administrative reform from the official perspective. I try to show that the 
HA has been increasingly relied on the principal-agent model as the organizing 
arrangement rather than bureaucratic hierarchical relationship alone. While the HA 
stresses a patient-centered services, the ideas of consumerism and market mechanism 
and come in. In addition to the actual work and programs that HA has undertook, it is 
also worthwhile to explore HA's managerial philosophy. 
recommended the establishment ofastatutory Hospital Authority to be responsible for all matters 
relating to the delivery of medical services in public hospitals. 
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Objectives of the Hospital Authority 
After the inauguration of the HA, it first defined its relationship with the 
Government, especially about the financial arrangement. The HA also finalized the 
staff remuneration package and the payroll arrangement. Another major task to be 
completed was about the transfer arrangement of the subvented hospitals to the HA. 
In sum, objectives of the HA are five folds. In its first Annual Report 1990-1991 
(Hospital Authority, 1991: 4), the HA stated its objectives as follows: 
First, with the integration of government and subvented hospitals into a unified 
system of public hospitals, a more effective utilization of resources should be brought 
about and a more uniform standard of service to the public should be achieved. 
Second, there should be much greater devolution of authority to the hospital level, 
as well as the introduction of modem management methods in the hospitals. This 
should improve motivation and accountability of the staff as well as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their operations. 
Thirdly, all staff should be offered the same terms and conditions of employment 
and there should be more flexibility in employment arrangements and greater 
opportunities for staff training and career development. Management training should 
be given priority in the initial years. This should promote staff harmony and improve 
their management competence. 
Fourthly, there should be a comprehensive development function in the Authority 
to ensure that Hong Kong will be kept abreast of developments and innovations in 
hospital services worldwide. The development function should also provide the 
impetus for major improvements in both the quality and efficiency of services and for 
proposing new initiatives. 
Fifthly, there should be a much greater degree of public participation in the 
provision of hospital services. Members of the public would be involved in the 
Authority itself through membership of the Board and its various committees, in the 
regional advisory committees, and in the hospital government committees of the 
individual hospitals. Direct input to each hospital from the community it serves should 
enhance the responsiveness of the hospital to the needs and wishes of the local 
community. 
The above-listed objectives somehow revealed the then prevailing managerial 
ideology, which includes components like reorganization of the service, introduction 
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of modern management methods, introduction of new management initiatives to 
increase efficiency, and stressing the importance of public participation, governmental 
responsiveness and accountability. In brief, as Christopher Pollitt points out, people 
generally believe that "better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide 
range of economic and social ills" (1993: 1). 
Organizational Mission of the Hospital Authority 
Many reformers have pointed out that a majority of problems in public 
organizations were originated from ambiguous and sometimes conflicting 
organizational goals. Unlike their counterparts in the private sector where the private 
organizations usually have clear organizational goal and business targets to be 
achieved. Accordingly, some rational reformers stress that organization should set up 
clear organizational missions. A special work group was formed and coordinated by 
an international management consultants firm to work out the HA's organizational 
mission and corporate culture. The HA finally adopted the following mission 
statement (Hospital Authority, 1991: 5): 
(a) to meet the different needs of the patients for public hospital services, and to 
improve the hospital environment for the benefit of the patients; 
(b) to project the public at large an image of care, dedication, efficiency, value for 
money and partnership, and to encourage public participation in the system, 
resulting in more direct accountability to the public; 
(c) to provide rewarding, fair and challenging employment to all its staff, in an 
environment conductive to attracting, motivating and retaining well-qualified staff; 
(d) to advise the Government of the needs of the community for public hospital 
services and of the resources required to meet these needs, in order to provide 
adequate, efficient and effective public hospital services of the highest standards 
recognized internationally within the resources obtainable; and 
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(e) to collaborate with other agencies and bodies in the health care and related fields 
both locally and overseas to provide the greatest benefits to the local community. 
In her own official claim, the above mentioned mission statement not only 
provide the direction of the managerial reform, but also implies the main features of 
the HA's organization culture - the emphasis of patient service and satisfaction. The 
HA named this new approach as a ‘patient centered' service. Graphically, the HA 
presented the concept as an "inverted pyramid". (See figure 7). 
Figure 7: The Hospital Authority's "Inverted pyramid" 
\ Patient Service Units / 
\ Support Services to / 
\ Patient Service Units / 
\ ^ 4 i t a l ~ / 
\ Chief Executive / 
Development Operational Branch Secretary General's 
Branch Branch 
Hospital Authority Board 
Source: Hospital Authority (1991). Annual Report 1990-1991, p.6. 
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The HA's corporation mission is putting patient first and to achieve a greater 
public and community involvement^ for a more efficient and accountable service to 
the public. The development of a more "patient-centered service" which opposes to 
the previous "medical-led" approach, has became the new philosophy of the HA. 
Hospital services should be planned and delivered to the public in such a way that "the 
service will no longer focus on aspiration of health care practitioners but on patient's 
needs." (Hospital Authority, 1994c) Put differently, hospital services should be 
planned and provided in such a manner that patient convenience and comfort, and 
their satisfaction are of the utmost importance. Such a direction, at first glance, was 
^ 
rather similar to the British Citizen's Charter. It implies a stress on the user right 
"consumer right" in the managerial terminology which closely associates with market 
operation. It aims to improve the powerless position of the service recipients and to 
gain public support on the services so as to increase the legitimacy ofthe government. 
The "patient centered" concept service and the idea of consumerism will be discussed 
later. 
When the HA was first established, it was one of the early 'examples' of the 
public sector reform in Hong Kong. The Authority drew a lot of public and official 
attentions on how it ran the services. As a new organization, it needed to win the heart 
and support from the public and its staff, particularly the civil servants who worked in 
previous government hospitals. This explained why the Authority stressed to put 
patient first and to improve the public hospital services so as to build up a positive 
public image. 
2 Different professionals, District Board members, community leaders, social and political activists 
were appointed to the Hospital Governing Committees, Regional Advisory Committees and the 
Hospital Authority Board. 
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One point must be mentioned here, unlike the institutional reforms and 
privatization programs in the west where many of those governments were facing 
immediate financial crises, when the HA was established, the general economic 
condition in Hong Kong was good. In addition, the government had committed extra 
resources for the organization transformation and building up of the necessary 
corporate infrastructure. A huge amount of money and resources had been invested 
on the refurbishment and renovation programs in different hospitals, on new programs 
and management initiatives, especially on the information technology, and for 
planning and building of new hospitals. This factor constituted significant impact on 
how the participants later perceived the concepts of "efficient" and "cost 
effectiveness". 
To understand the reform content, we should also pay attention to the values 
behind the reform. As Christopher Pollitt states "managerialism is a set of beliefs and 
practice" (1993: 1). In the following sections, I will list major changes that the HA 
has introduced in the past few years. In addition, I will explore the HA's underlying 
managerial values. 
Managerialism in Action 
HA currently manages a Head Office, 44 public hospitals/institutions and 49 
specialist outpatient clinics. At the end of 1997, it manages about 26,400 hospital 
beds and employs about 48,500 staff (Hospital Authority, 1997b). It is the second 
biggest organization just next to the Hong Kong Civil Service. 
3 In 1991, the British Government published the Citizen's Charter which stated the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens in using the public services. See HMSO (1991). ‘The Citizen's Charter' Cm 
1599. London: HMSO. 
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As an independent statutory body, the HA is under an arm's length control of 
the government. It is an executive body that manages the public hospital services. 
Policies related to the health care areas are developed by the Health and Welfare 
Bureau (previously named as the Health and Welfare Branch). However, HA does 
play an advisory role to the Bureau in the policy making process. 
Independence and the Concept ofan Arm's Length Control 
Being separated from the government structure, theoretically the HA would be 
free from the tie of the government "red tapes". Such an institutional arrangement 
implies a break from reliance on the traditional government department for service 
delivery, the HA will be operated as a service delivery agent (largely executive in 
nature) which maintain an arm's length relationship with the government. A 
principal-agent modef (see Figure 8 on page 72) has replaced the former top down 
hierarchical model. 
Such an arrangement facilitates the HA to undertake managerial reform as she 
has a higher degree of autonomy and could develop more flexible managerial 
mechanism and daily operating procedures to increase its efficiency. While the Chief 
Executive (CE) of the HA is made fully responsible for the performance of the agency 
and he would directly answerable to the officials in the policy branch ^>rincipal). On 
the other hand, the CE is the principal at the next level of authority, and he maintains 
a contractual control relationship with all the Hospital ChiefExecutives (HCEs). 
4 The principal-agent model is to address the problem of control (as induced by information asymmetry) 
and accountability in traditional public bureaucracy. In such a model, the original top-down 
hierarchical authority structure is divided into many different levels of responsibilities. At each level, it 
represents a clear contractual control relationship between a principal and the agent, the agent would be 
fully responsible for the management results. While acting as an agent at one level, the agent 
















































































































































































































Authority have been decentralized to the hospital level as to encourage more 
management initiatives while the HCEs would be ftilly responsible for the results 
management (the performance of the agency). With the different levels of principal-
agent relationships, the lines of responsibility and accountability would be clearly 
identified. 
However, it should be noted that even with these institutional reforms, the HA is 
still a public body. Core public values like public accountability, legality, equity and 
faimess are the founding stones of the HA. Though more flexible mechanism has 
been introduced, the HA still heavily relies on different set of rules and standard 
operating procedures, guidelines, checking and balancing mechanism to avoid abuse 
of power and ensure public accountability. It is also worth to note that the HA is only 
an executive agency and she has to follow the policy direction made by the policy 
bureaus. 
Public scrutiny is enhanced through a number of formal and informal 
mechanisms. The formal mechanisms include the HA Board is answerable to both the 
Executive and Legislative Councils. Public officials, professionals, local activists and 
public representatives have been appointed by the Government to the HA committees 
at different levels of management. Its operation is subject to the review of the 
Auditing Commission and the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints. 
The HA is also bounded by other informal constraints, like social expectation, 
scrutiny of the mass media and different complain channels available in the local 
community. 
Another point worth mentioning is that when the institutional change was 
introduced, except for the very top level of management, there was no massive 
personnel change. The organization transformation was relied on the same group of 
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Staff who were recruited and ‘trained，by the old system. When faced with the new 
organizational philosophy, the inherited values lying deep inside these staff would 
affect their perception about the ‘way’ to proceed. 
The Use of Strategic/Business Planning 
The HA published its first Business Plan (it has been renamed as Annual Plan 
since 1995) in 1992. The plan states the strategic directions of the organization and 
specific targets and performance pledges that it would like to achieve in that year. It 
also reports the results of works done in that year. Making explicit performance 
requirements and commitment, as well as the stress of performance/output measuring 
are some characteristics of the NPM. 
Furthermore, the Business Plan makes transparent about the use of public 
resources. It analyzes the corporate (business) environment, the service demands and 
service programs to meet these demands. It is one of the means by which the 
Government and members of the public could monitor the performance ofthe HA. 
The Business Plan 1992-1993 incorporated a "Business Description" section 
and a sub-section on market analysis. It made detailed analysis of service demand and 
supply, and the market share held by HA. Business plan and market analysis are 
commonly used in private business, however, the terminology was something ‘fresh’ 
in the public sector then. It revealed the initial managerial move in the HA. Not only 
does the HA Head Office publish its Business Plan, many hospitals also submit their 
own Annual/Business plans. 
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The strategic planning model was more explicit in the HA's Business Plan 
1993-1994. Four major corporate strategies were identified which formed the Five-
year Corporate Plan for 1993-1998. The corporate strategies were: 
(1) transformation of direct patient services; 
(2) developing a strong partnership with community; 
(3) organizational development and management reform; and 
(4) providing challenging employment and development opportunities for staff. 
In making use of the strategic planning process, the HA actually analyzed the 
opportunities and threats in the operating and societal environments, the strength and 
the weakness of the organization. This analysis is commonly known as the 'SWOT'^ 
analysis. 
The Corporate Vision and Strategic Directions 
In 1994 the HA reviewed the progress, and drew up its strategic directions of 
planning. The ideas were consolidated into the 'Corporate Vision’ of the Hospital 
Authority. The corporate vision highlights the important direction of development in 
the coming years: 
The Hospital Authority will lead in collaborating with other health care providers and 
careers in the community to create a seamless health care system which will maximize 
health care benefits and meet community expectations (Hospital Authority, 1994a: 12). 
In accordance with this corporate vision, five corporate strategic directions were 
developed (Hospital Authority, 1994a: 13): 
5 Strategic Management and SWOT analysis are something originated from the private market. 
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(1) The creation of a seamless health care system; by restructuring and 
reorganizing medical services into a collaborative network with other providers 
and careers in the community; 
(2) An outcome focused health care system which will maximize health benefits 
and meet community expectations; 
(3) Involving the community as partners in health in the decision making 
process to satisfy their needs; 
(4) Organization transformation and development, which entails: 
• a paradigm shift of providers to a patient-centered, outcome-focused service; 
• a new management culture of decentralization and empowerment of front-line 
units; 
• a multidisciplinary team approach to holistic patient care; and 
• an environment conductive to continuous quality improvement; 
(5) Corporate infrastructure development and innovation to support the 
implementation of strategies and enable the achievement of objectives. 
The above listed strategic directions were reaffirmed in the HA's 1996 
Corporate Plan review. However, the HA found that it was facing an increasing 
service demand and patient load. So in its Annual Planl997-1998, the HA stated the 
importance of a constant review of the financing of health care service provision and 
the need to develop, HA also aware the need to review the financing of health care 
and develop management capability to meet the service demand. Accordingly, the 
original corporate strategies were re-examined and re-prioritized. The "outcome 
focused health care" has become the first prioritized item in the HA Annual Plan since 
1997. 
Actually, in reviewing the HA documents, it is not difficult to find that the HA 
has increasingly adopted managerial thoughts and terms in its official documents. In 
the following sections, some of the service programs highlighted by the HA in 
different Business/Annual Plans and the Annual Reports will be cited to illustrate how 
the managerial ideas are being incorporated into the HA's managerial philosophy. In 
the sections below, I will examine the HA's strategic directions in details. It should be 
76 
Chapter Three 
note that HA has been seeking alternative arrangement as the organizing principles 
and the idea of principal-agent model has been adopted as to pursue management 
efficiency. 
Initiatives for the ‘Seamless Health Care System，and ‘Involving Community 
as Partners ‘ Strategic Directions: 
The ideas of "creating a seamless health care system" and "involving the 
community as partners" are interrelated. They strike to achieve several purposes. 
First, to ensure the continuity of care and access to service. Secondly, to better 
coordinate services available in each of the cluster and network, to develop 
complementary roles among the service providers and to avoid duplication of services. 
And of the utmost importance, the two ideas are to develop possible 'alternative' 
forms of service provision to control the foreseeable increasing health care demand 
and the escalating health care cost. As pointed out by the HA, "[Because] resources 
are always limited, maximization of the benefits of available resources will call for 
rational and innovative ways of utilizing the distribution network of services to 
achieve comprehensive coverage of the needs of the population". (Hospital Authority, 
1995a: 25). 
To achieve their target, the HA needs to maximize the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the existing distribution network, to manage the health care demand 
and to interface with other health care providers. To draw up the future working plans, 
the HA has to carry out a lot of data analysis and studies regarding the population, the 
market and the service utilization, so as to figure out the cost effectiveness of different 
forms of service delivery. 
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Under these two strategic directions, many programs were introduced by the HA. 
For examples, increasing the provision of extended care and infirmary beds to provide 
tertiary care to the patients. In addition, the HA also developed alternative forms of 
service. For instance, setting up outreach and community teams, geriatric/psychiatric 
day care places, pre-admission and post-discharge services and day surgical units. 
With these new initiatives, the HA hopes to lessen the public's demand on the more 
costly acute beds. 
The HA also implemented shared care programs for some patient groups, such 
as the Diabetic Shared Care Programs. These programs enable the HA to make use of 
the community primary care resources to continuously taking care the group of 
patients. The HA aimed to decrease hospital admission rate and specialist out-patient 
attendance by 10% (Hospital Authority, 1995a: 40). 
The two strategic directions were not only relied on the HA service, but also 
explore the collaboration opportunities with Department of Health, Social Welfare 
Department, community agencies and private practitioners, especially for the primary 
and tertiary care. 
One could not deny the strategic directions of creating a seamless health care 
system and involving community as partners are for optimal resource allocation. The 
HA has identified what are the core services from what are not. For those non-core 
services, HA chooses to maintain a collaborative contractual relationship with outside 
community agencies, thus more flexible modes of cooperation and service delivery are 
made possible. Such a model implies a break of the bureaucratic top down 
hierarchical structure and a tum from direct service provision that have been 
• 
recognized as inefficientl. 
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By maintaining principal-agent relationships with the outside partners, the HA 
could have more flexibility in managing resources as well as her service frontier. 
Initiatives for Developing an ‘Outcome_Focused，Health Care System: 
Under the NPM model, HA's control mechanism relies on different levels of 
principal-agent relationships, such a mechanism focus on outcomes/results than on 
procedures. Agreed performance targets (at hospital, departmental and personal level) 
will be worked out between the principals and the agents. The outcome focused 
health care system is seen both as a motivating and result management strategies. 
In the 1995/1996 Annual Report, the HA states that “[An] outcome focused 
health care system refers to a rational approach in critically examining the complex 
health care process and scientifically assessing the benefit of interventions to the 
health outcome of the patient. ...It is thus necessary to re-define the health care 
product against which health outcome is measured" (p.33). In the same report, the 
HA further points out that that the idea would be carried out by using priority disease 
groups and priority patient groups. It clearly demonstrates that rationing ofhealth care 
resources is needed, though the report does not use exact wordings like "cost-benefit 
analysis”, the measuring of outcome actually implies the same things. 
The out-come focused approach involves the analysis and categorization of the 
health care process and definition of care episode. Like many western countries, the 
HA started to develop diagnosis groupings like the Patient Related Groups (PRG). By 
developing the PRG, the HA wants to minimize the variability in clinical practices 
and thus control the costing for similar disease groups. The HA also started to gather 
statistics about the service utilization, and to calculate the cost for different specialties. 
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The next step was to develop outcome indicators by empirical studies, to measure the 
clinical outcomes, and conduct patient satisfaction survey to measure patients' 
satisfaction. It has been stated clearly by the HA that it would link input-outcome in 
its annual planning and its decision to allocate resource for different hospitals. In the 
year of 1995/1996 a new resource allocation mechanism was introduced to the 
planning process of major acute hospitals, part of the resource would be allocated 
according to the standard costing of the patient disease groupings (Hospital Authority, 
1995a: 44). 
The HA also encourages the development of quality parameters which covers 
both clinical and non-clinical hospital management. For examples, queuing time and 
infectious rate are compiled to alert staffs attention and involvement to improve their 
service to the public. These generic standards would be applied across hospitals for 
the Continuos Quality Improvement (CQI^) in hospitals. In the past few years, 
different CQI projects have been undertaken by different hospitals, the findings and 
achievements would be published in the HA Quality Bulletin. Clinical audits were 
also introduced and implemented in different clinical areas to ensure the standards of 
clinical care. 
For the quality improvement projects, they were largely measured by the 
quantitative data. Their reliability and validity would very much depend on the 
selection ofmeasuring criteriay'parameters, the design of the measuring instrument and 
the control of the measuring. However, are all aspects of quality measurable? 
It should be noted that the use of PRG, CQI and clinical audits, reflect 
mentalities like 'standardization' and ‘control.’ The implicit governing idea 




highlights a 'formulary-fit' management concept. For group ‘A, patients, the HA 
needs B, C and D procedures to achieve outcome E. There should be ‘no more’ and 
‘no less’ since doing more would mean waste, doing less would mean failing to meet 
the standard. Ifthe calculated cost is F, then resource allocation is G. 
At first glance, such a formula model looks quite logical and reasonable, but 
how true and how applicable it would be in the real situation is not unquestionable. 
Patient conditions and medical interventions are much more complicated than any 
theories can imagine. Nor could the outcome be really controllable and measurable. 
The "formulary-fit' mode is just to fit complicated conditions into a simple equation. 
Above all, this mechanic model also contradicts the HA's ‘patient-centered，service 
orientation which stresses the unique psychosocial needs of the patients. 
Initiatives for the ‘Organization Transformation and Development' 
In order to enable the principals at different levels to manage their agents' 
performance, the organization transformation and development strategy is adopted for 
such a purpose. Particularly, the utilization of information technology and the 
collection of different statistical data are for solving the problem of information 
asymmetry that inherited in traditional bureaucracy. The development of corporate 
data bank and other intellectual properties enable the principals to be more informed 
about what is going on and how things are managed. 
The HA has invested much training resources to train up leaders ^>rincipals) at 
different levels of management and clinical areas. Making the principals be better 
prepared to take up the responsibilities. 
The HA stated that ‘[Good] management is fundamental to organization 
effectiveness' (Hospital Authority, 1995a: 51). This strategic direction is to enhance 
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the managerial skills and knowledge of the health care professionals, through this 
management transformation to achieve the greatest organizational effectiveness. 
As early as in its second Business Plan 1993/94，the concept of New 
Management Initiatives P^MI) were introduced. They highlighted the critical 
elements of the management transformation, they were: 
(a) the patient is the foundation on which the new management structure is 
constructed, and management process and system developed; 
(b) each hospital will have a Hospital Governing Committee which will 
include members from the public to provide for community participation in 
the decision making process and more accountability to the public; 
(c) there will be a hospital chief executive who will have overall 
accountability and appropriate authority for the management of each 
hospital; 
(d) the implementation of general management processes and systems 
necessary o accomplish fundamental management functions of planning, 
organizing, executing, leading, monitoring and evaluating; and 
(e) developing the management capabilities required for management to 
discharge roles and responsibilities effectively. 
These new management initiatives describe some important concepts about the 
HA management structure. The first point stresses that the management structure and 
process should be patient focused. The second point emphasizes on the community 
participation as a means via which the HA can be held accountable to the public. The 
third point highlights the plan of decentralization and delegation of management 
authority to the hospital level where the hospital senior management as led by the 
Hospital Chief Executive (HCE) will be fully responsible for the performance of the 
hospital. The fourth and the fifth points are to re-emphasize the importance of 
management functions and capabilities to lead the change. They also revealed HA's 
inclination to managerial thoughts. The HA tries to introduce a "paradigm shift," that 
is to make the highly trained clinicians to recognize that clinical service have to be 
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managed, and to make them accept that a "management perspective" is essential to the 
complex clinical services (Hospital Authority, 1994a: 61). The HA has provided 
many management training courses to strengthen the managerial skills and knowledge 
ofthe staff in support of the business objectives. While Hood (1991) finds that the 
managerial movement involved the use of professional managers to manage the 
professionals, HA tries to use management philosophy to manage and influence the 
professional staff. 
The HA's NMI were classified into structural, process, people (developmental) 
and cultural aspects. For the structural aspect, the HA aims to build up a lean, flat and 
highly decentralized organizational structure and wherein services are integrated 
(Hospital Authority, 1993a: 48). To facilitate an integrated care approach, medical, 
nursing, allied health and management staff would form clinical management teams 
(for different clinical specialties) which headed by a Chief of Service. The clinical 
management team has become the key component in the new management structure. 
The clinical management team is now delegated with the necessary authority for 
management issue and resource allocation. 
For the management process, hospitals have now widely adopted the strategic 
planning and business planning as a management tool. They need to clarify their own 
visions and objectives of the service, link resource inputs and the budgetary process to 
the service outputs, targets and quality standards. 
For the staffing aspect, the HA always stresses that human resource is the most 
valuable corporate asset. The human resource functions have been strengthened at 
both the HA Head Office and the hospital level. Since the establishment ofthe HA, it 
supports decentralization and delegation of authority to operational units for 
cultivation of an open and participatory management culture. 
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(i) An open and participatory management culture 
Rapid and wide scale changes have been introduced ever since the HA 
was established, involving the staff was found to be a more promising way to 
implement the changes. Frontline staff were encouraged to initiate improvement 
in the day to day operation so as to increase their commitment and job 
satisfaction. 
The HA encouraged teamwork and team spirit to improve cross discipline 
cooperation and communication. Hospital senior management would constantly 
hold open forum to explain the HA/hospital policy to the staff and listen to their 
opinions. 
(ii) Staff Development 
At the initial stage, the HA had provided a lot of training opportunities for 
the staff to develop their professional and managerial skills. For example, 
comprehensive executive training programs were organized for senior 
executives to develop necessary managerial and leadership skills. Especially 
during the initial stage, the HA had organized many staff training programs to 
instill the new management concepts and the organizational culture. The HA 
had won some international awards in organizing staff training program. 
In addition, the HA encourages the development of specialists in different 
clinical areas and professional practices. In collaboration with different 
professional bodies and universities, the HA had organized many post-graduate 
training courses for the professional staff. 
The HA cares very much about the developmental needs of its staff. For 
all professional staff and staff in the supervisory grades or above, they have to 
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complete an annual Staff Development Review (SDR). The 
clinical/management unit head will review the performance of the staff in the 
year, and discuss with them about their professional/career development plan in 
the coming year. The unit head would try to associate and integrate the staffs 
development needs to the unit's annual plan, so as to increase the staffs job 
satisfaction, 
(iii) MotivatioMncentive 
In the past, promotion was largely based on 'seniority,' there were few 
incentives for people to innovate and work hard. In order to encourage the staff 
to perform better, the HA declared that promotion would not base on seniority 
alone, but also based on their performance. 
Furthermore, many new posts were created during the initial period, which 
in turn increased and promotion opportunities for the staff. To encourage staffs 
performance, election of outstanding staff and outstanding teams are organized 
at both the HA and the hospital levels. 
Regarding the monetary rewards, the HA staff would not have life long 
pension like what the civil servants could enjoy. However, the HA develops 
very attractive staff remuneration package which includes a significant amount 
of monthly cash allowance?. The HA staff could also enjoy medical protection, 
housing allowance and non-contributory provident fund. 
Government increment system is largely followed, but for managerial and 
supervisory grade, the annual incremental point is not automatically granted, it 
7 When HA was first established, in order to attract the civil servants tojoin the HA, it designed to use 
cash allowance to compensate the difference in the two remuneration packages. The amount ofcash 
allowance was different according to pay scale. Forjunior grade staff, they could get 16.5% ofcash 
allowance oftheir basic monthly salary. For the senior grade staff, the cash allowance could be as high 
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depends on the staffs performance. For instance, for very out-standing staff, 
double increments would be given. For some very senior posts, for example, the 
Chief Executive of the HA, there was extra bonus for satisfactory performance 
upon completion of the contract. 
For the cultural aspect, some core values have been highlighted, they are "team 
work," "cost-effectiveness," "patient centered services" and "quality" (Hospital 
Authority, 1993a: 48). Moreover, "participatory management and empowerment," 
and the development a "learning organization" culture were mentioned in the HA's 
1994/95 Business Plan (p. 61). In short, the HA tries to promote an organization 
culture of "quality patient-centered care through team work." 
Initiatives for ‘Corporate Infrastructure Development and Innovation， 
To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operation, the HA invested a 
large amount of money in developing proper corporate infrastructure and deploying 
the right kinds of medical and management technology. Besides constructing new 
hospitals, the HA also drafted detailed expansion and redevelopment plans for 
different hospitals and institutions. The ultimate aim is to shorter hospital stays and to 
improve the treatment for the patients. 
The HA has strengthened facilities and asset management capabilities at the 
hospital level by using new managerial tools and computing systems. The HA and 
hospitals could arrange contractual terms for maintenance and other repairing works 
with external agents. For cleaning and non-core supporting services, hospitals could 
now contracting out the tasks. The HA also streamlined the procurement and supply 
procedures. The concept of internal market and internal charges were also introduced 
as 60% ofthe basic monthly salary. The amount of cash allowance was revised to a lower percentage 
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to optimize the use of resources and minimize the supply induced demand (Hospital 
Authority, 1994a). 
Furthermore, the HA has invested heavily on information technology. Many 
information systems have been developed. They covered many managerial, financial 
and clinical aspects. These systems help to capture different kinds of data and 
statistics for the calculation of costing and allocating of resources. Though it was not 
mentioned in any of the HA Business/Annual Plan, by referring to the HA telephone 
directory, one can easily note that the HA has a strong Finance, Statistics and 
Information Technology Divisions at the Head Office. Particularly, under the Finance 
Division, there are sub-division like "Auditing" unit and the "Value for Money" unit. 
Some large hospitals also have their own Statistical Officers, Internal Auditors and 
Data Center. All these reflected the HA's stress on the new managerial functions. 
However, it is worth to note that the managerial control stresses more on the 
quantitative than the qualitative aspects. Under the managerialism, ‘quality，，if to be 
evaluated, will be measured by quantitative indicators. 
For developing the corporate infrastructure and innovation, HA tried to 
introduce different managerial tools, technology and personnel to enable the 
organization to operate in a rational, efficient and cost-effective manner. To pair with 
such an infrastructure development, it added other routine to the organization, each 
unit would have to collect and report different kind of statistics. People thought that 
the data were objective and would tell the fact. The reliance on statistical data and 
technology somehow changed people's mentally and behavior. In the next chapter, I 
will discuss how data collection and analysis could be biased than truly objective tools 
to support management decision. 
for all staffjoined the HA after 01.04.1998. 
87 
Chapter Three 
‘ In addition to the above-mentioned analysis, there are several important 
concepts that I would like to discuss in greater detail. The HA asserts that these 
concepts are foundations for its new corporate culture. 
The "Patient-Centered" Service Orientation 
Accesses to the service, patient convenience, continuity of care and patient 
comfort are benchmarks of the "patient-centered" orientation. It is worth to note that 
some ofits underlying concepts were intimations ofthe 1991 British Citizen's Charter. 
The HA's "patient centered" service orientation is a model of consumerism as being 
advocated by the NPM. The theory of consumerism in the public sector composes 
several elements, including access, choice, information, redress and representation 
(Potter, 1988). Under the NPM model, bureaucrats are not trustworthy for they seek 
to maximize their self-interest and neglect the needs of the service recipients. The 
stress on consumerism is to bring back consumer sovereignty and market mechanism 
a kind ofcontrol (by the public) over the public service delivery. 
Access to the Service/Information 
It is the Government's policy that no one should be prevented from receiving 
adequate medical attention (Hospital Authority，1993a: 7). Every Hong Kong citizen 
t. 
enjoys the right to use the HA services, including free Accident & Emergency 
Department services. Currently HK citizens pay HK$68 per day for inpatient services, 
and HK$44 per visit for the specialist outpatient services^ 
8 The services are heavily subsidized. For chronically ill patients and patients with financial difficulty, 
they would be waived. 
88 
Chapter Three 
Basically，people are allowed to choose the hospital and clinic that they would 
like to go to.9 However, it should be noted that the inpatient and outpatient services 
are largely relied on a referral system. The HA has introduced a "hospital clustering" 
and "networking" arrangement between hospitals to ensure patients could receive a 
continuous and comprehensive care throughout the episode of i l l n e s s � � The 
introduction of the hospital clusters also means a collaborative network with welfare 
and community organization in providing residential and non-residential rehabilitation 
programs for after care of the discharged patients. (Hospital Authority, 1994c). 
During these years, many new services have been developed. Among them, the 
development ofthe hospice care has extended the HA's provision of secondary care to 
tertiary care. Out-reach and community teams for the geriatric and psychiatric patients 
have been formed to ensure that patients have sufficient care and their conditions are 
closely monitored. 
The HA has strengthened public relation and enquiry functions at both the Head 
Office and the hospital level. The public and patients are ensured to have access to 
information regarding to the service provision, health information and patient 
supporting groups. Most of the hospitals have their own enquiry counters and Patient 
Resource Centers. In addition, there is a Health Information Center at the HA Head 
Office which is open to public. 
9 One exception is the provision of psychiatric clinical services. Each Psychiatric Clinical Unit is 
serving a pre-defmed residential area. 
10 Under the concept ofhospital clustering (vertical integration ofhospital services), all acute hospitals 
and extended care institutions will be grouped under 8 functional hospital clusters. These groupings 
help to meet the biological, physical, mental and social needs of patient and to ensure continuity and 
service coverage for the whole episode of ilbiess. While networking is a concept ofhorizontal 
integration ofservice lines which enhance maximum effectiveness on the use ofresources and 
providing an efficient referring network. For details ofplans on hospital clustering and networking, 




At both the HA Head Office and the hospital level, there are different kinds of 
publications and newsletters reporting the work of the HA>^hospitals. The public could 
also visit the HA homepage on the internet for different kinds of information. 
For the Convenience of the Patient 
A triage system is created in all Accident and Emergency Departments (A&E) 
of HA hospitals, so that emergency cases will be immediately treated by the doctors. 
For other cases the HA had initially committed themselves to a waiting time of not 
more than 30 minutes (Hospital Authority, 1993a). However, as the patient 
attendance had been increasing each year, and patient loads were especially 
unexpected during the Public Holidays, the HA had great difficulty in meeting this 
target in most of Accident and Emergence (A&E) Departments. 
In addition, computerized appointment system was introduced to all Specialist 
Out-Patient Department. The HA aimed to reduce the queuing time for a consultation 
to 1.5 hoursii and the waiting period for new case consultation to no more than 4 
weeks. Again, this target is difficult to keep for the increasing demand on the services. 
Last but not the least, for the convenience of elderly patients were and people 
with mobilization difficulties, the HA has introduced the Non-Emergency Ambulance 
Transport Services ^SFEATS) to transfer the patients. 
11 Before the new system was introduced, people came to attend an out-patient appointment had to wait 
for 3-4 hours for a medical consultation. It happened because there was no formal time block system, 
or only crude time blocks. So patients came to the clinics early in the moming to make sure that the 
doctors would see them. As a result, the waiting time would be lengthened. Another contributing 
factor contributed to the long waiting time was because doctors had to finish all the ward cases before 
they could go to the out-patient department. In order to shorten patient's waiting time, many hospitals 
now has modified the flow, the clinical unit would spare some doctors to see the out patients first. That 




A task group was commissioned to draw action plans and to implement a series 
of improvements to hospital and ward environments^^ so as to bring more comfort to 
the patients. For example, camp beds were eliminated, refurbishment programs were 
launched to improve lighting and ventilation. There was also a working group to 
review the patient catering services. Although service users were not included in 
these groups, their comments and opinions were sought by the HA for the drafting of 
its action plan. 
Finally, semi-private beds are available in some of the newly established 
hospitals. It provides more pleasant and comfortable resting environment to the 
patients. 
Patient Satisfaction 
A wide range of quality assurance programs has been carried out in order to 
increase the level of patient satisfaction. According to the HA, users of the service 
should have an active role to define what is a quality service. Indeed, patients now 
have more opportunities to evaluate both the process and the outcome of the hospital 
care by means of opinion surveys and other feedback mechanisms. The HA has also 
strengthened the complaint system. Every hospital has set up a Patient Relation 
Officer post. The officers will be responsible from all the complaints at the hospital 
level, he/she will directly report to the Hospital Chief Executive for the complain 
issues. 
12 Under the Supporting Service Development Committee (one ofthe eight functional committees ofthe 
HA), a number ofworking groups and task forces were commissioned to look into particular areas of 
service delivery. See Hospital Authority Annual Report 1991-1992. 
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In brief, patient satisfaction is at the heart of the quality drive. Nonetheless, 
whether it can be achieved greatly depends on the medical practitioners' attitude 
towards patients. A partnership attitude should be encouraged, with patients playing a 
greater role in decision making (Hospital Authority, 1993c). A step closer to this goal 
is implementation of the Patient Charter. Patient's right and responsibilities are 
explicitly stated in the Charter. It recognizes patients' rights to information, rights to 
seek for second medical opinion; the power to make their own decisions about the 
kind oftreatments that they would receive. The Charter helps to redress the relatively 
powerless situation of the lay public and to develop a closer, cooperative and caring 
relationship between the health care professionals and the public. The HA has spent 
many efforts to promote the Patient Charter to both the HA staff and the general 
public. 
Another key element in achieving patient satisfaction is to foster close 
relationships among nurses, doctors and patients. The HA wanted its patients to feel 
that they are receiving more personalized service. The idea of "named nurse" and 
13 
"named doctor" have been implemented in many hospitals/clinics. In some of the 
specialist outpatient services, patients would be arranged to see the same doctor 
throughout all the consultation sessions. Lastly, the HA has invested a lot of 
resources in designing special training course for the front line staff, especially staff 
who have direct contact with the patients. The goals are to change staffs attitude 
towards the patients and to improve their communication skills. 
13 The "named nurse" and the "named doctor" were first developed in the United Kingdom as part of 
the then proposed Patient's Charter. Under this system, every patient will be assigned to an individual 
nurse and Medical Officer in charge, who will be responsible for the patient care from admission until 
they are discharged. See Hospital Authority Newsletter, Issue 8, March 1993. 
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More Reasonable Service/Arrangement 
In the past, the visiting hours in public hospitals were very restrictive (only two � 
to three hours a day). It had caused great inconvenience to patients' relatives. Such 
practice was changed. Relatives can now have more flexible arrangement to visit the 
patients. 
Another improvement was on the arrangement for the dinner hour. In the past, 
the dinner time was at 5 p.m. in many of the hospital so as to suit the working 
schedule of the hospital kitchens. In most of the hospitals, the dinner time now has 
been changed to either 6 or 7 p.m. in the evening. 
The above mentioned are some of the major changes in the direct services to the 
patient under the new philosophy of the HA. Along with the "patient-centered" 
concept, the HA also introduces the "customer service" orientation. 
The ''Customer Service'' Orientation 
The HA is increasingly emphasizing instilling a "customer service" attitude among the 
hospital staff. Specific areas of emphasis are (Hospital Authority, 1993a: 42): 
(a) development of the Patient Relations function in hospital; 
(b) development of capabilities for efficient and effective handling of enquiries 
and complaints; 
(c) training for staff in interpersonal and communication skills; 
(d) exposure to and learning from private and public sector organizations which 
are customer-driven organizations; and satisfaction measurement. 
(e) Development of mechanism for patient feedback and satisfaction measurement. 
It should be noted that the "customer" concept in the HA does not only refer to 
the public. It also refers to "internal customers." When a service unit consumes (uses) 
the service or product provided by another service unit, it is seen as an internal 
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customer of that unit. The customer service orientation forces the HA to become 
more alert to the needs and feedback of their "customers," thus working towards a 
more responsive and personalized service. 
As many of the public services were either monopolies or oligopolies, the 
customers (users) of the service could seldom ‘exit，the service even if they were 
dissatisfied. 
As the market regulatory mechanism would not work in the public health care 
services, the user feedback and complaint mechanism instead. User feedback would 
be gathered through opinion surveys and through formal and informal channels. 
Patients or their relatives could bring their complaints to the Patient Relations 
Officer (PRO) at the hospital level. Of course, people can make their complaints to 
the District Board members, councilors from both the Legislative and Executive 
Councils and other public officials. People can also send their complaints directly to 
the Head Office of the Authority. Nevertheless, no matter where a come from, it will 
be first referred back to the PRO at the hospital level for follow up investigation. 
Ifthe complaints could not be settled at the hospital level, the complainant could 
appeal to the Public Complaints Committee of the HA where community members 
have seats on it. Complaints received from the Legislative or Executive councillors 
and the Commissioner of Administrative Complaints would be handled by the Public 
Complaints Committee. 
Last but not the least, the customer service orientation is also enhanced through 




Community Participation and Involvement 
Previously, hospitals were accused of being too paternalistic and insensitive to 
the needs of their patients. So, after the establishment of the HA, community 
participation in the provision of the services was identified as the most important 
ingredient for the success of the HA. The HA wants to cultivate and facilitate a better 
understanding on the community needs and thus to gain the public support to its work. 
Community leaders were, and still are appointed to the HA's committees. The 
HA's committee system consists of three layers, which are the Authority Board and its 
committee system at the center, the Regional Advisory Committees^^ at the regional 
level and the Hospital Governing Committee^^ at the hospital level. In addition, the 
Head Office and the hospitals also establish good liaison with community groups and 
organizations so as to enhance the public's understanding and support to the HA. 
Areas of emphasis include liaison with the District Boards, community groups; 
channeling of suggestions and feedback from members of the public; community 
programs in each hospital during the year; publicity on significant milestones and 
issues; and promotion of the work of the Authority through the mass media (Hospital 
Authority, 1993a). 
The HA executives have attended District Board meetings since 1995 to consult 
district leaders on the HA Annual Plan. Moreover, there are other consultation 
mechanisms like panel discussions, focus groups and open meetings that the HA 
executives could use to consolidate the public opinions. In the past few years, in 
14 The three Regional Advisory Committees are the Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. 
They serve as useful forums for members of the public to advise the Authority on the needs ofthe 
community for hospital services in the region. See Hong Kong Hospital Authority — Business Plan 
1993-1994. 
15 Hospital Governing Committee (HGCs) are given the role ofdetermining the strategic vision of 
hospitals, defming policies and overseeing the hospital management. There are three types ofHGCs, 
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collaboration with other social agencies, the HA participated actively in community 
welfare and educational programs and radio and television programs. It also organized 
exhibitions, talks, seminars, fund raising and other community activities. At the 
hospital level, to build up an open public image, many hospitals held open days during 
the initial years. The enquiry services and the complaint mechanism have also been 
improved. 
Public Accountability 
To ensure public accountability, the HA prepares and submits its Annual 
Reports and Business Plan to the Government, members of the Legislative Council 
and District Boards, and interested individuals. At the hospital level, similar reporting� 
mechanism is adopted. These documents provide a yardstick for officials and 
members of the public in monitoring and measuring the performance of the HA and 
hospitals. 
Furthermore, different professionals, government officials and community 
members were appointed to the Hospital Authority Board, Regional Advisory 
Committees and to the Hospital Governing Committees. These appointed members 
would oversee the work of the HA and have the responsibilities to ensure that the HA 
is running in a proper manner and public interests are accommodated. Since March 
1998, the HA Board Meetings have been opened to the public. Since then, interested 
individuals could sit in the meetings. 
At the hospital level, the Hospital Chief Executives are responsible and 
accountable for the overall management of the hospitals, he or she would need to 
they are the ex-subvented hospitals, the ex-govemment hospitals and teaching hospital HGCs. The 
HGCs can actually determine the policy and management of the hospital. 
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answer to public critics and enquiries. At the HA Head Office, ChiefExecutive (CE)， 
the Deputy Directors and other senior managers are also hold responsible for the 
overall performance of the HA. 
When compare with the traditional bureaucratic model, we could not denied that 
HA indeed have put much attention and resources to improve the service delivery. 
With the development of the "patient-centered" concept, patients' voices and rights 
are being respected. However, due to the uniqueness of public services and the 
political culture in Hong Kong, users' direct influence on public service delivery is 
still superficial. 
To sum up, the official documents outlined the reform contents, progress and its 
achievements. They obviously presented a picture that was very different from the 
past. They revealed a change in the management philosophy and an official 
commitment to improve the public health care services. From the HA's strategic 
directions, programs and the terminology used, it is clear that managerial ideas are 
commonly applied in the HA's operational procedures. 
The official documents and reports reveal the rational side ofthe reform, such as 
clear corporate mission, objective and scientific analysis, development of strategic 
directions and precise measurement of staff performance. One should be more 
cautious about the mythical side of the reform. As what Meyer and Rowan (1991) 
point out, rationality is used to increase the legitimacy and survival prospects of an 
organization. Rationality, after all, might be myth to bind people to a system ofmles 
and practice. 
The HA also stresses the development of a new organization culture to facilitate 
the managerial change. When mentioning about the organizational culture, we refer 
to "a frame of reference for the way one looks at, attempt to understand, and works 
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with organization" (Ott, 1989:1). To put it in a more simple way, it is a system of 
shared meanings, values, beliefs and practices. Schultz points out that to study the 
organizational culture is to study the meaning of organizational behavior, that is, "the 
meanings and beliefs which members of organizations assign to organizational 
behavior and how these assigned meaning influence the ways in which they behave 
themselves." (1994: 5) To get a better picture of all these organizational changes, I 
will examine another perspective, namely, the participants' perspective. To this we 
now turn to Chapter 4. 
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De-mystifying the Culture: NPMManagerial Reform 
from the Participants' Sense 
Thus far, we have reviewed the main themes and contents of the Hospital 
Authority (HA) reform in the previous chapter. These reforms are rational in nature, 
with an emphasis on developing a corporate mission and vision; relating staff 
motivation to the organizational objectives; stressing the input-and-output relationship; 
striking for cost-effectiveness; high productivity and efficiency in operations. 
Despite these institutional reforms, the bureaucratic structure is still preserved in 
the public hospital system. There are relatively clear vertical hierarchical structure 
and division of work according to functions and expertise. Formal institutions are 
maintained by rules and regulations, while the daily management still greatly relies on 
many standard operating procedures. Recruitment of staff is based on required 
qualifications and merits. Specialization, predictability, stability and faimess are 
some of the values treasured by the HA. 
The HA wants to institutionalize more effective management practices by 
changing the organizational culture and introducing new managerial values and 
concepts. Efficiency, high productivity, results-oriented practice and quality patient 
care are some ofthe desired values. This chapter examines the HA reform from the 
participants' perspective. In Robert B. Denhardt's own word, this is an "action" 
approach. As Denhardt puts it, “[The] perspective I have adopted here, focusing on 
the experiences of people acting in the real world of public organizations and on the 
skills needed for managerial success, permits a lively and interesting presentation of 
the field" (1995: v). I focus on the beliefs, values and meanings shared by the 
participants in the HA reform, which revealed the rarely reported part of the reform. 
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Put differently, the participants' accounts of the reforms provide greater details about 
the changes than any official HA statements. 
Mixed and Multi-Directions of Change 
One ofthe major themes ofNPM is to transform the traditional Weberian type 
bureaucracy to a leaner, flatter and hence more efficient organizational structure. 
However, most ofmy interviewees perceived that the HA's organization structure has 
been growing rather than shrinking. My interviewees pointed out that previously non-
existent senior management class was created after the establishment ofthe HA. One 
interviewee stated that: 
In our tradition, hospital services focused on patient care and were 
professionally led. Management functions were minimal. But now, under the 
HA, we have a lot of managers and administrators. Even for the laundry and 
catering service, there were specialized managers in charge of the service. 
Within the clinical areas, senior officers were renamed as departmental or senior 
managers. Instead of wearing the professional uniforms, they are now all 
wearing suits (Manager, Allied Health, ex-government hospital). 
Eventually, a managerial class was emerged. Former senior officers changed 
their job titles to managers. Their uniforms also changed to more managerial look. 
Through these artifacts the idea of management was made explicit to the 
organizational members. 
After the HA was established, standard working processes were introduced to 
the frontline. However, when people were asked to describe the change, their 
different backgrounds affect their perceptions of the organization change. Staff from 
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the ex-subvented hospitals generally thought that their hospitals were more 
bureaucratic than before. A senior clerk observed that: 
The scale of management was limited in the past. Management functions were 
mixed up. After the establishment of the HA, these functions have become 
more formalized and systematized. Different departments were set up and the 
scale ofwork had been expanded, more staff were recruited. In the past, the size 
of our hospital was not very big, people knew each other well and the working 
style was more flexible. Now, we have more standard operating procedures and 
job standards to follow (Senior Clerk, ex-subvented hospital). 
For staff who had previously worked in the ex-govemment hospitals, they 
generally agreed that "de-bureaucratization" happened in some management and 
administrative process, such as the purchasing and procurement procedures. These 
tasks were made simpler than before. For instance, 
[I]n the past, our organization was pretty inefficient since many materials and 
equipment were centrally supplied and purchased. The materials were not only 
more expensive but did not meet the needs of our patients. The HA allows more 
flexible arrangement in purchasing and ordering, although we still have to 
follow some standard purchasing procedures, like making quotations. Today, 
we have more alternatives and choices. The current system allows patients to 
buy their own required prosthetic equipment if they are willing to pay 
(Prosthetic Manager, ex-government hospital). 
Some interviewees also pointed out that the reform introduced a lot of changes 
and many of the workflow were re-engineered. New management systems and 
operational rules were developed. The following account suggests that a process of 
re-bureaucratization has taken place: 
When I looked back, many things were standardized and systemized. Like 
patient registration, in the past we would not capture so many details and make 
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SO many checking. If a patient lost his follow-up card, we would properly tum 
down the patient, or simply create a new record. We did not need to check for 
the patient's longitudinal record and attendance history, nor could we do so in 
the past without the use of computer. The decision making process was very 
simple. Now we have the computing system and we need to check out whether 
the patient's record is still active. The decision and action flow chart became 
more complicated. The Head Office has developed standard procedures to 
handle patients without Hong Kong Identity Card, and we have to follow them 
strictly. It is no longer just a "yes" or "no" decision, there are "n" kinds of 
conditions. We could no longer opt for "our" way, we have to strictly follow the 
standardized operating procedures (Senior Clerk, ex-subvented hospital). 
Another interviewee pointed out that newly introduced technologies have made 
work more complicated than before. The use of information technologies enables the 
processing of a large amount of data in a more efficient way. However, it also 
increases people's expectation and demand for better service quality. To frontline 
rank and file staff, they felt that their work looked more complicated than before. 
According to aNursing Officer, 
after the installation of new computing systems, we need to handle more things. 
In the past, only a few items were reported. Today, the top management wants 
everything: attendance, waiting time, demographic statistics, utilization 
pattern....Actually, we have more counting, reporting and meetings now. There 
have been a lot of formalization, standardization and re-engineering of works. 
The tasks were simpler before but are more complicated now Q^ursing Officer, 
ex-govemment hospital). 
In short, the organization changes happened in mixed directions. Both de-
bureaucratization and re-bureaucratization are occurring at the same time. Overall, I 
have identified two levels of changes. I label the first level as the ‘graphic，change 
since it involves some changes on the organizational chart: 
There is an on-going re-organization of department and work. Some services 
were combined, divided or redeveloped. Take our department as an example, 
we re-organize 2-3 times in a year. It may be due to a change of personnel, a 
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change in the division of work, or for re-engineering purposes. However, the 
changes are only on the organizational chart, there were not much changes in the 
actual tasks (Officer, Supporting Services). 
The second level of change involved actual change in the scope and nature of 
work. I call it the "content" change. Content change can be further divided into 
positive and negative changes. For positive change, the unit could get more personnel, 
resources, as well as power to command. According to the interviewees, positive 
content change were biased towards the inherited powerful groups and "popular" 
managerial professions, such as the medical profession, information technology and 
finance divisions. 
Negative change happened the other way round. It was more common among 
the rank and file staff. When their knowledge and skills were found out-dated, they 
lost their importance and recognition from the top management. However, negative 
change could happen to any personnel or in any units when there were power struggles 
within the organization. When resources were sufficient, there could be "win-win" 
situation. Negative change happened when resources were relatively tight, in which 
case somebody would be made worse offthan before. 
Participants' Sense Making 
Institutional economists believe that by establishing the appropriate formal 
structure, rules and incentive system, people's behavior would easily be constrained 
and regulated. Managerialists and rational choice theorists stress the use ofincentives 
to induce (manipulate) desirable behavior. These schools favor the instrumental view 
ofmanaging organization culture. To the managerialists, the institutional design is a 
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matter of making a rational (the best) choice. They assume that by working out the 
required institutional design (incentive structure), desirable behavior and thus new 
organization culture can be developed. 
The HA put a lot of stress on the development of a new organizational culture. 
When one talks about cultural change, one refers to whether new values, beliefs and 
meanings can be developed and commonly shared by the people. Such a process 
involves more than how and what an organization tells its members to do. How the 
members perceive, understand, and communicate the changes to each other is the key 
to a successful cultural change. 
Cultivating Group Norm and Identity 
The rational economic man model assumes that individuals are autonomous 
rational decision makers who are utility maximizers and make decisions independent 
ofhistorical and social contexts. When the HA was established, except for the very 
senior management level, there was no massive change in the personnel. It was the 
same group of staff who carried out the changes. Procedurally, the HA could 
introduce procedural changes overnight. However people's mentality could not be 
changed overnight. As some interviewees pointed out, there were too many 
“historical burdens." Organizational traditions and conventional practices still play 
important roles in the organization's daily operations. The managerial change was not 
independent of its historical and social contexts. 
When the managerial movement favors the development of an incentive 
structure to control and induce behavioral changes, in many real operational situations, 
formal rules and regulations indeed meant little to the staff, rather, the operational 
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imperatives govern (Wilson, 1989). It is especially true to the street level bureaucrats 
(Lipsky, 1980). The operational staff care more about the actual task, refer more to 
the group norms and peer expectations than formal rules and regulation. 
For instance, even for unambiguous issues such as punctuality, rules and 
regulations lose their meanings when the staff accepted another definition of 
punctuality. The following is an illustration of how the staff jointly revised the 
meaning of"official working hours": 
Workmen and Ward Aids are officially entitled to a half-hour lunch break. In 
practice, almost every one takes more than 30 minutes. It was not a matter of 
right or wrong. In large hospitals such as ours, you might need to spend 5-10 
minutes waiting for a lift. Moreover, during the peak hour, it takes more time to 
process the food order in the canteen. As a result, the "30-minute lunch break，， 
would not be followed even though it is the official rule. We would keep an 
eye closed ifthe workmen could make some arrangements among themselves to 
take care of their duties. The way agreed by the workmen themselves thus 
became the real official hours, (pursing Office, ex-government hospital). 
Group norms and commonly agreed standards have strong binding effect, and 
people's attachment to group norms may sometimes be irrational in nature. The same 
Nursing Officers reported the following scenario: 
The workmen and ward aids also need to attend shift duty. There is a 
convention that ifthe moming shift staff comes back earlier, the night shift staff 
can leave earlier. To me, this practice is fine provided that there is always 
someone available in the ward to do the minor duties. Eventually, the stafftake 
for granted that they can leave earlier if they have finished their work. One day, 
the moming shift staff did not report to work earlier as expected. Despite that, 
the night shift staffthought that she had already finished her work and thus left 
without informing any nursing staff. We did not have any workman or ward aid 
on duty that moming for 20 minutes until the morning staff reported to work. 
Unfortunately, we needed someone to send an urgent test to the laboratory 
within that period. I thought their conventional practice had interrupted the 
normal flow ofthe ward, so I briefed them about the importance ofdiscipline. I 
gave a verbal warning to the one who had left earlier than the official hour. 
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However, to these staff, the one who left earlier was right because every one did 
the same thing. They thought the one who did not come back earlier did the 
wrong thing for she did not meet her peer's expectation. I was surprised that the 
concepts of"right" and "wrong" for these staffwere totally different from mine. 
There are countless examples to show how influential the group norms could be 
on individuals' behavior. In fact, these prevailing group norms had little to do with 
rational institutional design (by the top management) or rational choice (by the 
individuals). It was the collectively "agreed" ways that determine the participants' 
way of doing things. 
Below are another two cases showing how working context and group norms 
affect employees' performance. There was a strong norm in public organizations, 
namely the "9 to 5"^  or the “official working hour". It was a norm accepted by the 
clerical and the junior grade staff. The HA reform apparently could not weaken this 
“9 to 5" norm. Such a sub-group culture had been well constituted into the 
organization structure. An interviewee told the following story: 
In our department, clerical staff keep their working time strictly to the office 
hour. In their dictionary, there is no such a word as 'urgent.' In my unit, even if 
I made it clear that the task was an urgent one, the staff still went to lunch sharp 
at the lunch break regardless of whether the task was completed. Recently, I 
gave a task to a clerk and told her that it was urgent and must be finished before 
she left the office. Soon I knew that my remark was meaningless to her. Before 
she left the office, she just gave me back the task and said that she could not 
fmish it before 5 pm. You can see that how strong the “9 to 5" norm is in 
public organizations (A Hospital Administrator). 
1 “9 to 5", here and hereafter, does not narrowly mean from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. since different post have < 
different working hours. Rather, it implies the "timely in and timely o f f norm. 
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While the clerical staff were seen as people with little initiation and limited 
working capacity, another Hospital Administrator told me an entirely different version 
about the working capacity of thejunior staff. According to this administrator, 
Clerk II in our hospital are junior and yet important supervisors. They are in 
charge of a working unit. They are required to write short memo for inter-
departmental communication, keep meeting minutes, prepare files and help to 
compile statistics. May be I am lucky, our hospital is new and most ofthe staff 
were recruited from outside, so that we could develop new practices. When we 
recruit new staff, we stressed that this hospital was different, we only had 60% 
of the required resource to do work. We were looking for people who were 
willing to work hard. So, most of the newly recruited staff were psychologically 
prepared to work hard before they came to join us. Thus, they stayed late in the 
evening and were very committed to their work (A Hospital Administrator). 
The above interviewee highlighted two very important factors in explaining the 
entirely different working attitudes of the clerical staff in his working unit. First, since 
the hospital mentioned in the latter case was new, there was no inherent norms and 
patterns, the hospital management could redesign the roles and responsibilities of the 
clerical grade staff. Second, the staff were informed about the workload before they 
were recruited. Cognitively, the group of staff were more willing to accept 
challenging work and overtime duties. When everyone accepted and "agreed to" the 
new arrangement, a new working culture would be developed gradually. 
Rewarding in Non-individualistic Mode 
The managerial reform has been widely accepted by most of the westem 
democratic governments since it is expected that better organization performance can 




The HA introduced a number of new mechanisms and new incentives for staff 
motivation to improve organizational performance. In the following sections, I will 
try to analyze the performance issue related to the HA managerial reform. 
Opportunities rather than Personal Ability 
Performance measurement is a complicated process in most public organizations. 
In fact, performance in public organizations are team products rather than individual 
achievements. Staff were deployed to tasks and working contexts that were normally 
difficult to control. As an interviewee pointed out: 
Not all the posts have equal workload and equal management support. 
Performance could be a matter of luck rather than personal ability. If you were 
deployed to the big projects, there would have more management support and 
resources. You would have better promotion opportunities since more people 
knew what you have done. If you were deployed to the non-core tasks, no 
matter how hard you have worked, no one would care about you (Administrator). 
Some interviewees also highlighted the problem of staff mobility. Under the 
former civil service system, personal favoritism would be minimized since both the 
staff and the supervisors would rotate to different departments. Since the HA 
decentralizes human resources management to the hospital level, there is no central 
coordination of staff rotation and movement. In addition, individual unit heads 
possess real power to control over the resources, including recruitment and promotion. 
Except for a few standard procedures, there is no other mechanism to counter-balance 
personal favoritism. As an interviewee remarked, “I am not sure whether the current 
system encourages performance, or the like and dislike of the unit head." 
As far as faimess is concerned, some interviewees pointed out that the current 
system is inferior to the previous civil service system. Though they recognized that 
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seniority might not be the best criterion, they pointed out that, “I still have a chance, 
and I can estimate when my chance will come." Under the current system, they never 
know whether they would have a chance. Performance measurement could be 
something rather subjective. 
Appeasing rather than Appraising 
Under the new institutional design, it is assumed that the HA would have more 
flexible arrangement in personnel policies; there should be better and fairer system to 
assess the staffs performance. 
Disciplinary actions and incentive pay are commonly used in private business to 
change staff attitude and behavior. However, the two are of limited use in the HA. 
Disciplinary actions so far were still rarely used in the HA to correct employees' 
behavioral problems. Unless the staff commit criminal acts or break major 
disciplinary rules, such as corruption and absence from duties, few supervisors would 
bother to initiate disciplinary punishment against the staff. As a Hospital 
Administrator pointed out: 
Taking disciplinary action is something rather unacceptable in our organization. 
I had once submitted a performance report in which I gave a negative evaluation 
of a staffs performance. However, the unit head rejected the report. When I 
asked the unit head for a reason, he replied that it was not the proper way to 
handle a problematic staff. He said that he agreed with me that the staff had 
performed poorly. However, he went on to say that the staffhad never got any 
bad report in the past. He would not like to be the first department head to give 
her the bad report. He further explained that if we gave her a bad report, the top 
management would only question our ability to lead and motivate the staff. 
Moreover, a bad report would not kick her out of our department, it would only 
made her stay with us. No unit would take over a staff with a bad report. My 
experience was not something unique; I knew many other supervisors had the 
same experience (A Hospital Administrator). 
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Even though the new managerial reform was introduced, the old institutions and 
the conventional practices were still exerting influence. There was some informal 
agreement on "not to initiate bad report". From the above quotation, one can see that 
the crucial point was whether the supervisor or unit head could overcome the 
psychological burden to initiate a disciplinary act and whether they were willing to do 
something that seems odd in the system. 
Conventional Increment rather than Judgmental Incremental 
The HA has introduced some performance related pay mechanisms to encourage 
staffperformance. For staffin the managerial grade or above, they would not receive 
annual increment automatically. Whether they would get one depends on their 
performancel Again, like the performance report, such mechanism exists on paper 
only. In real practice, there was only one choice, everyone would get one increment 
after the annual performance review. A manager explained why there was only one 
choice: 
First, it is difficult to prove someone was poorly performed since most tasks 
rely on teamwork. Second, conventionally people would get the annual 
increment and they expect to have it automatically. Third, when I have to work 
closely with someone, I dare not break the working relationship. So, even I was 
not satisfy with one's performance, I still gave him or her the increment. On the 
other hand, it is equally difficult to justify that someone is really performing 
outstandingly. When a manager tries to give double increments to a staff, other 
people might query that personal favoritism is involved. With these kinds of 
consideration, everyone would be an average staff (Senior Manager). 
2 There would be three choices. For staff whose performance was not up to the expectation, no 
increment would be given. Ifthe staffs performance met the expected standard, usually one increment 




The conventional practice and staff expectation constrained the manager's 
choice. It was the collective emotion in the organization that made such a choice. 
Wilson (1989) made similar observation that the managers would consider more about 
the constraints than the task before making any managerial decisions. 
Group Standard rather than Individual Standard 
Recruitment in public organizations largely follows the merit principle. In 
theory, the best available candidates will be recruited. The HA also claimed that it 
had developed the appropriate organizational infrastructure and incentive system to 
improve organizational performance. In real practice, however, the performance of 
public organizations received a lot of criticisms. What went wrong then? The remark 
ofan interviewee may provide some hints to this question: 
For a competent and knowledgeable staff, he or she should know what are good 
standards. I think the problem is not whether the standards are achievable, but 
whether people are willing to commit to those standards. To me，the concept of 
excellence is not a personal matter. Our work is interrelated and we rely on 
teamwork. There are some barriers to excellence. First, it may be due to the fact 
that people care more about getting the tasks done than what kinds of standard 
have been achieved. Second, it is difficult to get the whole team to understand 
what is excellence. In our organization, we have many good individual staffwho 
are personally committed to a higher standard of work. However, when a good 
staff is put to work with other people, he or she usually gives concession to the 
group standard. I feel that excellence has never been encouraged in our 
organization. I once was "advised" by the top management not to ask for high 
standard as it would create a lot of pressure on other people (A Hospital 
Administrator). 
The interviewee rightly pointed out that many people cared more about whether 
the work has been done or not, but not about the quality of the work. Moreover, it 
was the group standard, not the personal standard, that prevailed when one decided 
which quality standard one should strike for in a real working situation. While the 
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rational economic man model assumes that people are autonomous individuals who 
can make their own decisions, real life evidence would probably invalidate such an 
assumption. 
To overcome the quality problem, the HA implemented the Continuous Quality 
Improvement (CQI) programs and carried out auditing activities. For many of the 
clinical services, they had quality sub-committees to develop measuring tools to 
ensure that minimum acceptable standards have been meet. The common tools were 
different kinds of data and procedural checklists. The problem with checklists is that 
they confine people's attention to the “listed，，items only, thus reducing professional 
duties to programmed items. Some of the interviewees reported that the minimum 
standard had finally become the maximum standard. 
The above discussion demonstrates that managerial reforms are not introduced 
in a vacuum. The new mechanisms and practices operate in an organizational context 
where the old institutional practices still prevail. More importantly, organizational 
members make collective choice rather than individual choice most ofthe time. They 
referred more to the conventional practices, group norms and peer expectation than to 
the formal organization rules for decisions and actions. People jointly develop their 
own definition of organizational activities. Those meaning-giving and -sharing 
processes actually define the organizational culture. 
In the following sections, I will examine how HA managerial reform was 
understood, shared and re-constructed by the participants. 
Reconstructing Performance 
New incentives were introduced to encourage staff performance and positive 
working attitudes. Promotion was no longer based on seniority alone but also on 
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individual's performance. At first glance, it seems that the system has been improved. 
But in reality, no one could tell what would be accounted as good performance. It 
seems that there were no agreed standards and explicit criteria of measurement. 
People might finally agree on some criteria. It is interesting to note that those 
"agreed" criteria might have little to do with performance and rationality. They are 
norms that induce strong confirming behavior. The informal organizational norms is 
an important part of an organizational culture. 
Faddish Performance rather than Practical Performance 
In the search for reliable methods and valid standards for measuring 
performance, people tend to follow the fads. For instance, 
[A]t the very beginning, it was still based on seniority. In the first tide, when 
the top management favored the post-qualification academic achievement, 
everyone rushed to get a college degree. The second tide came when the 
hospital underwent a computerization process. Staff who possessed the skills 
suddenly became the "star" of the department. Of course, computing knowledge 
was never mandatory requirement in our profession, but it created the 
opportunity for some staff to interact with the senior management. Later, 
clinical research and Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) programs became 
very popular. Similarly, another group of "star" emerged subsequently Q^urse). 
It is natural for us to expect people in the middle to top management to be more 
cognitively ready to learn and accept new ideology and practices. With the practice of 
decentralization of authority, the middle management should have assumed the 
responsibility to initiate and lead cultural change. According to Edgar H. Schein, 
leadership and organizational culture are two sides of the same coin. Leadership is 
important to organization change. Especially, when the group encounters adaptive 
problems and the previous assumptions are no longer valid, leadership will come in to 
lead the change. As Schein puts it, "[T]his ability to perceive the limitations of one's 
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own culture and to develop the culture adaptively is the essence and ultimate 
challenge ofleadership" (1992: 2). 
However, some interviewees pointed out the problem of leadership in 
organizational changes. Performance assessment was controlled by a group of senior 
staff who largely came from the old tradition. These managers might be very 
experienced with the old things, but they were green about the new system and the 
new demands. As the interviewees remarked, the reform gave rise to an immature 
managerial class, particularly in the clinical-related areas. Many of these managers 
were ignorant of what roles they should play and what should be done to enhance the 
desirable organizational changes. Instead of leading the change, they chose to follow 
the fads and live with the change. 
Rhetorical Performance rather than Practical Performance 
On the one hand, there were no explicit criteria for what was good performance. 
On the other hand, the change created a kind of psychological pressure for individual 
working units/staff to report what they had achieved. To many staff nowadays 
performance was not a matter of whether one had done something significant and 
meaningful, but whether one could catch people's attention, especially the attention of 
the supervisor and the hospital senior management. I have labeled it as "oral 
performance" or "paper performance." One of the nurses reported the following: 
If you keep quiet and just work hard, you definitely would be a loser. The 
current system encourages people to be high sounding, it is important to "show" 
than to “do” the task (^urse). 
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Reporting is an important organizational routine.^ Ever since the HA was 
established, reporting became increasingly important. The pressure to report diverted 
people's attention and energy from their original responsibilities to activities that 
could give them extra credits. As a result, different studies and activities were 
initiated. According to the interviewees, not all the activities or studies were 
meaningful, some studies sounded great in name but were empty in content.^ 
Since there were no definite criteria for measuring performance, the system went 
through a trial and error process. Oral or paper performance was developed from such 
a process. They were widely accepted among the staff as they believed that they had 
found the way. The pressure for performance also changed the belief system of the 
organization. Previously, good staff were those people who were quiet, hard working, 
cooperative and responsible. Nowadays, these qualities lost their weight. 
The HA tried to introduce a direction for organizational transformation, but the 
change was too abrupt and different managerial fads^ were introduced. There was no 
proper system and mechanism to assess the quality of the final work. The "means" 
finally became the "ends" themselves; people followed the fashionable things without 
much understanding on what they were doing and why they were doing it. 
3 In Gulick and Urwick's (1937) classic paper on the science of administration, they pointed out that 
planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting were the major activities 
of leaders. 
4 A nursing officer quoted one example to show how trivial some of the studies were. In the hospital 
where she was working, some staffhad initiated a study to compare the degree ofcomfort reported by 
patients during dressing, to assess whether the use of forceps or by hands (with sterilize gloves) was 
better. She listed a number ofrationales to support her position. First, patient's feeling could be very 
subjective. Second, how patient feel would depend on the wound condition. Third, for wound care, the 
problem ofinfection is much more important than the degree of comfort. Fourth, the degree ofcomfort 
depends more on one's skill than on the tools he/she is using. 
51 have borrowed the terms 'managerial fads' from Eric Abrahamson's article 'Managerial fads and 
fashions: The diffusion and rejection of innovations', published in Academy ofManagerial Review, 16 
(3)，1991: 586-612. Writers have used labels "fad" or "fashion" to describe the diffusion of 
administrative technologies such as strategic-planning units (Porter, 1989),job enrichment (Hackman, 
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Imaginary Productivity rather than Real Productivity 
For most of the interviewees who were in the supervisory grade or above, they 
reported that the “9 to 5" norm was almost broken. To these groups of staff, "not at 5 
p.m." was the new norm. Regarding the “not at 5 p.m." norm, different interpretations 
and practices were constructed. While heavy workload was the commonly reported 
reason to stay behind, some of the interviewees helped de-mystify the reasons for 
overtime: 
The pressure to stay behind sometimes comes from the top management's 
expectation. A manager would feel proud if his/her staff stayed late in the 
evening. I heard that some managers would occasionally go into the cubicles to 
check who stayed there after 5 p.m. If you are working in such unit, what will 
you do? To survive, or to please your boss and to adhere to the group practice, 
the "smart" choice is to stay behind. And when most of the people do the same 
thing, it creates a kind of group pressure for compliance (Hospital 
Administrator). 
This kind of group pressure and practice could change the meaning of the term 
"official hours." In some units, the staff had jointly revised the definition of the 
working hours. One interviewee reported the following: 
If everyone leaves at 6 p.m., “6 p.m." becomes the real official hour to leave. If 
I need to attend evening class or have urgent appointment after office hours, I 
need to inform my supervisor as well as my colleagues that I could not stay late 
that evening. Psychologically, I felt that I was "applying" for early leave and 
waiting for others' approval....I would feel extremely uneasy i f I leave on time. 
To compensate, I need to come back earlier in the moming, or use part of my 
lunch hour on work. I feel pressurized to work in a hurrying manner just to 
show others that I am not breaking the norm (Administrator). 
1975), T-groups and matrix structures (Business Week 1986), quality circles (Lawler & Mohrman, 
1985), decentralization (Mintzberg, 1979) andjoint ventures (Kogut, 1988). 
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The pressure to stay late originates from some assumptions of the top 
management. Some senior managers assumed that when business-like practices were 
adopted, they thought that they had successfully tumed the units to work like a 
business. They would further associate themselves with those good business values 
like being "competitive," “productive，，and “well performed". As told by some of the 
interviewees, staff who stayed behind indeed were playing a "win-win game." They 
had different tactics to compensate for their “loss.，，Some would spend the time on 
personal things, others might come late in the morning or have longer lunch time. 
Some of them get official compensation hour later. Moreover, when people planned 
to leave at 6 p.m. or 7 p.m., they would automatically adjust the working pace to fit 
that hour. 
By now, it should be clear that the need to work overtime in some of the 
working units was created rather than out of real necessity. The need did not 
necessarily originate from the workload but from the top management's expectations 
and the peer pressure. Everyone feared that he or she would become a loser if the 
rules of the game was not followed. 
Discriminating the Right Person 
As a public organization, the use of monetary incentive was so far very limited 




To many of the staff, the new promotion system introduced flexibility to the 
organization, something almost unimaginable in the past^. The new mechanism really 
induced some changes on staffbehavior especially during the initial period when there 
were a lot of promotion opportunities. As reported by some interviewees, there was a 
dramatic behavioral change on staff who previously had been labeled as "self-
abandoned." These staff suddenly became very energetic and hard working. The new 
system seemed to be operating pretty well. 
However, under this mechanism, some interviewees observed that people were 
not only more aggressive but also more "calculating" than before. The system 
induced people to be more conscious about the benefit and opportunities that they 
could enjoy in the HA. The rational calculation has been officially recognized (and 
encouraged) under the new system. When benefit-maximizing behavior is stressed, it 
undermines the professional commitment to work. 
Retention rather than Promotion 
During the initial period, the HA wanted to promote a promising picture of 
organization change. Many of the services were under expansion, there were a lot of 
promotion opportunities and staff morale was pretty high. However, as time went by, 
the posts were almost filled up. Worse still, after the South-East Asian financial crisis, 
all public organizations have to meet a target of five percent productivity gain. The 
establishment would be frozen and subject to a process of natural wastage. People 
knew that their promotion chance were almost equal to zero. 
6 For example, a management trainee could be promoted to Hospital Administrator I within 2 years; a 
qualified nurse could be promoted to the rank ofNursing Officer within 5 years. But in the past, it 
might need double or triple amount of time for a staff to be promoted to the same rank. 
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It is also worthwhile to note that when the "seniority" rule was applied in the 
past, staff promoted to a senior post might already be in their late forties or early 
fifties. They would not stay in the post long, and the natural turnover rate was higher 
then than now. Under the new system, staff could be promoted to the senior ranks 
when they were just in their early thirties. They probably would stay in the post for a 
much longer period of time, and would affect the opportunities available to the junior 
staff. As one interviewee pointed out: 
It is like travelling by bus. If you can get on it, you probably would feel that it is 
good and convenient. But if you miss the bus, you are uncertain when the next 
bus will come, and whether it will really come at all ^sIurse). 
In addition, when promotion is based on performance, the fundamental question 
is what would be regarded as good performance. As mentioned earlier, performance 
assessment is a rather complicated issue in public organizations. It could be myths or 
fads than something concrete. 
A result of stressing the use of incentive to induce desirable behavior is the 
linking of personal benefits to organization goals. Would performance and motivation 
be substantiated if such incentives cease to be available? The current situation clearly 
demonstrates the limits of such a mechanism since most public organizations have 
little discretion in offering attractive monetary incentives to their staff, and rarely 
could they generate wealth to sustain such a mechanism. When a system attracts and 
retains people who care only for their own personal benefit, would it be good to apply 
it in the public service even though it seems to be an effective one? 
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Frustration by Merit rather than Inducement by Merit 
When compared with the criterion of seniority, the criterion of performance is a 
less objective and more arguable one. Its ambiguous content means that it would be 
more difficult to get a consensus of its meanings among the staff. Moreover, it also 
depends on whether the top management applies the concept in a fair manner. 
However, "fairness" itself is also a contested concept. 
Such a mechanism would be de-motivating if the staff felt that they had been 
unfairly treated, or when they disagreed with the senior management's "definition" of 
merit. 
These kinds of conflict were rare in the past since employees did not have much 
expectation on being promoted. But the new system triggered their expectation, and if 
their expectation could not be met, they would feel frustrated. People would "fed up" 
in the long run. As reported by one of the interviewees: 
Ten years ago, the junior staff would not have much expectation on promotion 
since they all knew how the game was played. But since the HA was 
established, people expected they would have better chances. As a matter of 
fact, there are many staff competing for a few posts. When someone else in the 
unit has just been promoted, there won't be any chance for other staff in the 
foreseeable future. Nowadays, people like to compare themselves with other 
people about their qualification and ability. Frankly, the promotion depend on a 
lot of things other than performance alone. Some staff would be de-motivated 
when they did not get the promotion. It created plenty of conflicts among the 
staff and it affected our previously harmonious working relationship (J^ursing 
Officer). 
The idea of "promotion by merit" and other incentive designs would be less 
problematic if they are judged independent from the organization context. However, 
we should be more skeptical about their applicability in the public organizational 
120 
Chapter Three 
context. Given the institutional constraints and the unique normative values, incentive 
designs ofthe private sector would be oflimited use. 
Pre-conceived Deployment rather than Open-minded Recruitment 
After the HA decentralized the human resource functions to the hospital level 
and to the individual unit. There were mmors about candidate selection prevailing at 
all levels in the organization. It did not matter whether the rumors were true or not. 
People referred to them as source of reliable information. While these stories were 
prevailing under the formal structure, they brought frustration as well as psychological 
comfort to the people. 
From advertising and selection ofcandidates to the composition ofthe interview 
panels, there were standard procedures and mechanisms to avoid personal bias and 
favoritism. However, many staff perceived the personnel procedures and the openness 
of the process as a kind of organizational rituals only. They tended to believe stories 
coming from informal channels. When a post was released, there would be rumors on 
who would be selected, or whether there was any "pre-selected" candidate. 
These mmors, ofcourse, brought along frustration to those staffwho would like 
to apply for the post. On the other hand, these stories also provided a means for 
people to evaluate their chance ofbeing selected and thus be psychologically prepared 
for the result. Rumors might be a by-product of the new mechanism. When people 
were uncertain about the change, they tried to make "guesses" and “test” them against 
the final organization decision. When the stories became increasingly reliable, it 




Satisficing Selection rather than Maximizing Choice ofCandidates 
I discussed pre-conceived candidates with some senior managers. Reviewing 
the issue from the standpoint of a supervisor, they stressed the need to pick up staff 
that they knew well and could cooperate with. As reported by one ofthe managers: 
To a certain extent I could not just pick up a guy whom I knew nothing about. 
In a private company, if I recruit a staff that I do not like, I can send him/her 
away immediately. However, in our organization, we do not have such a 
mechanism. Currently, the lateral mobility of the staff is relatively low, so i f I 
select a candidate whom I cannot cooperate with, we both suffer. Moreover, our 
organization has undergone very rapid changes, we have many new concepts 
and plans to implement, so I need some people who share my vision. I prefer to 
select a staffthat I know well. To me, ability is not the most important thing. It 
is not unfair. Simply looking at people's resume and the 20 minutes interview 
would not be very reliable either (Manager, Allied Health). 
These supervisors also stressed that whoever they selected, they would follow 
all the procedural requirements, the bottom line of a fair game. Again, it highlights 
that the managers seldom opted for the best choice available. 
In sum, the NPM aims to resolve staffmotivation problem through appropriate 
institutional design. However, whether seniority or merits is a better solution 
depends on the organization context and people's expectations than the idea itself. 
Second, the self-interested behavior as induced by the managerial reform introduced 
counter-cultural values to the public services (Laughlin, 1991). The new incentive 
system actually carries dangerous assumptions about staff motivation and human 
nature. When self-interested behavior is stressed, staff performance will depend on 
the foreseeable benefit they can eam. In the extreme cases, there will be poor 
performance and lazy behavior once those incentives disappear. All these highlight 
the importance ofnormative values in constructing a viable administrative order. 
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Motivating by Professional Values 
The HA managerial reform introduced new managerial values to the hospital 
management. These values and practices have invaded into many areas of operation, 
including professional practices. Professional practices are bounded by the 
professional codes of practice and uphold a set of normative values. These values 
constitute important guiding principles to the practice of the professionals and the 
development of their own sub-culture within the organization. Among all the 
professions I encountered, the medical profession was less submissive to managerial 
values. As a matter of fact, the medical profession has a high degree of professional 
autonomy on their work and they have more say in controlling their own practices. 
For all the doctors I have interviewed, they agreed that within their profession, 
the internal promotion and performance evaluation were so far fair within their 
profession. I quoted one ofthe Senior Medical Officer's comments on the promotion 
mechanism: 
It is our tradition that the senior grade medical staff would oversee the work of 
the junior medical staff. We have close monitoring mechanism such as case 
meeting and grand round to assess whether appropriate treatment has been given 
to patients. Moreover, we usually have a team size of no more than 15 people. 
The day to day work is opened to our peer. The department head and the senior 
doctors would know howjunior staffhave been performing. To get a promotion 
in the medical profession, each medical staffhas to meet some objective criteria. 
He/she has to pass different parts of examination, both practical and theoretical. 
So far this tradition has not been changed much. These criteria so far are still 
accepted by most, ifnot all ofthe medical staff, and most of us still regard it as a 
fair game (Senior Medical Officer). 
Although this doctor admitted that personal preference could not be totally 
eliminated, he still thought the system was a fair one. He also highlighted some 
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important elements of the concept of faimess. First, information was open to all the 
team members since the team size was small and they had close working relationship 
with each other. Secondly, the monitoring was rather “close and direct,’’ there was 
always a second and third pair of eyes overseeing one's work. Thirdly, they have to 
pass the objective assessment criterion, that is, the external examination. With these 
conditions, doctors generally agreed that the rules of game were open and fair. They 
remarked that, “at least, I know and I could tell you how the game is played. The 
whole team agreed the system was fair." 
I asked the doctor whether his colleagues would compete for promotion and 
whether they would try to stand out among their peers as were reported by 
interviewees in other disciplines. The doctor highlighted the norm ofhis profession as 
follows: 
For doctors who worked in the public hospitals, we have some collective 
personalities. We prefer to work in a stable environment, so that we could 
concentrate our time and energy in developing the necessary skills and 
knowledge in the profession. In our profession, respectable guys are people who 
are well experienced, knowledgeable and outstanding in the clinical practice, 
and not other things. So far, our standards are clear and explicit (Semor 
Medical Officer). 
Another Medical Officer pointed out that: 
Unlike the commercial business, ifyou could eam a great profit for the company, 
you might be promoted immediately. Our assessment system is much more 
complicated than that. My performance would not simply depend on the 
number ofpatients I have treated. . . . Promotion to us is more a matter of status 
and a sense of personal achievement than monetary benefit. This sense of 




Regarding the assessment system, nearly all the doctors I interviewed were able 
to point out the difference between their profession and the business sector: 
quantitative measurement could at best only reflect the workload but not the quality of 
work. Their assessment system still relied on peer monitoring. 
The doctors have expressed their reservations about the recently introduced 
contract system. Some of the interviewees said that the contract system introduced 
fundamental changes to their profession. A doctor asserted that 
the contract system introduces a "survival" problem which we have never 
experienced in the past. I do not know what will happen in the future. I do not 
know whether the competition is a positive one or a negative one. Under the old 
system, all the staff are permanent in nature. I do not know whether people need 
to please the unit head or the senior hospital management in order to get their 
contract renewed. I really don't know what will happen in the future (Senior 
Medical Officer). 
Professional staff who were committed to the professional values were less 
concerned about their own interests. I met a few very devoted nursing staff who 
served in clinical areas where there were far less promotion and training opportunities. 
Despite the unpleasant job nature and poor working environment, they were very 
satisfied with their job because they thought they could serve the patient better in 
these clinical areas. Religious and social values can also be a strong motivating factor 
to work. A staff who is a devoted Christian told me that many staff in her hospital 
voluntarilyjoin the home visit team and visited the discharged elderly patients. 
It cannot be denied that the new managerial values have eroded many of the 
professional practices and weakened their normative values. So far the bottom line is 
still there. This bottom line is indeed very important in preserving the special social 
responsibilities of the public services. 
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Remolding Terms, Ideologies and Actions 
In the previous chapter, I have summarized the managerial changes from the HA 
official reports. Along with the HA organizational reform, new managerial 
terminology was being introduced. Did the change in terminology bring about a 
change in ideology and action? To answer this question, let us review the 
interviewees' response to the application of the new managerial terms. 
Reinterpreting Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness 
The current managerial reform aims at making the organization more efficient, 
imposing better control over cost and enhancing productivity. But these managerial 
concepts do not operate in a vacuum. Before the organization participants leam the 
concepts, they have to search and jointly create new meanings of the concepts. The 
managerial concepts indeed have undergone a socially reconstructed process. 
When the HA was first established, the general economic condition in Hong 
Kong was good and additional resources were allocated to the HA to facilitate its 
reform. Many units and services were expanded; new services were developed; new 
posts and staff were recruited; new equipment and advanced technologies were 
introduced. In addition, individual service units could get additional resources for 
their new management initiatives and quality improvement projects. 
Under such an organization context, the staff perceived the organizational 
change at best as "getting more resources to improve the service," or just as “doing 
more to get more resources." As I pointed out earlier, many tasks were created and 
sustained for the "reporting" purpose only. Many interviewees reported there were 
more "waste" than "saving." People's common experience became part of the 
organizational memory and affected the members' interpretation of the meaning of 
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efficiency, and thus their ability to realize such a value. Although there was 
increasing pressure to enhance productivity and to cut cost, few supervisors were 
really competent in developing strategies to achieve these targets. Many interviewees 
reported that few staff could understand the concepts of "efficiency" and “cost 
control,” nor did they share a sense of crisis about the future funding and resource 
arrangement. Therefore, "efficiency" is a “context dependent" concept, its “standard” 
and meaning varies according to the resources available and according to the 
participants' common experience and practice. 
"Efficiency" itself is a contested concept. There are competing values and 
interpretations for such a concept. To assess whether public service is efficient or not, 
thejudgement should not be independent of other competing values behind the service. 
Pure efficiency can be a misleading and even dangerous goal? in the public 
administration. I was told that a doctor was being accused of providing "inefficient" 
service since his consultation time was on average longer than other doctors’，and thus 
affected the waiting time of other patients. Should efficient medical service be 
equated to maximizing the number ofpatients seen within the shortest period oftime? 
Should the “getting more from less" standard be applied uncritically in the medical 
profession? 
Some works might look more efficient when advanced technology was 
introduced. However, a higher level of efficiency also imposed a high running cost on 
the organization. Some interviewees pointed out that the use of information systems 
brought great improvement in keeping the patients' records. However, the running 
7 A commonly quoted example is the Nazi genocide policy which was carried out very efficiently by the 
German bureaucracy. We all knew that the result was very terrible. 
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cost was also very high. Moreover, to cover the annual recurrent cost for the 
computer systems, the department has to cut the funding for other items. 
Some interviewees observed that the re-engineering process was actually 
shifting the inefficiency from one unit to another. It solved some ofthe problems but 
generated new problems and conflicts. As one interviewees described: 
There are some "re-engineering" going on in our department, we have pressure 
to cut staff. Some staffhave been re-deployed to other departments or hospitals. 
But it does not mean that our work has been done in a more efficient manner. 
When a permanent staff is gone, temporary staff would be recruited to take up 
the work....Some re-engineering was fake; it only changed the organization 
chart. I know that some unit heads transferred the names and costs to other units, 
but the staff still stayed with the same old unit (Administrator). 
Some interviewees also observed that the more powerful unit could always shift 
its inefficiency to other units. Another interviewee reported the following: 
Many hospitals used the Health Care Assistants (HCA) to take up some simple 
caring duties. The arrangement sounds good and can help save manpower cost. 
But many of the HCAs were previously Workman II in the hospital. This 
group of staff is difficult to motivate and supervise. This arrangement 
introduces some problems on supervision and the quality ofwork. They are not 
totally reliable. In addition, when the HCAs take up the basic caring duties, 
some nursing staff would have their hands off with those tasks. I am not sure 
whether this is a desirable phenomena O^ursing Officer). 
From the standpoint ofthe frontline staff and supervisors, many ofthem thought 
that cost control policies were carried out inconsistently and thus created a lot of 
8 Since many ofthe manual duties have been automated or contracted out, some hospitals tried to re-
train the workmen to become the Health Care Assistants. The HCA will take up the simple nursing 
duties so to reduce the workload of the nursing staff. 
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misunderstandings and conflicts among different working units, and between the 
frontline staff and the patients. A hospital administrator reported the following: 
Can somebody really tell what is waste and how to measure it? I think it all 
depends on the senior management's preference. For example, when they 
announced that there were too many administrative and supporting staff, we 
have to cut the manpower. Worse still, they usually cut the working hands and 
not the senior staff. I think that they only care about the number of staffthan the 
amount of budget to be cut. Can anyone say how the manpower plan is drafted 
and how to judge whether it is a reasonable one or not (Hospital Administrator). 
Another manager in the Allied Health queried how the manpower plan and 
staffing figures were defined: 
There are mmors that our hospital will transfer 20-25% of the manpower to 
another new hospital. Does it mean that our hospital has been over-staff for that 
number? Where is the waste? No one knows how the figures are worked out 
(Manager, Allied Health). 
Indeed the efficiency and the cost-effective concepts might be something odd in 
the public hospital services. From the business point of view, the services were 
definitely a "money losing" business. In some special clinical areas, such as the 
hospice care for the terminally ill patients, the government puts in resources but it is 
almost definite that the patients, health status would not be improved as a result. If 
the managerial concepts are applied uncritically, the HA should not provide such 
services. Many of the public services are of the same nature. It is difficult to justify 
whether the resource input really brings along measurable benefit. 
Due to the contested nature of the "efficiency" concept, it is rather difficult to 
judge whether the HA is more efficient than before. It depends on what criteria 
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people are using. Deborah A. Stone (1988) remarks that efficiency analyses are 
political claims, "[B]y offering different assumptions, sides in a conflict can portray 
their preferred different outcomes as being most efficient" (p.53). 
After the HA was established, it has successfully increased its market share in 
the patient care services,^ at least the statistics so reflect. Unlike the administrative 
reform in the West where most of the reformed organization rolled back their scale in 
service provision; the HA went in the opposite direction. New hospitals were 
constructed, different kinds of primary, secondary and tertiary/extended care services 
were developed and the number of staff was also increased.^^ 
With an affluent organizational context, especially during the initial years, made 
the staff less conscious about the pressure to be efficient. In fact, it is the "economy" 
rather than the "efficiency" concept that prevails in most of the public organizations. 
Re-conceptualizing Flexibility 
Under the new managerial thought, the idea of "flexibility" is used to break the 
bureaucratic inefficiencies. However, flexibility can be a dangerous concept. 
Flexibility is dangerous particularly when the idea is judged by power instead of 
reason. 
Under the current management system, to ensure a higher degree of flexibility, 
rules and regulations could be overridden and modified if the case is well justified. 
9 The Hospital Authority was taking care of90.2% and 90.5% of the in-patient workload in 1991 and 
1992 respectively. The HA did not mention about the actual market share in its recent Annual Reports. 
I have checked out some statistics for comparison, the number of in-patient treated, accident and 
emergency attendance and specialist out-patient attendance were 647,742; 1,288,995 and 4,120,238, 
respectively in 1991 when the HA was first established. The numbers in the three categories were 
increased to 966,000; 2,139,000 and 7,102,000, respectively in 1997. See the Hospital Authority 
Business Plan 1992-1993 and the Hospital Authority Annual Plan 1998-1999. 
10 According to the official statistics, the number ofstaffwas increased from 37,000 in December 1991 
to 48,452 in 1998/99. See the Hospital Authority Annual Plan 1998-1999. 
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However, the tricky point is what should be regarded as “well justified." Even for the 
senior administrators, they did not deny it was something rather subjective. As a 
senior administrator pointed out: 
It is difficult to judge whether something is reasonable or not. Reasoning could 
be something abstract. Especially for affairs in the clinical areas, we may not 
possess the required knowledge to judge and to challenge. If the unit heads or 
the Chiefs of Service (COS) are willing to write the justification, we probably 
would accept that. Our role is to ensure that procedurally they have done the 
right thing (Hospital Administrator). 
In public organizations, management are required to follow the standard 
procedures in order to ensure procedural faimess and accountability. It is at best what 
the management can do. Here we can see that "flexibility" was determined by 
whether the proper procedures had been carried out or not, which had very little to do 
with reason. According to the hospital administrators, legality and fairness were 
achieved ifthe required procedures were followed. 
Re-coding Participation 
The HA deliberately wants to build up a public image of openness. When 
compared with the old system, the management style of the HA is definitely more 
open than before. More information are made available now. Public participation and 
the complaint system are also improved. At least the HA will report medical incidents 
to the public. Community members are appointed to oversee the management of the 
hospitals and the HA. Internally, the HA encourages decentralization and delegation 
of authority, open and participatory management style. Frontline staff and managers 
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take up an important role in reporting the public's feedback and making suggestions to 
improve the services. 
Some interviewees agreed that communication and cooperation among different 
disciplines were improved with the implementation of the “clinical management 
team" concept. While many ideas and rapid changes were introduced, especially at 
the operational level, the top management knew that they had to involve their staff in 
order to make changes possible. But does it mean that previous authoritative 
hierarchy is dismantled? The stories below may provide some hints to the question. 
A Medical Officer shared with me his experience in attending a meeting held by 
the senior hospital management. He said: 
The attendants were largely people holding senior posts in the hospital, there 
were only a few frontline staff. The senior managers took tum to report their 
work and progress to the Hospital ChiefExecutive (HCE). They had pre-defmed 
agenda items. As a floor participant, I could give my opinion and ask questions. 
However, the Board members would just write down the questions. They did 
not give me any concrete answers. Although on paper it states that all staff are 
welcome, I feel that I was not welcomed (Medical Officer). 
This Medical Officer also pointed out that there was serious communication 
problem between the top management and the front line staff. He complained that the 
hospital top management imposed unrealistic tasks and targets on them without 
considering their real working situation. He protested that: 
Those people at the top do not know what is going on at the frontline. This 
group of people, they leam the hospital affairs by reading reports in their air-
conditioned offices. They open their eyes and ears only to their supervisor and 
people whom they regarded as ‘peers,’ but definitely not to the frontline. The 
HCE and the senior management have not come down to the ward for more than 
a year (Medical Officer). 
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According to this Medical Officer and some other interviewees, meetings and 
the consultation process in the HA were largely ceremonial. They were gestures of 
the top management to legitimate their decisions. The top management was not 
prepared to discuss anything not on the agenda, nor would they accept any challenges 
to the authoritative status of the top management. 
Access to information and the power to make decisions may be the common 
yardsticks for staff participation. Most of the interviewees agreed that there were 
more information available nowadays. However, they also noticed the problem of 
"information explosion." An interviewee reported that: 
I think I have been overloaded with information, there are too many e-mails to 
read, too many memos and reports to go over. I am given a lot of information, 
but just do not know which is important to me. I do not have the time and 
energy to absorb them all. Frankly, I just selectively scan some of them, I might 
have missed out something important (Senior Clerk). 
Many interviewees I contacted said that they were in equally helpless situations 
even when they had the "official" information on hand. Since official papers usually 
show the positive side ofthe story but they may not be the whole picture. Except for a 
few technical areas and working procedures, they provide little help for decision 
making and action. As a matter of fact, official reports seldom describe the hidden 
problem of an organization and the real intention of the top management. As they 
reported, "being informed has nothing to do with the final outcome." 
For staff who were nominated as representatives to the task force and working 
groups, they also reported that they were merely physically present in the meetings. 
Whether they had a role to play depended on a number of factors. The membership 
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composition and the attitude of some senior staff were two particularly important 
factors. An interviewee reported that: 
It depend on who are involved in the group. The posts and ranks of the 
individuals would determine their role and the degree of participation. 
Sometimes I think the value of my presence is only to "support" the decision of 
some dominant figures (Hospital Administrator). 
The interviewee also stressed that people in the HA were "trained" to be 
conscious about each other's rank and post. The “positional” authority was more 
influential than "reasoning." Open and participatory management became a kind of 
“formality” in the HA, a kind of token to foster cooperative working relationship. The 
hierarchical structure still exerted great control over major decision making. 
Reinforcing Medical Dominance 
Another senior manager observed that even when teamwork and participatory 
management were encouraged, the hierarchical structure of the HA remained intact. 
What this manager referred to was the authority of the medical profession. He pointed 
out that “even when teamwork is stressed, please do not forget that they (doctors) are 
the leaders, and we are led by them." 
It is true that the medical staff generally are now more approachable and friendly 
than before. However, it does not mean that their power is being checked or 
diminished. Even the Harvard Consultancy Report (1999) recognizes the problem of 
medical dominance in Hong Kong. 
The HA's plans to decentralize and delegate authority to the hospital and to the 
clinical unit did not affect the dominant status of the medical profession. Except for a 
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few convalescent and rehabilitation hospitals/institutions, all Hospital Chief 
Executives (HCEs) are from the medical profession. The HCE and the Chief of 
Services (COS) ofindividual clinical unit have real control over resource allocation. 
A doctor, however, defended the authoritative status of the medical profession 
as follows: 
We do not intend to dominate all the decision making processes. It is the 
organizational structure that put us in such a position. Frankly speaking, if other 
staff can make good decisions, it will save our time and energy for some other 
tasks. However, the staff do notjust consult us for our opinions, they also want 
us to give instructions. Staff are too reliant on the medical profession to make 
the final decision (Medical Officer). 
Some interviewees noted that even though many people thought that the medical 
profession was too powerful, few people would be explicitly opposed to the medical 
profession. In short, the authoritative manner of the medical profession were both 
structurally embedded and reinforced by the participants in the organization. 
Hood (1991) thinks that the new managerial movement introduces professional 
managers to balance the professional power. Nevertheless, such a scenario was not 
found in the HA. Most ofthe hospital administrators reported that they had only very 
minimal role in balancing and counter-checking the medical authority. The best that 
they could do was to ensure that the doctors had followed the required procedures. 
But this can hardly check the power of the medical profession, who still predominates 
in important decision making. 
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Re-configuring the “Patient Centered，，Concept 
The "patient centered" services is an often cited concept in the HA documents. 
The concept has been regarded as the foundation of the HA's new organizational 
culture. This concept sounds so good and correct that no people would really oppose 
to its application. 
Like many other concepts, few people could really describe what this really 
means. To many of the staff, they associated the concept with rather "superficial" 
things, like better hospital environment, more courteous staff attitudes, the Patient 
Charter and the complaint system. Other staff used another set of terminology to 
explain the concept, like "efficiency care" and "continuous quality improvement" 
(CQI) which could be anything or nothing. 
As previously discussed, the HA introduced a lot of changes to the service to 
realize this concept. From the stand of the frontline staff, they generally supported the 
concept since they understood it was what the public demanded. Moreover, the client-
centered and holistic care concepts were increasingly stressed in most of the 
professional health care disciplines. 
However, the frontline staff also highlighted the constraints in putting this idea 
into action. In practice, the "patient-centered" concept contradicted with other 
managerial values, and also increased the direct conflicts between the frontline staff 
and the patients. 
Under the HA's cost control policy, the frontline medical staff have the 
responsibilities to ensure that the most cost-effective treatment is used. But this 
practice might be in conflict with the patient's own preference. Below are two 
examples to show the conflicts encountered by the doctors: 
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To reduce cost, if the effects of two drugs are similar, I am supposed to 
prescribe the cheaper one. From the management's perspective, the action is 
well justified. But from the patients' stand, if the patients have taken the drug 
for a period oftime, they prefer to have the same drug. Sometimes, it is difficult 
to convince the patients. . • . I don't think it is my responsibility to explain in 
details about the cost issue. Indeed, I feel very embarrassed to tell my patients 
that I change the drug because it is cheaper than other drugs (Medical Officer). 
Another Senior Medical Officer told an even more conflicting situation, he 
reported that it was something increasingly common in the daily operation: 
Everyday I encounter some patients who are referred to our Specialist Out-
patient Department (SOPD) by the private General Practitioner (GP) for some 
expensive investigations, like the Computerized Axial Tomography (CAT) scan. 
From my professional judgement, I do not think that patients need the 
examinations. However, patients would "question" and sometimes "argue" with 
me why they could not have the investigation. In my experience, it is rather 
difficult to convince the patients. However, they have been pre-occupied with 
the concept that they could have it done in the public hospitals. When I insisted 
that they did not need the investigation, some patients would query I have mis-
managed their illness. Some might even go to the Patient Relation Officer to 
file a complaint against me. And the hospital nowadays is very serious with 
patients' complaints. It would be remarked in the staffs personal record. As a 
result, in order to avoid trouble, some doctors might simply go along with the 
patients' request (Senior Medical Officer). 
The HA's cost control over services induced many direct conflicts between the 
frontline staff and patients which have adversely affected the staff-patient rapport. 
Another commonly quoted example is the refusal of the patients to transfer to the 
convalescent hospital since they thought that the facilities in acute hospitals are better 
and the hospital locations are more convenient for their relatives. For most ofthe time 
it is not something right or wrong but competing demands over the limited resources. 
As a matter of fact, the patient load has been increasing in all the HA hospitals. The 
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high working pressure put the frontline staff in a rather difficult situation. As an 
interviewee describes: 
for patients I have contacted, most of them were reasonable and they would 
accept our explanation. Last year, I had 1,700 new outpatients, about 5% of 
them were pretty unreasonable. In other words, I needed to spend time on 90 
patients for explanations that did not contribute to the overall service quality. 
Nowadays we keep spending time for the sake of respecting the patient right. I 
agree that giving explanation to patients and their relatives are part of our 
responsibilities. But the heavy workload makes it more and more difficult for us 
to do so (Senior Medical Officer). 
The same Senior Medical Officer continued: 
Nowadays, you do not know what the patients would do if they were dissatisfied. 
We are lucky if they go through the proper complaining channel. Then we still 
can check what indeed goes wrong. Today, it would be more common for them 
to forward the complaint directly to the mass media. I think the patients have 
abused the mass media. At the same time some mass media tend to exaggerate 
the incidents and distort the whole picture (Senior Medical Officer). 
Other interviewees also confirmed that doctors nowadays were more willing to 
give explanations and to respect patients' personal feelings and preferences on the 
treatment. Staff attitude towards the patients and relatives improved a lot too. 
However, many of them did not deny that they would give up their own stance when 
facing demanding patients. It was because once the patient filed a complaint against 
the staff, it would be recorded in the staffs personnel record regardless of whether the 
complaint is valid. This "trouble" avoiding attitude not only waste the public hospital 
resources, but also affect the resources available to other patients. To the frontline 
working staff, they thought that the hospital top management seldom offered sufficient 
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support to them to realize the "patient-centered" concept. The HA had unjustly put 
two competing concepts on them. 
Although it seems that much has been done to realize the "patient-centered" 
concept, there is no fundamental change in the structured power relationship, 
especially the relationship between the medical profession and the general public. 
Despite the strengthened complaint channel, it is still very difficult to initiate legal 
proceedings on the medical incidents. It is questionable whether the mentioned 
changes implies a fundamental change in attitude, or are merely behavioral changes to 
avoid troubles. 
Manipulating and Re-presenting Numbers 
One observable change about the HA organizational reform is its reliance on the 
scientific data (statistics) for service planning and reporting. Particularly, the 
organization was quoting different output statistics to justify its performance: the 
number of project/program completed, the number of patients treated, attendance, 
utilization rate and satisfaction rate, etc. The number and the statistics seem to be 
scientific and objective in nature, and most people accept them without doubt. People 
generally believe that numeric values reflect the factual side of the organization. 
Again, these statistics are also a kind of human construct. They are created myth in 
the organization. Stone remarks that measurement with numbers are political rather 
than neutral in nature, the choice on measures depends on the purpose for measuring, 
and the number itself is "a gesture of authority." (1988: 137) 
Objective Means or Political Ends? 
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As managerialism stresses on performance and the relationship between input 
and output, measuring becomes an important activity in the organization. The original 
purpose of measuring is to collect objective data to "describe" what has been done, 
and to make forecast about the future. Measurement itself involves the application of 
objective tools. 
In real situations, measuring activities is rarely objective. Behind the choice of 
the measuring tools are often hidden political intentions, either to prove or to disprove 
something. Indeed the "intentions" behind would determine the choice on measuring 
tools and thus the final "results". The same things happened in the HA managerial 
reform. Each department needed to report performance and to justify itself for the 
next year's funding. The HA assumed that counting by definition was objective, but 
in reality, different departments picked up their own definition and unit of counting. 
A medical officer reported that in reporting the workload for a particular cardiac 
investigation, some hospitals used "patient" as a unit of measure; but other hospitals 
used "artery" as the unit of measure thus over-representing the workload. The HA 
indeed has tried to standardize the unit of measurement, but when measuring involved 
a purpose, the purpose determined how the phenomenon would be measured. 
With the known purpose of measuring, people tend to manipulate the data to 
meet such a target. For example, the length of stay in hospital is selected as a criteria 
to assess the quality of clinical care provided, the shorter the length of stay means the 
quality ofcare is good and the use ofhospital resources is efficient. On the other hand, 
the longer the length of stay might reflect problematic clinical management and the 
waste of hospital resources. Once this kind of official interpretation was established, 
people tend to "establish" and "manipulate the data" to meet the official target. I was 
told that one simple way to do so was to admit patients for minor operations or 
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investigations, since these patients only stayed for one or two days, they would help to 
lower the average length of stay ofthe total patients. Thus the statistics looked good, 
but in fact it was wasting the hospital resources. 
However, it should be noted that the "length of stay" could be used to present a 
picture of helplessness. Some units argued that the longer length of stay reflected 
patients' degree of dependency. The longer the stay would mean the higher the 
dependency, thus the need for more manpower, facilities and resources. 
Many interviewees likewise pointed out that admission rate, discharge rate and 
many other reported statistics could be manipulated to meet the official objectives and 
targets. With the recognized meaning behind the agreed standards, the management 
would keep check on the statistics and make sure they were "adjusted" to meet those 
standards. 
The New Case Waiting Time: Using Management Solutions to Political Problems 
The mass media once criticized that the new case waiting time for the specialist 
out-patient clinic was too long. The HA faced a lot of political pressure to shorten the 
new case waiting time for the first consultation appointment. Both the government 
and the HA presented the problem as if it could be improved by better management. 
Actually, when the public demand was high and without additional resources, the HA 
indeed was just using a management solution to a political problem. Some of the 
interviewees explained how the problem was managed: 
Without additional resources, do you really think that we could shorten the new 
waiting time? The way we managed the problem was to average out the 
resources for all the cases. It was simple mathematics. . . . Simply looking at 
the official statistics, we could announce that we have successfully “managed” 
the waiting time. However, each patient shares less resource as a result. Even 
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worse, when the waiting time has been shortened, it would keep those who 
originally planned to see the private general practitioner to stay in the services, 
such a "solution" only worsened the real situation and endlessly increased the 
workload (Senior Medical Officer). 
When management solution (managing the waiting time) is used to deal with a 
political problem (shortage ofresources and high service demand), everyone will be a 
loser in the long run. It is because the patients will receive less care and attention, 
and the staffwill be overloaded as a result. Although the statistics look good, it does 
not mean that patients are better off and receive quality care. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the decision to measure, the objects and 
criteria of measurement are controlled in the hands of the top management, people 
who are supposed to be accountable for the performance of the organization. I was 
told that some hospitals had constantly conducted staff satisfaction surveys to monitor 
the working morale and staff relationship. Soon the management found that the 
staffs utmost concern was about manpower allocation. When the resources were 
increasingly tight, the hospital management knew that it was difficult to settle the 
staffs dissatisfaction. Finally the hospital management chose not to conduct studies 
that would generate unfavorable findings. 
As Stone (1988) points out "pS[o] number is innocent for it is impossible to 
count without making judgements about categorization. Thus, every number is a 
political claim about ‘where to draw the line., Projections, correlations, simulations, 
and every other fancy manipulation of numbers all rest on the decisions about 
similarities and differences. And similarities and differences are the ultimate basis for 




In this chapter, I examine the HA managerial reform from the participants' 
perspective. In a lively manner, the participants told what they had experienced and 
how they had been reacting to the reform. Through their eyes, these participants 
helped de-mystify the managerial cultural change in the HA. There are several major 
findings. 
The participants received mixed signals about the organizational structural 
change. Instead ofkeeping the organization slim and small, and making work simple, 
the participants perceived that the reform had happened in multiple and mixed 
directions. There were de-bureaucratization as well as bureaucratization in the 
organizational processes. 
Second, the managerial reform did not happen in a vacuum. The old institutions, 
conventions, group norms were still prevailing, and constituted an important reference 
framework within which the participants sought meanings and solutions for 
organization activities. Unlike what the rational economic man model suggests, rarely 
would organizational participants make decisions that were independent of the 
organizational context. 
Third, whereas the new managerial reform stresses that organizational 
performance can be improved by introducing new incentive mechanisms, we found 
that they were so far of limited use in the HA. Even with the new incentive 
mechanisms, few managers were "willing" to adopt it, again the old practice 
dominated. 
More importantly, the design of new incentives are based on the rational 
assumption that individuals are self-interested utility maximizers. The participants 
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pointed out some negative consequences of the system. Although the negative 
consequences does not negate the validity of the public choice approach totally, the 
fundamental question is why design an incentive structure to induce self-interested 
behavior in the first place? Instead, the problem calls for the revitalization of 
normative mles to construct a viable administrative order. 
Fourth, the HA managerial reform introduced a set of terminology to 
communicate the new ideology and meaning to its members. However, despite the 
fact that the terms carries official meaning within the formal organizational structure, 
they provide little meaning to the frontline staff. Rather people jointly sought the 
meaning from their reference groups, revised and recreated new meanings that are 
applicable and fit into their working context. 
Fifth, quantitative analysis and statistics were widely used to report organization 
performance. The use of statistics was seen as an objective tool to report 
organizational output and to describe the fact. In real application, statistics are rarely 
objective. Data collection, analysis and interpretation involves a process of selection 
(ofcategories) and manipulation which are political in nature. 
The danger of the new managerialism is its deductive nature. It reduces 
complex and political problems to simple management issues. Problems are re-
defined in simple causal relations among a few discrete variables. Thus it only yields 
short term (short-sighted) and piecemeal solutions to those problems. 
These findings show that organizational life is better explained by the 
institutional and cultural model than the rational economic man model. Individuals 
are social as well as cultural beings. The rational choice and its economic man model 
are of limited applicability to the public sector. Its stress on methodological 
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individualism is unrealistic to real organizational life. It is fundamentally flawed in its 




The objective of this thesis is to expose the limitations of the rational-actor model, 
on which the New Public Management is based to reform the public administration. By 
studying the reform ofHong Kong's hospital system, the thesis argues that understanding 
and explaining administrative behavior in the public sector calls for a reorientation 
towards institution-cum-culture as it provides a more meaningful cue to how an 
organization actually works and how an organization life is nourished. 
Administrative reforms since the 1980s have been overwhekningly casted in the shadow 
of New PubHc Management in most of the developed and developing countries. Despite 
the criticisms that there is nothing much new when considering also the classical pubHc 
administtation theories prevalent in the first thtee decades of the centuty, the NPM has been 
successful to gain wide currency in the inteUectual world as weU as the poMcal world. In 
fact, the socio-poKtical environment nearing the 1980s did provide a fettdle seed-bed for its 
currency. The stringent financial contingency coupled with an ever-increasing demand for 
better goods and services in the society gave no room for welfare states (mostly in European 
continent) and minimal governments ^ke that of United States of America and Hong Kong) 
aHke to resist reforms. Given its inteUectual Hneage, the potent chaUenge posed by NPM is 
less about reforms of pubHc administration than reforms against pubHc administration that 
is criticized to be too bureaucratic, inflexible, and unresponsive. 
NPM tends to endorse an economic view of human behavior, especially the one 
embodied in such economic schools of thought as public choice theories and principal-
agent model. Be they politicians，bureaucrats or citizens, human beings are primarily 
explained to be rational actors striving to maximize their individualistic utilities. 
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Rationality, individualism and maximization form the cornerstone of NPM philosophy. 
And given such rational-actor philosophy, the polis is made equivalent to market. By 
running the government like business, the NPM puiports to bring government business 
closer to citizens, now reconceptualized as clients, customers and consumers, whilst 
rendering the society no less democratic in the name of consumer sovereignty. A whole 
set of managerial reform measures is thus developed to reform against public 
administration, primarily geared to eliminating the "public" nature of administration. 
The case of Hong Kong's Hospital Authority best illustrates the point. The Scott 
Report in 1985 attributes the managerial problems in the hospital system to bureaucratic 
pathologies. Reform measures in the spirit of NPM are taken to be the cure. Reforms 
kick off by having the authority structure changed. The public choice idea that hospital 
sendees can be less “public” in essence logically leads reformers to choose to bring the 
Hong Kong hospital management system under the HA, a statutory body instead of a 
traditional government department. The HA then carry out measures to reconfigure its 
authority relationship with all hospitals under its jurisdiction and set corporate visions to 
guide how these hospitals should be managed internally. For the sake of economic 
management, hospital administrators are made more cost-conscious in the delivery of 
hospital services. Different performance-related measures derived from an assumption 
that line employees are rational and self-seeking in the organization are adopted to 
empower the management to exercise control and monitoring functions in a more 
effective manner. Performance standards are to be set by employees themselves, but all 
consequences arising from success or failure in fulfilling them are to be bome by 
themselves, too. This new responsibility system allows management to solve the 
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problem of information asymmetry, i.e. dominance by the agent (the line employees in 
the hospital) as outlined in the principal-agent model. Incentive system is also installed 
to distinguish, channel, and then reward those individual employees' interests that are 
deemed beneficial to the organizational goal, and punish those that are not. Many more 
procedural devices made available from the advance of information technology are 
introduced to reform the financial report system in the hospitals. Most fundamental of 
all, reformers find it necessary to open up the black-box government bureaucracy by 
assigning patients a more visible role to play in the delivery of hospital services. The 
consumer orientation of the NPM boils down to patients，rights and its assertion is 
expedient in delimiting the self-seeking pursuit of individual employees with market 
voices and demand. 
Although it might be too early to conclude and give a final verdict on whether the 
Scott-initiated reforms are successM, it is still fair to point out that the reforms have 
misfired in some important aspects. This failure, if any at all, lies with the inherent 
inadequacies in the philosophy ofNPM. Reformers inspired by the NPM often fail to 
recognize the limitation ofthe economic view ofhuman behavior; they are all trapped in 
the intellectual development of "economic imperialism”. Polis is, after all, different 
from market in most important aspects. Individual behavior cannot be wholly explained 
in terms of a rational structure ofthinking, an indogenous self-interested preference, and 
a maximization strategy of computational choice. Individual behavior in the public 
administration can even be less so. Applying the economic rational-actor model to 
explain public administration behavior will blind researchers from some more meaningful 
dimensions of organizational life, and, even worst, misguide reformers to a wrong 
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diagnosis whilst perpetuating and reinforcing problematic administrative behavior. 
To illustrate the limitations ofthe NPM and its rational-actor explanation, this thesis 
draws lessons from Spencer Zifcak's research and undertakes participant observation and 
interviews to discover the more meaningful administrative behavior and organization life 
in Hong Kong's hospitals. Specifically, it is found that institutions and culture can give 
more powerful explanatory utility. Institutions do not simply denote formal rules and 
regulations laid down by HA. In fact, HA does not start on a clean slate. Hospitals 
and the professions have developed their modus operandi well before the setting-up of 
HA. They have their institutional memories and history unsusceptible and even 
resistant to changes imposed by the HA in the name of NPM. The informal ways of 
managing and delivering hospital services constitute the cognitive images and cultural 
identities ofthe line employees, to such a significant extent that reform measures going 
contrary to these are only received on a conditional, and sometimes half-heartedly, ifnot 
totally distorted fashion. 
The findings as a whole revealed the importance of historical institutions and 
organization culture in understanding organization life. Organizational history, 
conventional practices and group norms form an important reference frame for decision 
making. Inside the organizations, most decisions (choices) were made on a collective 
ratherthanindividualbasis. The managerial ideas were communicated to the 
participants through a set of official language and terminology. As a matter of fact, they 
provide little meaning to the frontline participants, rather the participant sought meaning 
from their own reference groups, whose members jointly revised and gave new meaning 




Examples of culture-driven behavior abound in the hospitals. In measuring 
performance, there have been "automatic increment rather than judgmental increment", 
"team work rather than individual work", “faddish performance rather than substantive 
performance". In adopting the promotion by merit principle, some staff reported they 
have been "frustrated by merit rather than induced by merit", and under most of the 
circumstances, there have been “satisfying selection rather than maximizing choice of 
candidates". Concepts like "efficiency", "effectiveness" and "participation" have been 
reinterpreted and re-conceptualized. All these serve to highlight the fact that the 
relationship between HA and hospitals on the one hand, and the management ofhospitals 
and the line employees therein on the other, are more complex than that is conceptualized 
and explained by the public choice theory and the principal-agent model In a word, 
hospitals are not entities operating like a mechanical system, no matter how bureaucratic 
they may be. 
This thesis does not attempt to denunciate in toto the merits of NPM and 
delegitimize all its managerial reform measures. Like all other preceding public 
administrative reform ideas like Taylorism, NPM in some disguised forms may be here to 
stay for some time to come; that will be the case in Hong Kong's hospital system. For 
reforms of public administration to be effective, however, reformers need to fully 
recognize and capture the critical importance of non-economic, non-/ir-rational, non-
individualistic, and non-maximization behavior exhibiting in and shaping the workings of 
a public organization. 
There are several implications when managerialism is applied to the public sector. 
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First, the danger of new managerialism is its reductionist nature. It reduces complex 
social and political problems to simple management issues. Problems are reduced to 
simple causal relationship among a few discrete variables that are detached from the 
organizational contexts. The acontextual nature of problem definition would only bring 
along piecemeal management solution. 
Second, to separate public management functions totally from political 
functions is neither realistic nor desirable. The political (public) values and purposes 
constitute important reference frames which give meaning to the daily activities ofpublic 
organizations. The stresses on the management (technical) efficiency could hardly 
provide any satisfactory answer to social and political ills. 
Third, the economic man model suggests the use of incentive mechanisms to 
link individual behavior to organizational performance. Such a measure encourages 
selfish behavior from people. Thus selfishness, instead of being the universal 
unchanging human nature, is merely the self-fulfilling prophecy arising from the 
ontological assumption of a social science theory. Philosophically, it brings conflicting 
values to the public sector. In the public domain, we encourage collective purposes and 
public interests. Selfish behavior could be dangerous to community life. 
Although managerialism emphasizes the decentralization of authority, 
participatory management, staff empowerment, in actuality it often leads to excessive 
control and regulation. The use of incentive mechanism is a means of manipulation. 
As Robert B. Denhardt remarks, "managerialism embraces a variety ofpractices that are 




Whereas the NPM stresses the use of the right management "techniques" for 
improving pubic organizations, Denhardt asserts that "pS[]othing that occurs in the public 
service is just about techniques. Everything that occurs is about values and meaning 
and significance" (1993: 266-267). Denhardt suggests an alternative approach with a 
stress on normative values\ Such an approach tries to revitalize normative values as the 
guiding and motivating principles to strike for significance in the public sector. This 
approach may appear as ‘soft, and abstract. However, many studies on organization 
culture show that ‘a commitment to values' will induce strong confirming behavior to 
organization goals. To re-state the importance of normative as well as professional 
values may indeed provide much fruitful meanings to public service practitioners, since 
these values would help to make explicit the purpose of public services and the 
requirements of public duties. 
1 In Denhardt's framework, there are five important ideas, they are: “A Commitment to 
Values"; "Service the PubUc"; "Empowerment and Shared Leadership"; "Ptagmatic 
IncrementaUsm"; and "A Dedication to PubHc Service". Please see Denhatdt, R. (1993). 
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Appendix I 
Appendix I: Profile of the Interviewees 




Interviewee 1 Nursing Officer 37 F 17 GS 
Interviewee 2 Registered Nurse 35 F 14 GS 
Interviewee 3 Nursing Officer 35 F 14 HA 
Interviewee 4 Reg isteredN u rse 30 F 12 HA 
Interviewee 5 Nursing Officer 40 M 16 GS 
Interviewee 6 Ward Manager 40+ M 22 GS 
Interviewee 7 Registered Nurse 30 F 10 HA 
Interviewee 8 Registered Nurse 33 F 14 HA 
Interviewee 9 Nursing Officer 37 F 18 HA 
Interviewee 10 Senior Nursing Officer 40+ M 20 HA 
Interviewee 11 Senior Nursing Officer 50+ M 30+ GS 
Medical Staff 
Interviewee 12 Medical Officer 30 M 8 HA 
Interviewee 13 Medical Officer 27 M 8 HA 
Interviewee 14 Senior Medical Officer 36 M 12 HA 
Interviewee 15 Senior Medical Officer 37 M 12 HA 
Interviewee 16 Chief of Service 50+ M 30 HA 
Interviewee 17 Senior Medical Officer 40+ M 40+ HA 
Allied Health 
Interviewee 18 Radiologist I 29 F 8 HA 
Interviewee 19 Department Manager 40+ M 20+ HA 
Interviewee 20 Senior Manager 50+ M 30+ HA 
Interviewee 21 Department Manager 40+ M 20+ HA 
Administratin and Supporting Services 
Interviewee 22 Manager 30+ F 5 HA 
Interviewee 23 Hosptial Administrator I 30+ F 15 HA 
Interviewee 24 Hosptial Administrator I 28 F 6 HA 
Interviewee 25 Secretary 20+ F 4 HA 
Interviewee 26 Manager 30+ M 15 HA 
Interviewee 27 Senior Hospital Administrator 50+ M 30+ HA 
Interviewee 28 Senior Hospital Administrator 40+ M 20 HA 
Interviewee 29 Senior Clerk 40+ M 25 HA 
Interviewee 30 Manager 40+ M 7 HA 
Key: 
Employment Terms: GS = Government Servant; HA = Hospital Authority 
163 
- : � T t V ::.: .�� . :::“.. .-. . ‘‘ 々 、 ： Y T " ^ ^ j f ; f l f A ^ ^ F ^ y ; ( 7 ^ i 
: ¾ ' ¾ " ¾ ^ ' . 1 " ' . . - : ’ H ' "， t A y � ^ , ? t l � r � ; : , � “ - : , 1 
.,•::.:.."..•- • •• J " : � � ” ’ ^ 
.T. ••- : ::-. ‘ . . . . - ... I I ：、％•* / . ’ r: 
] . : . : . . � � ’ h . __ . 
. “ ‘ ' • , . ••-, . , � . : : . . . • t. •； • .,:,、:..:、:":：…； -...:,:• •• 
_ ‘ , .. '•• . •. • 
i . .: “ - - •“ ., 
• 
,; ， . 
. •• • • . 
»'••• ,. 
.. _ � 
.1 . . j J . • ‘ ‘ . . , 
‘ . , . • •‘， ，. 
, . • - • , ‘ ^ ’ ： 
', • ,'. • • •• . ：;,.: . . . ‘ .. ” ‘ " ‘ (1 U 
• . = • •.』 . • , 、 . - . . ‘ , '^'>，'）,、与： 
了 - .. 广..-.:: • . . 、 ' ： . " . ‘ . … . … . - 『 ： .:、产 工'\'《〔"々 喜、'、二: 、• - '•' .:. -, ' ‘ .::.,::: ：^;¾'':^":>.,:-^' „:,:^ s^ /' .：；'!:^v-,fDl^.'->i‘^  ;^.-¾¾'M)iA;sfe.i.3.....__..._...—......_._...... ，.—: 
CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
圓丨圓圓_11111 
•OBfiOBbAB 
